Venezuela, Russia: Comrades in
arms By M K Bhadrakumar
During a passionate tour in May of
European capitals, Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez politely declined an official invitation
from Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel
because he preferred to meet ordinary people. And
indeed he proceeded to meet ordinary people -
accompanied by Che Guevara's daughter.
But
during his three-day visit to Russia last week,
Chavez didn't have a single walkabout. He made it
clear it was a "working visit" by commencing in
Volgograd and Izhvesk (seat of Russia's arms
industry) before reaching Moscow.
Equally,
his Russian hosts took care to advertise that the
last thing they had in mind was planting a
hedgehog in the American underbelly, as Soviet
premier Nikita Khrushchev used to say. A string of
Russian commentators hastened to insist to anyone
who
cared to lend an ear in
Washington that there was "nothing personal, just
business" in the Kremlin's new odyssey in the
Western Hemisphere - unlike in the Soviet era.
However, it is highly unlikely Washington
will accept at face value these protestations of
innocence. A US State Department spokesman
expressed concern that the developing ties between
Russia and Venezuela had implications for
"regional stability" in Latin America and warned
that such ties would not be good for Moscow or
Caracas.
What incensed Washington to no
end was that by the time Chavez came to Russia on
Wednesday, Venezuela already had a US$52 million
agreement with Russia to supply 100,000
Kalashnikov assault rifles and munitions, as well
as two agreements worth $474.6 million for
construction in Venezuela of a plant to produce
AK-103 assault rifles, along with another to
produce 7.62-millimeter bullets.
And while
Chavez was in Moscow on Thursday, the two
countries signed a contract for the delivery of 38
Mi-17V-5 helicopters, which combine transport,
gunship, reconnaissance and rescue capabilities,
and Mi-35M fire-support helicopters, as well as an
agreement for the supply of Su-30MK2 multi-role
fighter aircraft. Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov estimated the contracts were worth more
than $1 billion.
Venezuela has also shown
interest in purchase from Russia of Amur-class
submarines, Tor-M1 and Osa-10 air-defense missile
systems, infantry fighting vehicles and other
equipment worth $3 billion.
Considering
Russia's total arms exports during 2005 amounted
to $6 billion, it is possible to put into
perspective the huge significance of Venezuela to
the Russian arms industry.
It is the first
time Russia has gained a solid foothold in the
Latin American market, which has been
traditionally a US preserve. President Vladimir
Putin sought to calm US sensitivities by saying in
Chavez' presence: "Our military-technical
cooperation is not meant to spite other countries.
It is aimed at reviving Russian economy and
raising the living standards of the people."
Venezuela, in essence, is procuring the
Su-35 fighter aircraft to replace its existing
squadron of F-16 aircraft, after the ban imposed
on May 15 by Washington on all arms sales to
Venezuela for allegedly having an
intelligence-sharing relationship with Iran and
Cuba, which, in the opinion of the US, are states
sponsoring terrorism. In other words, Washington
sought to turn the screws on Chavez and make him
crawl, while Moscow swiftly stepped in to hold his
hand, making a good pile of money in the bargain.
The Russian-Venezuelan arms deal is a slap
in the American face whichever way one looks at
it. Moscow has paid back Washington its $3.8
billion deal in June to sell 48 F-16 aircraft to
Poland. Ivanov explained the Russian calculus in
uncompromising terms.
As far as Moscow was
concerned, arms supplies to Venezuela didn't
violate international law as there were no legal
restrictions on arms exports to Venezuela, and
"Venezuela is not on any sanctions or restricted
regime list and has unhindered rights to procure
arms from any country," he said.
The
Russian Foreign Ministry was no less adamant. It
explained that Russia was acting within the ambit
of international law and relevant Russian
legislation; the arms deal fell within the purview
of "relations between two sovereign states"; and
it was based on the free play of market forces and
derived out of commercial advantages.
