Resurgent Russia aims for the
summit By M K Bhadrakumar
Two telephone calls from President George
W Bush to President Vladimir Putin within the five
days from May 30 to June 5, and a visit by Henry
Kissinger, the ace US statesman of realpolitik, to
the Russian leader's residence at Novo Ogaryovo in
the Moscow suburbs last Wednesday, and the
prospects of the Group of Eight (G8) summit in St
Petersburg next month suddenly brightened. [1]
All of Europe will be keenly watching the
outcome of this latest Russian-US tango - most
likely the Bush administration's last major act in
addressing where exactly Putin's Russia belongs in
the international system.
At the core of
it lie the profound issues of energy security in
the
21st
century. Simply put, Russia has the capacity to
supply the energy, but the West must reciprocate
by granting Russia in political terms what has
been denied to it in the past 15 years -
integration with the Western world.
The
prickliness in Russian-US relations in recent
weeks suggests that Washington will somehow deny
Putin the finest hour arguably of his entire
presidency, namely a successful hosting of the G8
summit on July 15. Russia regards the summit as an
acknowledgment of its role in the first league of
world powers.
Putin's meeting with
Kissinger took place two days after Bush made his
second successive phone call to Moscow, during
which, according to a Kremlin press statement, the
"two leaders [Putin and Bush] followed on from
their telephone conversation last week [May 30],
discussing issues related to the preparations for
the G8 summit in St Petersburg and the agenda for
the Russia-US summit that will take place at the
same period".
Putin told Kissinger that
despite the "nuances" in Russian-US ties, the
relationship on the whole was changing for the
better. Putin referred to the Kissinger era in the
Cold War period (read the "Kissingerian" vision of
"balance of interests"), and recalled that it led
to a "successful development" of relations between
the two superpowers. Putin went on to take note of
the Bush administration's interest in relations
with Russia "first and foremost in the energy
sector".
Putin observed, "Our [Russian-US]
points of view do not always coincide, but we
understand each other and find compromises. The
latest steps we took concerning Iran bear witness
to this." Putin spoke with deliberation, since
Kissinger "maintains relations with many American
public organizations and with the present
administration".
Later, talking to the
media, Kissinger said he received a "very positive
feeling" that "significant opportunities" lay
ahead for Russian-US cooperation and that progress
would be made in "many areas" at the July summit.
Distancing himself from US Vice President
Dick Cheney's recent condemnation of the Kremlin's
record on liberal democracy, Kissinger commented,
"One must think about the evolution that takes
place in any country. I have a very positive
feeling regarding the evolution that is taking
place in Russia."
He stressed that
Russia's claim to G8 membership was never in
doubt, "I participated in establishing the G8
[then the Group of Six] in 1975. The issues that
we discuss today are better solved thanks to
Russia's participation than those that we
discussed in 1975." Since the Kissinger mission to
Moscow, the pace of events has significantly
quickened.
The Kremlin appears to be
already so engrossed in the unexpected turn of
events that it would seem to have forgotten that
yet another summit is just around the corner, this
Thursday - the fifth anniversary of the founding
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in
Beijing.
Moscow's "multi-vector" approach
in foreign policy would dictate that it must
embrace both the G8 and the SCO. But Moscow has
priorities. The day after Bush's second phone call
to Putin on June 5, powerful Kremlin figure,
Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev, signaled
to Washington, "It is obvious to me that the
Russian state should profess to be mainly part of
Europe."
He continued, "It does not mean
that we should forget about our ties with other
regions, but historically we are above all a
European country. Any future Russian leader should
remember this." Four days after Medvedev spoke,
top Kremlin adviser Sergei Prikhodko elaborated
that Moscow expected "serious signals for the
further deepening of the Russian-American
partnership" when Putin meets with Bush at the G8
summit.
Conceivably, there are three
"serious signals" that Moscow would expect. First,
over energy security. Second, Russia's membership
in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Third,
acknowledgement of Russia as a full-fledged member
of the G8 - which means making a complete success
of the St Petersburg summit.
