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    Central Asia
     Mar 31, 2006
Revolutions gone astray in Eurasia
By M K Bhadrakumar

March has been a fateful month for "revolutions" in three former republics of the old Soviet Union. The March 26 parliamentary election in Ukraine was a pale reflection of the tumultuous "Orange Revolution" of 2004; also this month a revolution struggling to be born was aborted in Belarus; and in the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan, people reflected sourly on a revolution seemingly gone astray after one year.

The mystique of the "color revolutions" is no longer sustainable. Revolutions can no longer be staged against the seductive



backdrop of rock music and feverish all-night partying. It turns out that progress toward real democracy and prosperity is a long slog. As The Economist pointed out recently, "Revolutions need money; somebody paid for the floodlights and free food in Kiev."

That somebody included organizations close to the administration of President George W Bush, who himself has been the head cheerleader for advancing democracy across the globe. But unlike their active intervention in Ukraine in September 2004 and the behind-the-scenes support for the "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, the Bush people chose not to get too involved the election this March 19 in Belarus.

Bush limited himself to a stirring address, reminding the people of Belarus that this year was the 88th anniversary of the first effort to establish an independent Belarus. Washington thought some mileage could be had by needling Moscow about the incorporation of what was then known as Byelorussia as a Soviet republic in 1918. At a minimum, it helped take Washington's mind off sad thoughts about the death of the Orange and Tulip revolutions.

Bush was probably wise not to get too close. President Alexander Lukashenko didn't need to rig the election to win. Most independent opinion polls (including "unfriendly" ones like that of the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies in Kiev) gave Lukashenko a comfortable lead of about 55% in a straight and fair election. He should have known that nobody in a real democracy gets 82.6% of the vote, but perhaps he didn't care.

Lukashenko is authoritarian but still very popular. Says The Economist, "Unemployment is 1.5% ... other ex-Soviet republics are actually poorer than they were under communism, while Belarus is richer. The average wage last year rose to US$218 per month. Pensions have grown and are paid on time."

Real wages have continually increased in Belarus for the past several years; inflation is under control; Lukashenko has halved the number of people below the poverty line during the past seven years. He followed policies that gave Belarus the fairest distribution of incomes of any country in the region. He preserved the Soviet-era industrial complexes, the large collective-farm agricultural system, and the system of social support.

Compared with neighboring Poland, where unemployment is soaring, or Ukraine, where economic growth has plummeted since the Orange Revolution, Belarus is an oasis of stability. It was natural that the United States failed to ignite revolutionary fervor in Minsk. The Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Tuesday, "What happened in Minsk was a failed attempt to follow the opposition tactics that were used in presidential elections in other CIS countries", ie, members of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Guardian commented in the run-up to the Belarusian election: "Europe and the US are pouring in money. According to the New York Times, cash is being smuggled from the National Endowment for Democracy, Britain's Westminster Foundation, and the German Foreign Ministry directly to Khopits, a network of young anti-Lukashenko activists."

But as Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center in Washington, explained to the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "Despite all the flaws in the Belarusian political system, it's clear that the criticism of Minsk isn't based on its domestic policies, but on the fact that Lukashenko isn't oriented toward cooperation with the West and the US - not even as a formality. He's more focused on an alliance with Russia.

"The US didn't back any particular candidates in either Ukraine or Belarus. It's clear that Ukraine's election won't produce any kind of result that won't be acceptable to the US. But this isn't just about fair elections, but a matter of pushing Russia's influence out of the region.

"Color revolutions succeed when the authorities are not only authoritarian but also lack self-confidence ... Until President Lukashenko loses popularity in Belarus, I don't think his regime will have any serious problems," said Simes.

The Looters' Revolution
March 24 was the first anniversary of the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. It marked the day that ex-president Askar Akayev fled the country to Moscow; he resigned a few days later, to be succeeded ultimately by President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. The new president decreed that March 24 be celebrated as the "Day of the Triumph of Justice", but large sections of population preferred to remember it as "Looters' Day" - a sign of how things have soured for the Kyrgyz people in the past year.

This change of power was another supposed triumph for Bush's democracy project, yet he was uncertain as to what kind of anniversary felicitations he should send to his counterpart in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek. The Americans in the embassy there must have informed him that there was great confusion in the Kyrgyz minds over whether the events of a year ago made their country better or worse.

Clearly, Bakiyev's government was thinking positively. On the eve of the anniversary, Prime Minister Felix Kulov wrote to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington, which jointly manage the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), that Kyrgyzstan was ready to join. Kyrgyzstan wouldn't be able to pay back any more of its foreign debt, which exceeds $2 billion (equivalent to 80% of its current gross domestic product, or GDP). It takes Washington's support for admission to the privileged circle of the HIPC, thus becoming eligible for a debt writeoff. Only 28 countries have been admitted so far - 24 from Africa.

