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    Central Asia
     Aug 23, 2007
Page 2 of 2
Missile row magnifies Russia's concerns
By Federico Bordonaro

military expenses are on the rise, and Moscow announced a moratorium on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and openly accused Washington of unilaterally destroying the European strategic balance by setting up a missile-defense system without consulting Russia. At the same time, the Kremlin has adopted rigid stances on Kosovo, Transnistria and Georgia.

The impression is that Russia wants to reposition itself clearly as a re-established global power before the US elects a new



president in the autumn of 2008. US pre-election tactics, Washington's difficult Middle East campaign, and high oil and gas prices give Russia an opportunity to accelerate its comeback.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Moscow will seek an extreme diplomatic crisis with Washington in the coming months and years. Instead, it will presumably formulate a broad proposal, designed to renegotiate its strategic relations with the West. Briefly said, Russia wants to renegotiate what it had to do in 1990-92 from a weak position during the deep political, economic and military crisis that followed the perestroika years.

Main implications
The Tsitelubani incident and the following inquiry have some important ramifications and implications for both global and regional actors. The US and EU low-key protests signal the weakness of the Euro-Atlantic alliance at this moment. Apart from some sensationalist articles in the press, which try to validate the theory of a full-blown neo-cold war, Western diplomatic reactions have been cautious.

Western divisions, which stem from the different security and strategic cultures in Europe and the US, continue to hamper the birth of a comprehensive Atlantic geostrategy in the wider Black Sea region - notwithstanding the sea of printed proposals and studies on the issue. Russia is successfully exploiting such a void, especially at a time of US fatigue in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

As a consequence of such Western tactical difficulties and strategic dilemmas, Russia will remain confident and at times threatening in the South Caucasus, despite international condemnation for actions such as those in Upper Kodori or South Ossetia.

Russia's rigid stance and military responses to NATO's progressive expansion in eastern Europe and the South Caucasus has not stopped European administrations forging closer ties with Moscow when it comes to energy. Instead of an either/or logic, the EU states in both central and western Europe are opting for a policy mix when it comes to energy strategies. They have launched new projects with Gazprom (Germany, Belgium, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria among others), but also with the US-United Kingdom axis in an attempt to diversify their oil - but especially natural gas - acquisitions.

At the regional level, Saakashvili's willingness to join NATO and the EU will likely continue, but Tbilisi probably expected more support. However, Saakashvili enjoys a strong consensus at home and is unlikely to change his firm stance on South Ossetia.

As a result, Georgia's breakaway regions will remain highly volatile even though Georgia's domestic policy appears to have entered a cycle of relative stability. International decision-makers will need to consider political risk in Georgia from a geopolitical, rather than political-economic, view. Deeply rooted geopolitical conflicts involving ethnic minorities and outside powers will remain a threat for the country's stability in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, although Georgia accuses Russian peacekeeping missions of merely serving Moscow's interests, Tbilisi still lacks the capabilities fully to govern its breakaway regions on its own.

Conclusion
The results of the missile incident's ongoing inquiry appear to contradict Russian claims and will presumably augment Moscow's negative image among Euro-Atlantic decision-makers. However, this seems to be a calculated risk by Russia. At the moment, the Kremlin gives less importance to its international image than to its ability to put pressure on some geostrategic hot spots.

Driving a wedge between pro-Western elites in former Soviet states and the enlarged NATO is critical for Russia's geopolitical interests. Therefore, look for Moscow to insist on a series of negotiations on the wider Black Sea region's conflicts and Kosovo, which will seek to secure Russian interests and influence. The US and EU will now have to make a fundamental decision: either to opt for a harder stance and try to continue their expansion of the Euro-Atlantic geostrategic realm deep inside Eurasia, or to take Russian interests seriously.

This latter possibility would mean that the broad arc of instability extending from Belarus to Central Asia through the wider Black Sea region will assume a bipolar structure (the Euro-Atlantic combine and Moscow being the two poles), where Russia will be able to project power and influence, notwithstanding the EU's and NATO's enlargement.

Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

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