No
matter the Russian explanation, what worries
Washington even more is the near-certainty that it
is a matter of time before Russian arms exporters
fan out into the entire Western Hemisphere. Chavez
has opened the floodgates for Russian arms exports
to the United States' strategic back yard.
Rosoboronexport, Russia's state-controlled
arms exporter, was on record in April as holding
talks on military hardware supplies with a number
of countries in Latin America, including Cuba.
The Venezuela example may well repeat in a
host of other countries - Russian arms exporters
promptly exploiting the fractures in the United
States' political relations with its South
American neighbors. This puts an enormous
responsibility on the United States' "neighborhood
diplomacy". Economic sanctions, as an instrument
of diplomacy, may simply have to be phased out of
the US repertoire in the Western Hemisphere.
The emerging dimensions of the
Russian-Venezuelan cooperation in the energy
sector bring this home with telling effect.
Leading Russian energy companies, including
Gazprom, LUKoil, Zarubezhneftgaz and
Tekhnopromexport, have been active on the
Venezuelan market. Last August, Gazprom won a
tender for the Rafel Urdaneta natural-gas project
and was granted licenses for prospecting and
developing gas fields in the Gulf of Venezuela
with an estimated capacity of 100 billion cubic
meters.
Chavez revealed during his visit
to Moscow that Venezuela sought Russian
participation in the construction of an
8,000-kilometer, $20 billion pipeline connecting
Venezuela with the Atlantic coast via Brazil and
Rio de la Plata. Venezuela also signed an
agreement with Russia for construction of a
pipe-making plant.
Venezuela's imports of
goods and services from the US for its oil
industry work out to $5 billion. Chavez is
determined to reduce the level of dependency. This
generates export opportunities for Russia's
oil-engineering industry.
Moreover,
Venezuela currently accounts for 15% of US
crude-oil supplies. But Chavez is keen to develop
alternative markets, including China. Herein lies
the strategic significance of the proposed
pipeline project.
During Chavez' visit, a
Gazprom subsidiary also clinched the deal to
develop Venezuela's gas industry. The scheme will
outline a strategy for the medium- and long-term
development of Venezuela's gas sector and will
include the country's mineral base and an outlook
for its development, the forecast of gas demand
and plans for gas production, transportation,
distribution, storage and refining.
Again,
details have emerged of Russia building a
hydroelectric project in southwestern Venezuela
costing $900 million. Putin estimated, "The
potential private investment of Russian companies
[in Venezuela] may reach hundreds of millions,
billions of dollars."
What distinguishes
Russia's ties with Venezuela on the one hand and
US-Georgia or US-Ukraine relations on the other is
that while a broad similarity exists in
geopolitical terms, there is a sharp divergence in
their actual content. Russia-Venezuela cooperation
is self-sustaining, complementary and mutually
beneficial, unlike the United States' relations
with the countries of the post-Soviet space, which
are politically motivated insofar as the United
States' "partners" are far from solvent in
economic terms and will remain recipients of US
assistance for the foreseeable future.
Also, unlike the US predicament with
"color revolutions" in the post-Soviet space,
Russia can confidently visualize that Latin
America is politically stable. That is to say,
Latin America's "left" turn is not by any means
leading the continent to upheavals and
revolutions. The left-leaning governments in Latin
America have come to power through constitutional
means and democratic elections. Thus the political
situation is becoming "stable", and no conflict
needs to be expected (except if US diplomacy
deliberately works to destabilize leftist regimes
in the region).
Left-leaning in Latin
America is viewed in Moscow as a process rooted in
the Cuban revolution and will, therefore, retain a
strong aversion toward US hegemony. Also, Latin
America finds itself as having more than one
category of left, and the situation is compounded
by quarrels among its political elites. But still
there is not a tremendous amount Washington can
actually do to alter Latin America's swerve to the
left. As well, while Latin America's left turn is
real, all the same, Moscow sees the current
"reddening" of Latin America as vastly different
from the continent's heritage in the second half
of the last century as a "red continent".
