The Sino-Russian
romance By Rian Jensen and
Erich Marquardt
This Tuesday, Russian
President Vladimir Putin is to make an official
state visit to China. Putin will arrive in time to
witness China's Year of Russia ceremony, kicking
off a year-long festival with the aim of
encouraging improved cultural relations between
the two countries.
Putin's visit to China
is further evidence of the intensifying ties
between Moscow and Beijing, with Liu Guchang, China's
ambassador to Russia,
describing the bilateral relationship in recent
days as reaching an "unprecedented high level".
Both countries find it in their strategic
interests to improve relations. This enhanced
relationship is manifest in their participation in
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the
strengthening of their military relationship,
improved economic ties, and substantial energy
commitments.
Strategic
partners The Russia-China relationship
improved significantly last July 1, when a meeting
between Putin and his Chinese counterpart Hu
Jintao led to a joint statement that rejected
attempts by any country to gain a "monopoly in
world affairs" and to "impose models of social
development" on other countries.
This
statement was clearly directed at the United
States and came after Moscow and Beijing reached
agreement that they did not desire increased US
influence in Central Asia. The "colored
revolutions" that were sweeping through Eurasia -
in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan - caused
concern in both Moscow and Beijing, as each
perceived US motives in the region as potentially
threatening their spheres of influence.
Moscow's and Beijing's efforts to increase
control over the countries that make up the SCO
reflect this policy. For instance, shortly after
the SCO meetings in Kazakhstan last July 5,
member-state Uzbekistan announced that the US
military could not use its base at Karshi-Khanabad
for any purpose other than its support operations
in Afghanistan. Tashkent's statement was a prelude
to its July 29 announcement that the United States
would have to shut down its operations at
Karshi-Khanabad altogether.
Outside the
SCO, Russia and China have closely aligned
diplomatic stances. Russia supports China's policy
toward Taiwan, voicing criticisms in recent weeks
regarding Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian's
move to "cease" the activities of the National
Unification Council. Beijing, for its part,
remains quiet about Russia's activities in
Chechnya. Moreover, both countries have been
reluctant to take concrete action against Iran and
its controversial nuclear-research program.
Last August, the Russia-China relationship
reached a symbolic point when both countries
engaged in their first-ever bilateral war games.
The exercises, called Peace Mission 2005, took
place from August 18-25 and consisted of sea, land
and air maneuvers. Peace Mission 2005 provided
Beijing the opportunity to demonstrate to Taiwan
and other Asian states that its improved relations
with Moscow augment Chinese power in the region.
Additionally, the war games allowed Russia to show
the United States and the European Union that
Moscow was nurturing a relationship with the
up-and-coming Asian superpower. On a more
immediate level, the joint war games provided
Moscow the opportunity to sell more Russian
military hardware to the Chinese.
For
instance, as a result of Peace Mission 2005,
Beijing discussed with Moscow the purchase of
Russian-made Il-76 air transport planes and Il-78
air-refueling tankers. China continues to buy much
of its military equipment from Russia, including
Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets and a few
Sovremenny-class destroyers. Speaking to reporters
on January 13, Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov said, "Russian-Chinese military and
technical cooperation has been, is and will be
developing. I can assure you of that."
Indeed, the chairman of the State Duma
Committee for International Affairs, Konstantin
Kosachev, recently said China and Russia are
"strategic partners". Nevertheless, Moscow has
refrained from selling Beijing some of its most
technologically advanced weapons systems, although
this could change.
Peace Mission 2005 also
served Russia's and China's interests in Central
Asia, with Sino-Russian military cohesion sending
a strong signal to the states of the SCO. The
signal was that Russia and China see it in their
strategic interests to control developments in
Central Asia and in the former Soviet republics.
This signal acts as a warning to those states - or
factions within those states - that changes in
foreign policy toward the West and away from the
East could result in repercussions from China and
Russia.
With Peace Mission 2005 behind
them, Russia and China are planning for new
military exercises, this time to take place in
southern Russia. Russian Interior Minister Rashid
Nurgaliyev stated on March 2 that Russia and China
have "made plans to conduct exercises in spring
2007 in [Russia's] Southern Federal District".
According to Nurgaliyev, the joint exercises will
include special forces from China's Public
Security Ministry, in addition to special forces
and regular troops from Russia's Interior
Ministry. The exercises, described by Nurgaliyev
as large-scale, will "develop skills for
cooperation in accomplishing objectives to counter
the threat of terrorism".
Economic and
energy needs In addition to the political
and geostrategic motives, there are economic
imperatives behind this strengthening partnership.
Bilateral trade volume in 2005 reached nearly
US$30 billion, a 37% increase from 2004, and
leaders of both countries have pledged to at least
double that level by 2010.
