Russia's new assertiveness in the Central
Asian geopolitical theater has been frequently
noticed and analyzed in the past few years.
Moscow's national-security strategy, summed up by
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in an article in
the Wall Street Journal in January ("Russia must
be strong"), can be directly correlated with
Russian strategic and economic interests in the
broad area encompassing the South Caucasus, the
Caspian Sea and the Central Asian republics.
Ivanov's guidelines Ivanov's
article effectively highlights Russia's strategic
priorities and appears marked by a pragmatic,
history-based assessment
of
Moscow's security needs. "Russia must be strong"
is a title and a program at the same time.
"National security is a crucial task for
Russia, a country so greatly endowed with
territory and natural resources," the text reads.
"Our military strategy is, therefore, focused on
creating the ability to respond to the external,
internal and cross-border challenges of the 21st
century." In other words: history and geography
force Russia to project its power beyond its
national borders in order to be a stable and
relevant global power, whereby the area from the
Black Sea to Kyrgyzstan assumes a vital strategic
and economic-security role.
What is
particularly interesting is Ivanov's (and the
Kremlin's) focus on being "prepared for the
possibility of a violent assault on the
constitutional order of some post-Soviet states
and the border instability that might ensue from
that". Hence Moscow is obliged to "consider the
implications of the so-called 'uncertainty factor'
as well as of the high level of existing threats".
This concept is very clearly explained by
Ivanov himself: "By uncertainty we mean a
political or military-political conflict or
process that has a potential to pose a direct
threat to Russia's security, or to change the
geopolitical reality in a region of Russia's
strategic interest. Our top concern is the
internal situation in some members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], the club
of former Soviet republics, and the regions around
them."
This is a classic example of how
great powers perceive potential threats to their
"sphere of influence". Possible interference in
smaller states' internal situations gets justified
by security goals. The enhancing of regional
military-strategic dominance also has political
ends - possibly even reshaping the domestic
political environments of minor powers to suit the
great powers' interests.
Moreover,
Ivanov's argument is totally consistent with
previous Russian strategic concepts. On October 9,
2003, during a press conference in Yekaterinburg,
Ivanov stated that "Russia reserves the right to
intervene militarily in the CIS states".
Some observers noted at the time how
closely reminiscent such a statement was of those
made by Leonid Brezhnev during the 1968
Czechoslovakia crisis.
Moscow's doctrine
as expounded by Ivanov (thus encompassing a
"political process") suggests that further
pro-Western, liberal-inspired social and political
changes in CIS countries, such as those
experienced by Georgia or Kyrgyzstan in the past
two years, may well be considered unacceptable for
Russian regional-security interests.
Geopolitical structures To put
it briefly, present-day geopolitical structures
explain why Central Asia and the Caspian Sea will
be affected by this Russian doctrine. These
regions are crucial to Moscow's military security
and control over fossil resources, and at the same
time they are increasingly marked by four
fundamental drivers. The first two are the basic
geopolitical orientations of the former Soviet
republics, which could be visualized as mutually
opposing forces.
One force links the
republics to the "heartlandic", Russian-led
geostrategic realm because of historic and
geographical reasons; the other, originating from
US strategic goals and national fears of Russian
hegemony, connects them to the US-led, maritime,
Euro-Atlantic realm. [1] This opposition makes
political influence and military might in the
broader region the geopolitical prize in a renewed
Russo-US competition.
The other two
drivers are definitely newer. One is the CIS
countries' aspiration to self-determine their
foreign policy and energy management, and the
other is the increasingly influential role of
Beijing.
More than one observer has
labeled this context a "new great game". From the
Russian point of view, political instability in
the region can thus constitute either a threat -
as it can be instrumentalized by Russia's
adversaries - or a window of opportunity, as in
the case of Abkhazi separatism in Georgia, which
might be encouraged by Moscow to weaken a pro-US
nation.
Relations with China in the region
are also complex. Moscow and Beijing seem to
cooperate when it comes to making sure that US
military presence will not be permanent (as was
the case with Uzbekistan last year). Likewise, the
two powers have increased their collaboration
within the context of the SCO (Shanghai
Cooperation Organization). Creating a more
integrated economic and security framework in
Central Asia could ensure the rise of a
Sino-Russian strategic partnership in Eurasia.
However, China and Russia appear to be
competing for influence in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan - and especially in the former,
energy-rich nation. Russian hegemony in Central
Asia is vital for President Vladimir Putin's
political strategy of using energy resources to
pressure Eastern European and South Caucasian
neighbors.
On this political and strategic
stage, the role of the Caspian Sea is crucial.
Russia's efforts to enhance its own influence over
the "big lake" are easily understood: energy
security and geostrategy appear once more tightly
linked to one another.
Last month, Russian
oil major LUKoil announced its discovery of rich
new oil deposits on the Russian Caspian shores,
after having taken over 51% of Primoryeneftegaz, a
company licensed to operate in the oil and gas
fields of Astrakhan oblast.
From the
strategic standpoint, the Caspian context is
extremely complicated. Moscow has been building up
its Caspian flotilla since the 1990s, partly
because of fears that Iran might threaten
Azerbaijani oil platforms.
However, the
Kremlin has failed to create a Russia-led
collective security structure, notwithstanding its
offers to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Washington financed Azerbaijan's and Kazakhstan's
efforts to build their own independent defense
structures in the Caspian Sea (Operation Caspian
Guard) - a move that was very negatively perceived
by Moscow.
Consequently, Moscow has
repeatedly stated its determination to enhance the
role of the "Collective Security Treaty
Organization" (CSTO). For instance, capitalizing
on shared objectives such as anti-terrorism,
Russia engaged Kazakhstan in joint naval exercises
last year. If Moscow successfully expands the
scope and influence of the CSTO, it will be able
to project its power in Central Asia more
consistently and, at the same time, it will send a
clear message to Washington and Beijing.
As Georgia and Azerbaijan - and perhaps
Kazakhstan too - are candidates to join the
Euro-Atlantic community (the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and, at a later stage, possibly the
European Union itself), Moscow's doctrine as
illustrated by Ivanov tells us that confrontation
between Russia and the United States in Eurasia is
set to get sharper - unless a grand bargain is
reached.
Note 1. The
concept of geostrategic realms is developed by
Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics of the World
System, 2002.
Federico
Bordonaro is senior analyst with the Power and
Interest News Report. He can be contacted atfbordonaro@NOSPAMpinr.com.
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