Page 3 of
3 Russia draws
Europe into its orbit By M K
Bhadrakumar
plain speaking with
pro-US agitators in Bishkek's city square -
something that Putin couldn't afford to do lest it
was construed in Washington as Russia's "imperial
muscle-flexing".
Nazarbayev chastised the
agitators clamoring for Bakiyev's resignation:
"First, all must sit at the negotiating table.
Second, one must respect authorities who have been
elected by the people, and these authorities must
use their power to establish order in the country
in a democratic and lawful way. If neither the
first nor the second solution is acceptable, then
Kyrgyzstan will
be left with the
alternative of being another Afghanistan - with
its turmoil, anarchy, lawlessness, extremism,
terrorism, drug trafficking. In such an
eventuality, Kyrgyzstan will turn into an enclave
of instability. Does anybody really want this?"
Nazarbayev has been equally caustic about
attempts by Washington to instigate instability in
Ukraine with the objective of rolling back the
revival of Russian influence in Kiev.
What
emerges is that the US attempt to drive a wedge
between the Central Asian countries and Russia
lies in shambles. Russia's economic recovery and
its willingness and capacity to play an assertive
role in the region have instilled confidence in
the Central Asian states that they can look up to
the Kremlin for a leadership role.
Contrary to Western propaganda, Central
Asian leaderships have always felt close to
Moscow. A variety of factors work as underpinnings
of affinity between Moscow and the Central Asian
capitals - personal, cultural, historical,
political and geopolitical, and economic. Plainly
speaking, Washington has grossly underestimated
the Central Asian states' reluctance to antagonize
their big neighbor.
Putin's emphasis on
pragmatic common interests as the cornerstone of
Russia's relations with the countries of the
region appeals to the Central Asian leaderships.
Putin doesn't mind if Ashgabat or Astana or
Tashkent bargains hard with Moscow on the basis of
economic self-interest, as long as Russia's
overall geopolitical interests are kept in view,
especially at a time when the growing
contradictions in US-Russia relations are bound to
affect the CIS countries.
Putin
unceremoniously got rid of Moscow's remaining
notions of imperial ambitions. He cut out the
needless verbiage of the Boris Yeltsin era. At the
same time, he concentrated on upgrading Russia's
economic presence in the region and began
responding to the calls of regional security and
stability. Over the past seven years of his
presidency, Putin transformed Russia's ties into
working relationships. This may well be his finest
legacy in post-Soviet Russia's foreign policy.
Washington's record, in comparison, has
been appalling. US policies are predicated on
competitive politics with regard to Russia. They
take stock of the challenges and opportunities in
Central Asia in zero-sum terms. Thus if the US
were to assist Kyrgyzstan in hydroelectric-power
generation, the prerequisite would be that the
awesome power of the Pamir's cascades doesn't flow
through transmission lines criss-crossing the
Russian landscape.
But as Frederick Starr,
an influential scholar on Central Asia, pointed
out recently, how could Washington make Kyrgyz
hydroelectric power flow toward South Asia? "The
only trouble is that Pakistan has this whole
process and, therefore, US policy by the throat.
The fact is, everything we've discussed here stops
at the border of Pakistan," Starr reminded a
senior State Department official on a public forum
at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in
Washington.
Washington's policies in
Central Asia are intrusive. And, when the Central
Asians retaliate, as Tashkent did in May 2005
after the Andizhan events, there was nothing the
US could do about it (see Into the valley of death
..., Asia Times Online, June 15, 2005).
In due course, Washington stooped to make
amends. But when a superpower stoops low, it
becomes ungainly. Tashkent ignored US entreaties.
Washington is now left with an Uzbekistan policy
that is content with spreading an occasional
canard or two about Tashkent's equations with
Moscow.
Yet Washington is still to learn
that the proud people of the steppes do not easily
forget slights. In a completely unwise move last
week, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice all
of a sudden raised US concerns over Kazakhstan's
political reforms with Foreign Minister Marat
Tazhin, who was on a visit to Washington. Rice
tied US support to Kazakhstan's bid to chair the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe to political reform.
M K
Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years,
with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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