Page 3 of 3 SCO is primed and ready to fire
By M K Bhadrakumar
Evidently, Bushehr is not the sum total of Russia-Iran relations. Both
countries are pragmatic enough to realize that. Indeed, both countries are
under compulsion to control any damage to their bilateral cooperation. Russia
has shared interests with Iran in the Caspian and Central Asia. Iran is the
only Caspian power, arguably, with which Russia has total identity of views as
regards the inadmissibility of involvement by extra-regional powers (read the
US and NATO) on issues of the security of Caspian region. Russia has to work
closely with Iran at the summit of the Caspian littoral states scheduled to
take place in Tehran this year.
The CSTO's Bordyuzha might have spoken with a swagger when he recently invited
Iran to join the CSTO as a member country. But the proposition wasn't entirely
lacking in seriousness. During
the visit of Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev to Tehran on July 15,
the influential chairman of the Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the
Iranian Majlis (parliament), Ala'eddin Broujerdi, strongly criticized the
intrusive regional policies of the US in Central Asia.
He roundly condemned the US for plotting to destabilize the Central Asian
region. Interestingly, Broujerdi called for the exclusion of extra-regional
security organizations from Central Asia. Broujerdi's stance on Central Asian
security was almost the same as that of Russia and China.
A key agenda item to be watched at the SCO's Bishkek summit will be the role of
Iran in energy cooperation. This is a topic of common interest to Russia and
China. On its part, Russia stands to gain if Iran's energy flows are diverted
toward the Asian market rather than finding their way to the European market.
(Safari has been quoted as saying in Beijing on Tuesday, "Iran is willing to
draw up an energy charter to cover the entire Asia.")
Russia has been watching with unease the renewed efforts by Turkey and the
European Union (despite apparent US reservations) to line up Iran both as a gas
supplier and as a conduit for Turkmen gas for filling up the proposed Nabucco
pipeline, which rivals Russia's energy projects in the Balkans and southern
Europe. Last month, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding in
this respect. Last week, Turkey followed up with an agreement with Italy and
Greece, which will be the consumers of the Iranian gas.
Russia is keenly watching, and will hope that Iran does not commit to the
Nabucco pipeline. Russia has an added interest in encouraging Iran to become an
energy supplier for China insofar as by doing this the potential for any
Russian-Chinese conflict of interests over Central Asian energy reserves
(especially in Turkmenistan) diminishes. In fact, the proposed Chinese gas
pipeline leading to Turkmenistan can be easily extended to Iran. Finally, Iran
is an important player in any grand Russian strategy involving a variant of the
idea of a world gas cartel.
SCO's Afghan challenge
From all these perspectives, the time has come for the SCO to ponder seriously
its future relations with Iran. Without doubt, two big questions await the SCO
summit: Iran's admission as a full member and the direction of the SCO's
partnership with Turkmenistan.
Parallel to the SCO's "Great Central Asia" strategy involving Iran, the summit
can be expected to come up with new initiatives toward Afghanistan. Again, both
Russia and China view with growing concern the deepening crisis in that
country.
To quote from a People's Daily commentary in June, "The 'Taliban phenomenon'
has produced grave concern ... its resurgence has severely challenged the
authority of the Afghan government ... the Taliban have grown more robust ...
taking full advantage of local feelings of dissatisfaction over living
conditions and anti-US sentiments ... the Taliban have galvanized their link-up
with al-Qaeda remnants ... Afghanistan is at risk of becoming the second Iraq."
Russian thinking has also been on a similar track. In fact, Moscow has gone a
step further and openly questioned the continued rationale of the United
States' monopoly over conflict resolution in Afghanistan. Moscow, like Beijing,
is keen to adopt a two-track approach. First, it will endeavor to work closely
on a bilateral track with the government headed by President Hamid Karzai. The
visit by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Kabul signified an intensification
of Russian diplomacy toward the Afghan problem. At the same time, Moscow is
also looking for a multilateral approach involving the CSTO.
Significantly, Bordyuzha suggested this week, "We [CSTO and the SCO] together
should assist in preventing the Taliban from coming to power, otherwise we will
get serious problems in Afghanistan, problems for many years."