The Kyrgyz economic crisis is at least partly a legacy of the Tulip Revolution. The overall situation facing Kyrgyzstan is indeed daunting - political instability (including criminalization of politics), ethnic tensions, clan struggles, drug trafficking, Islamic militancy, extreme poverty and unemployment. Akayev, the deposed Kyrgyz leader, starkly reminded everyone last week: "The threat of the country's collapse is not unreal. A national catastrophe awaits us."

Half of Kyrgyzstan's national income today comes from remittances by the migrant laborers working in Russia. They contribute about $200 million annually. This is augmented by the annual rent that Bishkek lately sought for the use of Manas Airbase by US forces. No matter what happened to the Tulip revolution, Bishkek has signaled its desire for long-term engagement with Washington.

The Bush administration must hold itself accountable for much of the chaos left behind by the Tulip Revolution. Follow-through or nation-building may not figure highly in US foreign policy, but in Kyrgyzstan's case, an exception is needed. That may eventually help Washington to evolve a Central Asia policy that is intrinsic to the region's needs and worthy of a global power.

Orange peelings
Sunday's election in Ukraine brought the many contradictions into sharp focus. The Our Ukraine Party of President Victor Yushchenko, hero of the Orange Revolution and darling of American democrats, lost heavily in the voting for parliament despite strong US backing. His party pulled in barely 15% of votes. Yet he emerges as the power broker, since neither of the two top performers, his old nemesis from 2004 Viktor Yanukovich and ex-prime minister Yulia Timoshenko, can form a majority coalition without Yushchenko.

Yushchenko views his erstwhile Orange Revolution ally Timoshenko with deep distaste, believing she harbors ambitions to replace him as president. Yet he may have no choice but to realign with her, pinning hopes that the coalition may not last. On the other hand, despite his "pro-Kremlin" image, Yanukovich is keen to link up with Yushchenko. Yanukovich said: "We are ready to work with all ... there is no compromise we will turn down."

The US at some point might actually encourage a Yushchenko-Yanukovich coalition - provided Yushchenko maintained his anti-Russia stance (over natural gas, Black Sea bases, use of the Russian language, blockade of Trans-Dneister, etc) and provided, of course, that Yanukovich moderated his opposition to Ukraine's North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership. (Two-thirds of Ukraine's people oppose NATO membership.)

It would not prove difficult for Yanukovich to fulfill these "conditions" to receive Washington's blessing either, since everything ultimately would depend on the wishes of the big business interests backing him, especially the billionaire kingmaker of Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov.

Entrenched business groups manipulate all three top political figures - fiery revolutionaries such as Yushchenko and Timoshenko, and Yanukovich alike. As in Kyrgyzstan, "revolution" simply resulted in a reshuffling of mafia clans manipulating the politicians in power. (Ironically, in his felicitation message to Bakiyev last Friday, Yushchenko wrote that the "ideals for which the Kyrgyz people struggled correspond with the ones of [the] Orange Revolution in Ukraine".)

The calculus of power remains the same. Economic plunder continues to bleed Ukraine white. GDP growth declined from 12% in 2004 to 2.5% in 2005. The results of Sunday's election show that the people's disillusion has followed the same downward curve.

Moscow remains uninvolved and impassive. It has learned to play by the rulebook of Bush's revolutions. Moscow didn't even make an issue of Yushchenko's crude attempt to disfranchise hundreds of thousands of ethnic-Russian voters (Yanukovich's support base) by simply changing the voters' names from the Russian language into Ukrainian - an ethnic Russian would be puzzled to see his name Skvorsotv figuring as Shpakov in the voters list.

As for the impressive election campaign of the "pro-Kremlin" Viktor Yanukovich, full credit goes to the savvy US public relations firm that he hired, which had an impressive record of catapulting to the White House two US politicians - Ronald Reagan and George W Bush. Not surprisingly, the Russian Foreign Ministry has already offered to deal with any new government in Kiev on the basis of the "principles of equality, friendship, pragmatism and mutually beneficial cooperation". What happened in Ukraine?

The biggest potential "revolution" comes next year, when Russians go to the polls to elect a president. But if the Bush people thought these color revolutions were merely dress rehearsals for the main event, they might be mistaken. There can be half a dozen different ways that the Kremlin may approach the transition in 2007, but the bottom line is that it will not bend down to a noisy revolution.

M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian career diplomat who has served in Islamabad, Kabul, Tashkent and Moscow.

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)


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