Proletarian internationalism, of course, is a
thing of the past.
Furthermore, Moscow
sees the "era of 21st-century socialism" (as
Chavez once described it) as an altogether new
brand of socialism fueled by a combination of the
plunder of local resources by transnational
corporations; unfair distribution of the local
national wealth, injustice, poverty and
underdevelopment caused by the rapacious local
elites; and Washington's shortsighted diktat. Thus
even the radical socialism expounded by Chavez
stems from the ideals of independence leader Simon
Bolivar, and actually puts forward a capitalist
path of state development.
The scenario on
the whole offers a conducive framework for
post-Soviet Russia to cooperate. On the economic
front, Chavez wants to get away from the
neo-liberal model and to resist globalization.
Chavez' program has an uncanny resemblance to
Russia's own approach in its search for striking a
balance among the market, the state and society.
As Chavez put it once, "We need to bring the
invisible hand of the market and the visible hand
of the state together in an economic system where
there is as much of the market as possible and as
much of the state as necessary."
Chavez'
approach would, arguably, ring familiar in Putin's
Russia - "Private property, privatization and
foreign investment are still guaranteed, although
within the overall limit of the overriding
interests of the state, which will keep under its
control strategic sectors, the sale of which would
mean a partial transfer of national sovereignty,"
as Le Monde Diplomatique magazine summed up the
complex and nuanced Chavez brand of socialism.
Thus, despite the low-key approach to
Chavez' Russia visit, the fact remains that Moscow
regards him as a charismatic leader who is shrewd
enough to play with contradictions and interests.
The Kremlin cannot but be acutely conscious that
Russia has some Soviet-era inheritance in Chavez'
Venezuela.
The broad empathy revealed
itself for a moment in public, when at the joint
news conference with Chavez, Putin dwelt on what
drew Russia and Venezuela close together. He said
in measured tone: "We are actively cooperating in
the international arena and believe that the world
order should be firmly based on international law.
We are in favor of a multipolar world. And
certainly we shall support Venezuela in its
legitimate aspirations to take a place as a
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council."
Chavez responded by expressing his
appreciation for the Russian helping hand "for
having liberated us from, shall we say, a
blockade". Later, however, at a public function in
Moscow while unveiling a bust of Simon Bolivar,
Chavez was explicit about the "blockade" he had in
mind.
"It seems that the United States is
destined to fill the entire world with misery
while speaking in the name of freedom. This is
happening in Iraq, in the Middle East, in Latin
America. The United States' empire is the biggest
threat that exists in the world today - an
irrational, blind, stupid giant who does not
understand life, who does not understand the
world, who does not understand human rights."
Moscow's support of Chavez' Venezuela is
bound to annoy the US. But just as the US did not
think it necessary to consult Russia on its
actions in Russia's near abroad, Moscow would aim
at making a point without allowing that to ratchet
up the level of mutual annoyance with Washington
or resorting to rhetoric. That will need delicate
fine-tuning and cool-headedness, which today's
Kremlin is adept at.
Clearly, Russia is
not desperate for money at the moment. Washington
is bound to assess that in Russia's return to
Latin America, foreign policy is in the
foreground. But Washington would see that it was
quite different from the Soviet forays into Latin
America. The Soviet Union never counted money when
it came to support for political interests. But
not so Putin's Russia, even if at times it may mix
the two aspects and sow seeds of confusion in the
minds of onlookers.
On balance, Russia can
be expected to act carefully and pragmatically,
without openly challenging the US, whose
influence, Monroe Doctrine or not, continues to be
great in Latin America. As a Russian wit remarked,
Moscow has shown that it can eat beluga caviar
with pancakes with George W Bush and a week later
drink vodka from a Cossack sabre with Hugo Chavez.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for
more than 29 years, with postings including
ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and to Turkey
(1998-2001).
(Copyright 2006 Asia
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