Bordyuzha hinted at the likelihood of an extensive involvement by the SCO in
Afghanistan. He said, "Work should be conducted in all spheres, political and
economic, and in rendering assistance in the formation of armed forces and
law-enforcement organs of the government, as well as in the fight against
illegal drug trafficking."
To be sure, the SCO summit can be expected to come up with proposals aimed at
intensifying the functioning of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group.
American headaches
The SCO summit therefore poses challenges for the US from various angles. The
coming together of the CSTO and the SCO is a double setback to US regional
policies. Both are entities that are anathema to the United States'
geopolitical interests. The US strove to stifle these two organizations in
their infancy, but instead now sees them gather new strength.
The US game plan projecting NATO into the Central Asian region runs into a
formidable obstacle. The US dilemma is acute. Unless NATO expands into Central
Asia, there can be no full "encirclement" of either Russia or China. It is
senseless if NATO remains stuck in the southern Caucasus.
Indeed, NATO's credibility is at stake, too. As things stand, NATO's
"transformation" isn't progressing smoothly. Afghanistan has become a lump in
NATO's throat. NATO can't spit it out, nor can it swallow. It is disfiguring
NATO. No amount of propaganda can hide the reality that Afghan people
increasingly view NATO as an occupation force. Apart from insufficient troop
strength, NATO commanders are in desperate need of intelligence.
The United States' "pull" within NATO is also in decline. This week, Italian
Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema openly called for the cessation of all US
military operations in Afghanistan, except strictly under NATO command. The
change of leadership in France, Germany and Britain doesn't seem to work quite
the way Washington expected.
Therefore, Washington will do its utmost to ward off the SCO's "encroachment"
on to Afghan turf. Washington will count on Karzai to smother the SCO's
overtures. The US predicament will be that on the face of it, the SCO
initiative on Afghanistan cannot be questioned. Karzai would also look rather
foolish if he were to spurn an offer of help from the SCO. After all, the SCO
has a legitimate interest in effectively stabilizing the situation in
Afghanistan, since the stability of the Central Asian region is linked to it in
many respects.
On the other hand, Washington's grip over the Kabul setup will incrementally
weaken once Afghanistan develops an "SCO connection". Washington should be
extremely wary, since Afghans are adept at playing their optimal role in the
"Great Game". Most important, the US will increasingly find itself under
compulsion to perform as a team player, which suits neither its geostrategy nor
its standing as the sole superpower.
In all this, Pakistan remains an unpredictable player, given the fluidity of
its internal situation, even though Islamabad is keen to work closely with the
SCO and China. Most of the supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan pass through
Pakistan. It will be quite an irony if a situation develops where the US ends
up doing all the fighting in Afghanistan, while the SCO gains in public
adulation among the Afghan people and in the wider region as a
"nation-builder".
Least of all, Washington knows that the SCO's involvement in the Afghan problem
ultimately means Russia will be making a big re-entry into the Hindu Kush,
apart from foiling the United States' grand design to steer NATO as a global
security organization with global partners. Curiously, on July 17, Tajikistan
announced that an agreement had been concluded providing for the deployment of
Russian combat aircraft on the Ayni Air Base outside Dushanbe. Indications are
that in the first instance Russia will deploy Su-25 jets and Mi-24 and Mi-8
helicopters. The Russian deployment will be within the CSTO framework. Moscow
just about stumped the United States' last lingering hope of gaining a toehold
in Tajikistan.
All this pales into insignificance for Washington if the SCO summit favorably
views Iran's admission as a full member. There is only an outside chance at the
moment that the SCO will want to wade deep into the fierce crosscurrents in the
Persian Gulf region. But Washington will be nervously watching.
The point is, Iran, Russia and China have all "lost" in different ways in the
aftermath of the United States' US$63 billion arms deal in the Gulf region.
Washington has once again shown that "the winner takes it all".
So the "losers" cannot be faulted if they quickly do some homework and see the
logic of undertaking some networking of their own to cut their "losses" and
maybe even retrieve some lost ground. Certainly, Ahmadinejad will be a star
attraction at the at the SCO summit and his presence in Bishkek will be way
beyond the calls of protocol.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