The meeting
of the finance ministers of the G8 in St
Petersburg last Saturday, therefore, aroused
interest. Its focus was indeed on energy security.
Washington and Moscow would seem to have worked
hard to evolve a framework of understanding. The
joint communique said:
We discussed the current situation
in the energy markets and the risks that high
oil prices pose for the global economy going
forward. We call for comprehensive action by
both energy producing and energy consuming
countries to facilitate investment in the energy
sector, improve energy efficiency, including
through national initiatives, and promote
greater transparency and reliability in
energy-market data, including through
development of a global common standard for
reporting oil reserves. We recognize the
importance of the principles of the Energy
Charter, of diversification of energy markets
and supply sources, and of strengthened energy
response cooperation in ensuring energy
security.
Summing up, Russian Finance
Minister Alexei Kudrin signaled Moscow's
satisfaction. He said "St Petersburg is not only a
window to Europe but to the whole world" and
highlighted Russia's "integral role in the world
economy". It appears that the pressure on Russia
to ratify the Energy Charter is easing.
For the Kremlin, the all-consuming concern
in the weeks ahead will be to carry forward the
momentum created at the G8 finance ministers'
meeting. The negotiations that lie ahead must
grapple with tough questions - Russia's insistence
on its rights to acquire property in utilities,
pipelines, natural-gas facilities and other
infrastructure in the United States and Europe,
and Russia's willingness to give matching access
for Western companies to the Russian energy
industry.
The US only recently rebuffed a
relatively modest attempt by China to acquire
UNOCAL. In comparison, Russia's Gazprom hopes to
acquire stakes on the US east coast in pipelines
and liquefied-natural-gas conversion facilities
involving massive investments.
In essence,
Gazprom is looking for a variant of its swapping
of assets with Germany in the North Sea Gas
Pipeline project. (German companies were given
shares in the Russian gas fields in return for
Gazprom gaining access to energy production and
transmission in Germany.)
Moscow has been
holding back a decision on the Shtokman gas fields
in the Barents Sea for which Chevron and
ExxonMobil have been short-listed. Naturally, the
current negotiations involve the highest levels of
leadership in Moscow, Washington and the European
capitals.
Speaking to the media after the
G8 finance ministers' meeting, US Treasury
Secretary John Snow implied that Washington was no
longer making an issue of Russia's "reliability"
as a partner in energy cooperation. Second, Snow
said Russia could well join the WTO before the G8
summit. (US Trade Representative Susan Schwab
commented separately in Washington last Friday
that Russia's WTO membership was "not beyond the
realms of possibility".)
In a sign of
Russia's new role within the G8, Kudrin announced
that Russia would cancel US$700 million in debt
owed by poor countries, of which $250 million
would be diverted to poverty-reduction projects
under an agreement with the World Bank. At a press
conference in St Petersburg on Friday, World Bank
president Paul Wolfowitz described it as a "clear
demonstration of the role that Russia started to
play as an emerging donor - I would say as a new
partner".
And don't forget the SCO
... With so much at stake, and the stars
shining on the big event in St Petersburg, Russia
is approaching the SCO summit gently. Wisdom and
prudence dictate that US sensitivities must be
borne in mind. The US views the SCO with distaste.
(It comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.)
The SCO has turned down a US request for
observer status, and then proceeded to demand a
timeline for vacation of US troops from Central
Asia. The SCO provided safe haven for Uzbekistan
when it came under US pressure for "regime
change". The SCO comprehensively discredited the
color revolutions in Central Asia.
By its
sheer presence, the SCO challenges the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) claim to
be the only viable security organization with a
reach in Central Asia. Most important, the US
suspected that the SCO acted as a Russia-China
condominium for countering its influence in the
region. There was a time when the US felt the SCO
would ultimately wither away, but on the contrary,
it is gaining traction.