When speaking
to the media on March 13, Russia's trade
commissioner to China, Sergei Tsyplakov, projected
that Russia-China trade may reach $36 billion this
year. The two countries are also expected to agree
on the establishment of special economic zones,
which was noted by a Chinese diplomat on Saturday
as "one of the most important documents to be
signed [during Putin's visit] at an
inter-governmental level".
Energy is also
a critical area for Sino-Russian cooperation.
Bilateral initiatives are driven by Beijing's
aggressive effort to secure reliable access to
energy supplies to fuel its booming economy, which
recently surpassed France and the United Kingdom
as the world's fourth-fastest-growing, at an
annual rate of roughly 10%. As the world's
second-largest importer of oil (nearly 130 million
barrels in 2005), with demand projected to grow
roughly 7% in 2006, China naturally looks to the
Russian Far East as a source for imports.
Russia currently provides 8% of China's
energy needs, and is expected to ship nearly 15
million tons of oil to China this year - nearly
double last year's level. Already the amount
shipped this January via the Trans-Siberian
Mainline Railway was up 42% from the same period
in 2005. Yet Russia's ability to meet the 2006
target remains unclear as, among other reasons,
the imperiled Yukos will have difficulty even
meeting previous years' export levels.
The
two countries have been engaged in discussions for
expanding energy cooperation on a number of
fronts, and Putin's visit to Beijing is widely
expected to finalize - if not add substantive
momentum to - talks about oil and gas pipeline
projects. For instance, Russian state energy firm
Gazprom announced on March 13 that it will sign a
memorandum with China National Petroleum Corp
(CNPC) agreeing to build gas pipelines to China's
Xinjiang region. The budget and prospective date
of completion are unknown.
The signing
will occur during Putin's visit, and will build on
negotiations that were initiated last December
between the two energy companies. Beijing has been
seeking ways to raise the level of gas as a
percentage of total energy consumption to 8-10% by
2010, doubling current figures. Gazprom chief
executive officer Alexander Medvedev said the
signing of an agreement in Beijing this month will
"stipulate the price formula" for gas shipments.
Putin's visit may also provide a push to
negotiations about a cross-border oil pipeline
from Siberia to northeastern China. Such a
pipeline would be an offshoot of the East
Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, which
received final approval from Russian authorities
at the end of February, overcoming vociferous
criticism from environmental groups concerned
about the pipeline's proximity to Lake Baikal and
the possibility of oil seepage into the UNESCO
(United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization) World Heritage Site.
On March 11, Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Alexander Zhukov, who is also co-chairman of the
Russian-Chinese commission for cooperation in
education, culture, health care and sports,
announced that the Russian state oil giant
Transneft would construct the ESPO line through
Siberia to the Pacific coast, with a possible spur
to China. The first stage of the $11 billion,
two-stage pipeline will run 2,400 kilometers from
Taishet in Ikurtsk region to Skovorodino in Amur
region and is due for completion in 2008; the
second stage consists of a pipeline from
Skovorodino to Perevoznaya Bay for export to Japan
and other Asia-Pacific economies.
The
agenda for Putin's visit is expected to include
discussions about an ESPO offshoot from
Skovorodino that will link up with China's energy
grid in Daqing. China has lobbied intensively for
this separate pipeline, fearing that Siberian oil
supplies will be directed instead to Japan. A
possible Daqing spur is expected to deliver a
total capacity of 30 million tons of crude to
China, with the remaining 50 million proceeding to
the terminal at Perevoznaya.
A lasting
partnership During the past year, Russia
and China have taken measures to improve their
bilateral relationship, and Putin's visit is sure
to strengthen ties. Moscow and Beijing recognize
their mutual interests in Central Asia, both in
terms of limiting US encroachment and weakening
revolutionary forces in the region. Although
debates persist about sales of advanced weaponry,
China's security calculus still requires a
reliance on imported Russian arms that, in turn,
sustains Moscow's defense economy.
The most
contentious aspect of the bilateral relationship
is in the energy arena: Russia has historically
been reluctant to allow Chinese investment in this
strategic sector, and unwilling to commit firmly
to the construction of cross-border oil pipelines.
Yet recent developments may portend changes in
this area. Russia's readiness to establish a
direct energy corridor to China ensures that
relations will continue to intensify in the near
term, although it remains unclear whether
continued cooperation - in political, military,
and economic areas - will lead to a truly durable
partnership.
Rian Jensen is the
associate editor of China Brief, a journal
published by the Jamestown Foundation. Erich
Marquardt is the publications coordinator at
the Jamestown Foundation. The views expressed in
this article are their own, and do not represent
the Jamestown Foundation.
(Copyright
2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing
.)
