SPEAKING
FREELY The two faces of militant
Islam By Christopher Swift
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
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President George W
Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin are
certain to celebrate their recent successes in the
global "war on terrorism" when the Group of Eight
(G8) summit begins on Saturday in St Petersburg,
Russia.
On June 7, US aircraft killed
al-Qaeda's Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in a
safe house outside Baquba. On July 10, pro-Kremlin
militia liquidated Chechen separatist Shamil
Basayev in Ingushetia. Both operations featured
prominently on national
television, with US and
Russian pundits predicting the eventual collapse
of their adversaries' insurgent networks.
At first blush, the similarities between
Zarqawi and Basayev appear significant. Both used
Islam to inspire followers and legitimize violent
force. Both led dynamic insurgencies embracing
comparable military tactics. Both appear to have
been betrayed by inside sources.
Yet
despite apparent symmetry between US and Russian
operations, critical distinctions between
Chechnya's indigenous rebels and Iraq's foreign
jihadis still remain. Rather than collaborating in
a common struggle, Bush and Putin face dissimilar
adversaries animated by distinct values and
dramatically different agendas.
Despite
their superficial similarities, Zarqawi and
Basayev manifested two ideologically and
politically distinct faces of contemporary Islamic
militancy. That distinction turns on the
relationship between politics and religion. For
Basayev's rebels, Islam is inherently
communitarian. It defines ethnic and cultural
identity.
It reinforces notions of Chechen
nationhood. It animates violent opposition to
Moscow's historic dominance and a drive toward
political self-determination. Rather than
threatening a global conflagration, Basayev's
Islam mobilized a discrete population for limited,
localized ends.
For Zarqawi's jihadis,
Islam is radically cosmopolitan. It subsumes
ethnic and cultural identity. It eschews Iraqi
nationhood in favor of establishing a regional
caliphate. It champions violence against Kurds,
Shi'ites and moderate Sunnis in a drive toward
social and theological purity. Rather than
promoting self-determination, Zarqawi's Islam
catalyzed burgeoning Arab resentment for
unlimited, globalized ends.
Those
ideological differences underscore important
distinctions in each group's character and
composition. Zarqawi's jihadis are predominantly
foreign. Leaders mobilize manpower through
transnational networks, recruiting disaffected
Muslims in the Middle East, Europe and beyond.
Most are loners, leaving their families and
homelands to fight in mixed international units.
Their struggle is globalized yet atomized. Despite
cooperating with Ba'athists and other Iraqi
Sunnis, al-Qaeda's forces fight for a millenarian
ideology rather than a discrete community.
By comparison, Basayev's rebels are
overwhelmingly indigenous. Leaders mobilize
manpower through subnational jamaats and
Sufi spiritual orders known as tariqat.
Recruiting is largely spontaneous, with volunteers
from Chechnya and adjoining Russian republics
fighting on a seasonal or semi-seasonal basis.
Their struggle is localized and highly
personalized. Despite limited assistance from a
tiny and rapidly diminishing cohort of Arab
volunteers, the Chechens continue fighting for
readily identifiable ethno-nationalist ends.
Those ends do not legitimize Chechen
terrorism, especially in cases where civilians are
the intended targets. Nor do they eliminate
prospects for closer military cooperation between
local rebels and global terrorist syndicates.
Nonetheless, these distinctions illuminate
critical differences between militant Islam's
subnational and transnational variants. Absent a
common spiritual idiom, Chechen rebels share more
with the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka than they do
with al-Qaeda. Basayev was Chechnya's Che Guevara,
not Russia's Osama bin Laden.
Recognizing
the two faces of militant Islam carries critically
important implications for how the United States
frames and fights the "global war on terrorism".
It also carries important implications for
US-Russia relations. In Iraq, an assertive US
military posture is necessary to curb the
transnational terrorist threat and provide
conditions necessary for domestic institutional
development. Defeating Zarqawi's global insurgency
requires a local solution. Only authentic Iraqi
leadership will mobilize the nation against
foreign jihadis. To ignore that reality risks
consigning Iraq to protracted civil conflict.
In Chechnya, that analysis is reversed.
Russia's aggressive military campaign fuels a
cycle of violent repression and armed reprisal.
Rather than negotiating with moderate separatists,
the Kremlin controls a criminalized and
increasingly coercive indigenous elite. Ending
Basayev's local insurgency requires a global
solution. Only authentic US leadership will
convince Russians and Chechens to pursue a
meaningful political dialogue. To ignore that
responsibility risks the imminent emergence of a
failed state within the sovereign boundaries of a
nuclear superpower.
Christopher
Swift is a doctoral candidate at the
University of Cambridge.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