With all these
factors at work, Moscow wouldn't provoke
Washington needlessly. Indeed, Putin's policy has
often been compared to the Russian policy in the
1890s led by finance minister (and the first
constitutional prime minister of the Russian
Empire under Czar Nicholas II) Count Sergei Witte
- strong internal economic development through
state-driven liberalization, and steering clear of
any form of foreign-policy adventures.
The
"Witte system" will not root for Iran's membership
of the SCO at this juncture. Washington knows it
too. Thus when ambiguities crept in recently, a US
State Department spokesman said Washington would
ask Moscow for an "explanation" for the invitation
extended to Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad
to attend the SCO summit in Shanghai.
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, two of Russia's
closest allies, spoke up at the SCO foreign
ministers' meeting in Beijing last month against
the idea of the SCO adding new members. Moscow of
course took a back seat.
Besides, from the
Russian perspective, the SCO summit is taking
place in vastly changed circumstances. Russia had
a desperate need of the SCO last year, when the
specter of "color revolutions" was haunting the
region. Last year's summit in Astana, Kazakhstan,
took place against the backdrop of the "Tulip
Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan and the uprising in
Andizhan, Uzbekistan. The helping hand from
Beijing within the SCO framework helped Moscow
counter US policies.
But Russia today
finds itself in a far more comfortable position.
True, Central Asian states have their own
"multi-vector" approach to foreign relations. All
the same, the US is yet to give a creative thrust
to its Central Asia policy. Meanwhile, Russia's
dominant influence prevails in the region.
Russia, therefore, wouldn't expect any
"sensations" at the SCO summit. Russia would
rather ponder the SCO's future trajectory.
Certainly, the SCO is not to develop into a
full-fledged military bloc - an "oriental NATO".
Russia prefers the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) [2] to be the main vehicle of
collective security in the region.
The
CSTO is predictable - and Russia's leadership role
in it. The CSTO charter grants Russia the right to
be consulted over any politico-military decisions
by the Central Asian states. At the same time,
Russia wouldn't be averse to the CSTO having a
"partnership network" with the SCO. In fact, the
SCO might as well forge partnership networks of
multilateral associations in Asia and the Pacific
regions rather than add new members.
The
point is, for Russia at the present juncture, the
SCO is in a "standby" mode. A successful G8 summit
is the top priority. Having said that, SCO has a
centrality in Russian policies, being the only
forum within which Russia works with China on
issues of common concern and shared interests in
the Central Asian region.
Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a discussion in the
Russian parliament last Wednesday that there were
issues in Russia's bilateral relations with China
that were "real" and that "cause concern", but
Russia views them in perspective as "a very small
part of the general picture of our relations with
China". He said China's importance for Russia "by
far transcends any individual aspect of our living
side by side as neighbors".
Lavrov stated,
"They [the Chinese] are our strategic partner.
China is a fast-growing power, which undoubtedly
has a great future ... It is in our vital interest
to live in friendship and cooperation with our
great neighbor ... Having said that, I agree that
this implies mutual cooperation, mutual regard for
each other's interests and mutual respect."
Thus Russia will continue to view the SCO
as a forum of vital importance in regional
cooperation with China - an exclusive forum that
even lends credence to Russian aspirations of
acting as a "Eurasian bridge" between the West and
China.
Notes 1. The G8
comprises the members of the Group of Seven (G7)
and Russia. The G7 members are Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States, which together account for about
two-thirds of the world's economic output. Russia
officially became the eighth member of the G8 at
the 1997 Denver, Colorado, "Summit of the Eight".
But while Russia is a G8 member, it does not
participate in financial and economic discussions,
which continue to be conducted by the G7. Russia
has the G8's smallest economy.
2. The
Collective Security Treaty Organization comprises
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The members are not
allowed to join other military alliances or other
groups of states, while an aggression against one
signatory would be perceived as an aggression
against all.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for more than 29 years, with postings
including ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and
to Turkey (1998-2001).
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summit on July 15. Russia regards the summit as an
acknowledgment of its role in the first league of
world powers. 
