Kazakhstan and 'the new great
game' By Federico Bordonaro
As energy-security matters gain center
stage in world affairs, Kazakhstan's geopolitical
importance is on the rise. Although its past
pro-Russian stance hasn't been abandoned, Astana
is playing a sophisticated game.
Well
aware of its key economic and geostrategic role in
Central Asia, Kazakhstan is upgrading its
partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union,
while at the same time
maintaining good relations with China and Russia.
NATO and Kazakhstan: An evolving
partnership After the breakup of the Soviet
Union, Kazakhstan's economy has attracted large
foreign investments, which coupled with rising oil
revenues have fostered a high gross domestic
product (GDP) and the introduction of economic
reforms and privatizations much appreciated by
Western financial markets.
As the largest
country in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has
progressively expanded its influence as a key
player on the regional chessboard: the United
States sees it as an indispensable ally in the
struggle against Islamist terrorism; Moscow wants
to co-opt it into a post-Soviet, Russia-led
political-economic structure; and China is
obviously reinforcing its influence in Central
Asia, both economically and strategically.
Kashagan, located in the Kazakh waters of
the Caspian Sea, is one of the major oilfield
discoveries of the past 30 years, and some
analysts maintain that it could hold anywhere from
10 billion to 30 billion barrels of crude - a
prospect that has been galvanizing the attention
of EU countries in their quest for energy
security, with increasing investments aimed to
establish a strong Euro-Kazakh partnership.
In this framework, NATO is trying to
upgrade its relationship with Kazakhstan, which
appears receptive to its offers to enhance its
security policy and independence.
January's news bulletin of the Kazakh
Embassy in Washington reported that Astana's
cooperation with NATO "will be elevated to a new
level following the preparation of an individual
partnership plan between the country and the
alliance".
"The document harmonizes all
aspects of practical interaction and dialogue
between Kazakhstan and NATO," Kazakh Defense
Minister Mukhtar Altynbaev said at a press
conference on January 13. Altynbaev made it clear
that "Kazakhstan does not have the objective of
joining NATO. However, the development of mutually
beneficial military-technical and political
cooperation with the alliance will promote
strategic security in the region and guarantee
support in tackling a broad range of pressing
issues."
Kazakhstan has in fact been a
member of a NATO-sponsored defense cooperation
initiative, the "Partnership for Peace" (PfP),
since 1994. In 2002, Kazakhstan joined the PfP
Planning and Review Process (PARP). This framework
agreement foresees that its signatories undertake
a series of economic, political and military steps
to harmonize their security and defense policies
with NATO planning, as well as making progress to
democratize the armed forces and upgrade the
state's defense capabilities.
At the 2004
NATO summit in Istanbul, international terrorism,
extremism, and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction were declared the three new major
threats to international security. To fight such
perils effectively, NATO officials clearly stated
that the strengthening of the alliance's
cooperation with Central Asian and Caucasian
states was crucial. Accordingly, NATO quickly
moved to adjust its administrative structures by
appointing a special representative for the
Caucasus and Central Asia along with two liaison
officers, one for each regional bloc.
Europe's energy security NATO
members, and especially the European states, are
in urgent need of energy security. The Caspian Sea
and Kazakhstan are therefore at the top of their
agenda, as a summit in Prague on February 24 made
very clear.
Kevin Rosner, the conference's
co-director, told the press that "the issue of
energy security, however you define it, [whether]
from a producer or consumer standpoint, is in
many, many cases the most important
national-security issue facing both alliance
members [and] partners". This is even more true
since the regular sabotage of oil pipelines in
Iraq has demonstrated how supplies can be
disrupted at source.
As a consequence,
Kazakhstan is set to play a bigger role in
Europe's energy security policy. Washington is
supplying radars to both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
to monitor security in the fossil-energy-rich
Caspian Sea, while Poland has officially called
upon NATO to play a collective role in
safeguarding its members' energy security.
The EU policy toward Kazakhstan has been
centered on the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA), signed in January 1995, which
came into force in 1999. In 2002, the two sides
extended their ties to include energy and
transport issues, establishing a new Subcommittee
on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). And in 2005,
the sixth meeting of the Cooperation Committee and
the Cooperation Council took place.
According to official EU sources, the
implementation of the PCA with Astana is becoming
"ever more important". In addition, the EU and
Kazakhstan have signed other bilateral agreements
on steel-industry policies, nuclear safety and
nuclear-fusion research.
Once virtually
unknown in Europe, Kazakhstan now sees its
prominence in the EU's geopolitical perceptions
sharply increased. Since Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan have all expressed an interest in
eventually joining the European Union, although
the process appears a long and difficult one, the
EU has come to consider Kazakhstan a geopolitical
continuation of its expanded territory, and a key
to securing the Caspian.
The new great
game While January's agreements with NATO
were aimed at boosting cooperation on science and
technology, emergency civil planning,
environmental protection and anti-terrorism, it is
obvious that Washington and Brussels are trying to
strengthen their political ties with Astana or, in
other words, to smooth the progress of
Kazakhstan's more pro-Western orientation.
Two crucial aspects are becoming evident
here. The first is that US and EU attempts to
stabilize the broader area, from the South
Caucasus to Kyrgyzstan, and promote a pro-Western
Kazakhstan in particular, are likely to come into
conflict with long-standing Russian interests in
the region. The second is that Kazakhstan's
foreign policy is aimed at maximizing its own
national interests, and not at pleasing one global
player at the expense of others.
In the
post-1991 context of the end of Russian Empire,
Moscow has shown its willingness to maintain or
restore its historically strong influence in some
vital geopolitical areas. Speaking in Yalta on May
24, 2004, President Vladimir Putin said that
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan may "sign
concrete agreements" in view of the creation of
the "Common Economic Area of the four states".
As Ukraine underwent a decidedly
pro-Western turn in December 2004, after Viktor
Yushchenko was elected president, the Russian
project may seem to have suffered a serious
setback. However, Moscow hasn't yet given up its
aim of progressively winning back as much
influence as possible in Kiev. And what is more
important, Russia has since then been determined
to reassert its influence in Eurasia (see Why Russia must be strong,
February 24).
Kazakhstan's foreign policy,
based on a careful balancing act among the
competing influences of Washington (and its EU
allies), Moscow and Beijing, indicates that the
country will strive to avoid being used by any one
actor against the others.
More
specifically, the Central Asian giant is
safeguarding its national independence and
enhancing its business opportunities by accessing
three different collective associations.
Astana is a member of both the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). By
strengthening its ties with NATO, the Kazakh
government is pursuing its plan to use
multilateral organizations to keep the superpowers
in check. While membership in the SCO and CSTO can
be effective tools to share information and engage
with China and Russia, as well as signaling to the
West that Astana's place is in Eurasia, NATO can
provide it with the right means to counterbalance
the Eurasian giants via the US and the EU.
Should such a complex policy prove
successful, Kazakhstan not only may enhance its
own national security, but it could also work as a
balancing player in the middle of "the new great
game".
Federico Bordonaro is
senior analyst with the Power and Interest News
Report. He can be contacted atfbordonaro@NOSPAMpinr.com.
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