Page 2 of 2 Saudi monarch woos Turkey's Islamists
By M K Bhadrakumar
Ankara even hosted a round of talks in April between the European Union foreign
policy chief Javier Solana and Iran's former chief nuclear negotiator, Ali
Larijani.
But what Riyadh must be viewing with a sense of disquiet is the emerging
reality that Ankara and Tehran share common interests and concerns in the
region's geopolitics. Ankara not only appreciates Tehran's support and
understanding for the problems posed by PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
terrorism, but has lately begun flaunting its Iran connection. At the peak of
the
current crisis on Turkey's border with northern Iraq, Turkish Foreign Minister
Ali Babacan visited Tehran on October 28.
He acknowledged that Turkey is seeking practical cooperation with Iran in
tackling Kurdish militancy. Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad told Babacan,
"The fate of regional nations is inter-linked and they should safeguard one
another's interests." Ahmadinejad phoned Gul to stress that "Turkey's concerns
are received with understanding" and "occupiers [United States] had covert
agreements [with Kurds], have prepared the ground for disunity [among regional
states] and are supporting terrorists through their double-standard policies".
Turkish-Iranian security cooperation has also shifted gear. It has become overt
and sustained and it is deepening. Turkey made good use of its Iran card while
appealing to the US on the PKK problem. Riyadh surely feels exasperated that
President George W Bush's coddling of Kurdish separatism and terrorism is
bringing Salafi Turks and Shi'ite Iranians closer together in an unprecedented
bonding of the traditional rivals.
What alarms Riyadh is that Iran also took the initiative to evolve a common
position with Syria in extending support to Turkey on the Kurdish problem.
Following up on his talks with Babacan, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr
Mottaki visited Damascus on October 29, where he said, "Iran condemns the use
of northern Iraqi territory as a launch pad for terrorist operations against
Turkey and is fully prepared to combat terrorism at any price." In response,
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem said, "Our brothers in Tehran are making
efforts which are complementary to ours ... PKK's terrorist activities threaten
Turkey as well as Iran and Syria."
Surprise move on Kirkuk
Any Turkish invasion of Iraq will trigger a massive shift in the region's
balance of forces. Turkish columnist Hasan Kanbolat of the Islamist daily Zaman
recently wrote, "The Arab countries are generally afraid that Turkey's
operation may expand to include even Baghdad. Some governments worry that
Turkey, having become a regional power, actually plans to permanently enter
Iraq and the Arab world and strengthen its claims on the oil reserves of
northern Iraq. They fear, in essence, that Turkey intends to use the PKK as an
excuse to return to the Middle East with the spirit of the Ottoman Empire."
The Saudis fear that a Turkish incursion into northern Iraq would willy-nilly
encourage the emergence of a Shi'ite state in southern Iraq bordering Saudi
Arabia's volatile Shi'ite provinces. Besides, the Saudis are nervous that
Turkish-Iranian-Syrian understanding could have implications for Lebanon.
Tehran of course has been playing its cards astutely. It incessantly envelops
Riyadh in a friendly idiom. On Sunday, Ahmadinejad will undertake a second
visit within the year to Riyadh.
Last week, Iran threw another trump card on the table by going on record that
it opposed the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution (worked
out under American supervision), which calls for holding a referendum on the
status of Kirkuk province to decide on its inclusion in the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). Mottaki told Iranian television, "There are differences of
opinion about issues such as Kirkuk or the internal borders of provinces. We
have suggested a moratorium so that decisions can be made about them."
The Iranian bombshell pleases Ankara immensely. To the contrary, the
pro-American KRG leadership went ballistic. KRG president Massoud Barzani's
office angrily reacted, "These [Iranian] proposals contradict the Iraqi
constitution, and therefore we reject them. They constitute interference and
will further complicate the situation." The KRG will be suspecting Iran-Turkey
collusion. (The Iranian proposal was embedded deep in a package it submitted at
the conference of Iraq's neighboring countries in Istanbul on November 3.)
The dilemma is acute for Saudi Arabia insofar as Iraq has also been the theater
of a historical struggle between Shi'ite Iran and Sunni Anatolia. In the
Iranian move on Kirkuk, Saudis see Tehran as lending a big helping hand to
Ankara, which is bound to further consolidate the two countries' understanding
over the Iraq situation. In intrinsic terms, though, the Iranian proposal ought
to satisfy Iraqi Arabs as well as Arab countries. But what gives it a cutting
edge is that it is not based on technical grounds but on manifestly political
motivation. In fact, Tehran admits as much.
The Iranian proposal undercuts the "Sunni solidarity" that Saudis are seeking.
For the secular Turkish establishment, though, there is no such contradiction
since cooperation with Iran is very obviously for strategic reasons. Moments
such as this bring out what strange bedfellows the Turks and the Saudis are.
'Green money'
All the same, King Abdullah's overture to Turkey has logic. He will know Turkey
has always been enamored of petro-dollars. The Saudis can be trendsetters at a
time when the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf have huge surplus
resources to invest. Turkey signaled its priorities when a double taxation
avoidance agreement was signed during King Abdullah's visit.
An influx of what Turks call yesil sermaye or green money - from wealthy
Islamist businessmen and oil-rich Arab countries - has quietly boosted the
AKP's finances over the years. Turkey's Islamic business skyline has certainly
changed beyond recognition during AKP rule in the party's strongholds like
Kayseri and Konya in inner Anatolia.
Turkish economists estimate that infusion of green money into Turkey could be
anywhere up to $12 billion. They speculate that Turkey could be a beneficiary
of the Saudi and Persian Gulf countries' liquidation of their US holdings since
September 11, 2001.
Some experts believe green money may already have begun influencing Turkish
policies. To be sure, Saudi investors will take note that following the AKP's
massive election victory in July, Turkey's political fulcrum has shifted. The
newly elected president Gul fondly recalls his assignment as a specialist in
the Islamist Development Bank in Jeddah for eight years from 1983 to 1991.
Riyadh can claim a genuinely warm friend in Gul.
Limits of Saudi influence
King Abdullah's visit is a celebration of growing ties. It is an
acknowledgement of Turkey's regional role, and a statement that Riyadh will go
the extra yard to cement common approaches on regional problems with Turkey.
But how far can a Saudi-Turkish strategic partnership develop? The crunch will
come over Iraq's future. Much will depend on how Bush makes good on the pledges
he made to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their talks in
Washington on November 5 regarding PKK terrorism. Even as King Abdullah was
visiting Ankara, Turkey's chief of general staff, General Yasar Buyukanit,
repeated that an operation inside Iraq is in the pipeline awaiting government
approval.
Buyukanit played down the Washington parleys. "We are a great state and we do
not need approval from anyone," he said, adding Turkey only sought
"coordination" with US forces in Iraq to avoid friendly fire.
The Saudis have no real means of influencing either developments on the
Turkey-Iraq border that could trigger a chain reaction, or Bush's complicated
thought processes over Iran that could dramatically alter the region's
chessboard.
For the first time in decades, even though oil is selling for almost $100 a
barrel, the Saudis will realize the limits of their capacity to influence the
course of events in their region. They find non-Arab parties - the US, Israel,
Iran, Turkey and even the Kurds - entirely managing the birth pangs of the new
Middle East, while not a single Arab regime is directly involved. The Turks
will know the Saudis are dealing from a weak hand.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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