Putin's choice: Charm could be unlucky
By M K Bhadrakumar

Long live Kremlinology! The Kremlinologists are back in business, no matter whether the new cold war is hotting up or not. Last week, a sliver of a statement attributed to a Kremlin functionary was avidly dissected for meaning in world capitals. He revealed that President Vladimir Putin doesn't propose to vacate his official dacha at Novoye Ogaryovo in the Moscow suburbs even after his term ends next March. Here was conclusive evidence that Putin after all didn't intend to walk into the sunset of his tumultuous political career any time soon.

Novoye Ogaryovo lies at the edge of the prestigious birch-tree



lined district where the privileged caste of Russia's businessmen, pop stars, ice hockey players and top officials live in secluded estates with high walls and CCTV cameras. Fur-clad women can be spotted in nearby Barkhiva Luxury Village, gently gliding past, wearing earrings set with yellow diamonds costing a million dollars, shopping for Lamborghinis. Welcome to post-Soviet Russia.

An invitation to the grand presidential residence signified a special gesture - but even visiting US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates were kept waiting in an ante-chamber for a half hour recently before Putin received them. (Putin was making a point that Russia cannot be taken for granted anymore.)

But until 48 hours ago, Kremlinologists continued tying themselves in knots as to who would be Putin's nominal successor in the Kremlin. There had to be someone. Russia's constitution didn't allow a third consecutive term for an incumbent president.

The latest speculation was that Putin was heading for the Belarus capital of Minsk with the intent of sealing a union of Russia and the Russian-speaking former Soviet republic to its west - something backed by an overwhelming majority of people in the two countries.

The conspiracy theory was that such a union would doubtless need a new constitution, and surely enough, a new president, and what better way could Putin have for sneaking his way back into the presidency? Then, there was the perennial speculation that Putin was never really the source of power in the Kremlin, but was a mere representative of a new class of siloviki, which means a tribe of closely knit yet mutually warring protagonists from the erstwhile Soviet intelligence and security apparatus who aggrandized authority over Russian political and economic (and even cultural and intellectual) life in the post-Boris Yeltsin years.

The Kremlinologists were confident that the siloviki would inevitably replace Putin with someone from within the tribe, and that the Byzantine world of power politics in Russia would remain much the same despite the verisimilitude of a transition.

Amid all these viewpoints, Putin dropped a bombshell by his announcement on Monday in his characteristic crisp style, with poker face, almost as an afterthought, that he endorsed the candidacy of Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, his protege from St Petersburg days, as the official Kremlin candidate for the upcoming presidential elections. "I can say that I have known him for more than 17 years now and have worked closely with him throughout these years, and I fully and wholeheartedly support this choice," Putin modestly told a gathering of senior Russian politicians at a meeting in the Kremlin. Actually, Putin insisted he was endorsing their choice, and wouldn't even claim Medvedev to be his choice.

Why 42-year-old Medvedev? To be sure, he was only on the fringes of the consideration zone of the West's Kremlin watchers. Once again, Putin outfoxed the Western capitals - this time, though, the surprise element has come almost as his Christmas gift to the Western world. The point is, Medvedev is the acceptable face of the Kremlin as viewed from the West.

A self-confessed aficionado of hard rock - Black Sabbath is reportedly his favorite - dressed nattily and with his stunning good looks, Medvedev easily became the cynosure of Western media attention when he appeared on the world stage in the Swiss ski resort of Davos for the World Economic Forum meeting in February. He spoke as an avowed supporter of democratic values, he was very market-friendly, and media-savvy with an engaging style almost infectious in its personal magnetism. The West quickly concluded it could do splendid business with him in a globalized world.

But there was a catch. Medvedev's chances of succeeding Putin were rated low, as he happened to be one of just a handful of the inner circle of Kremlin functionaries who wasn't one of the powerful siloviki. By his choice of a young liberal as his successor, Putin, therefore, has made a huge conciliatory signal to the West. There can be no opinions about it. Medvedev undoubtedly represents the age-old strand of "Westernism" (as against "Orientalism") in the Russian elite's outlook.

Apropos the "correlation of forces" (to use Marxian idiom) in the international arena, Putin has made a big statement. He has shrewdly estimated that Washington is doing all it can to mend fences with Beijing so as to put Moscow at a disadvantage in the highly sensitive triangular equations involving the three powers; that equilibrium must be found through improving Russia's relations with Europe; that a thaw in chilly Russian-American relations remained unlikely in the short term.

Putin remains conscious that Russia's destiny lies with Europe, and its multi-vector foreign policy emphasizing a democratized world order conforming to international law cannot optimally perform unless Moscow has a balanced relationship with Europe based on mutual accommodation. Medvedev could just be the bridge-builder that Putin needs.

But Medvedev should not be seen as anything other than a complete devotee of "Putinism". He headed Gazprom, the energy leviathan, which piloted the reassertion of state control over oil and gas and came to symbolize resurgent Russia's principal foreign policy tool. He wanted Russia to integrate but stressed Russia's democracy would still have its unique features drawn from its culture, history and traditions.

Though he identifies with Russia's middle class, Medvedev lacks an independent political base and owes his meteoric career almost entirely to Putin. Arguably, even after becoming president, he would have to continue to communicate with the siloviki via Putin. On the plus side, he has shown an extraordinary capacity for survival in the treacherous depths of Kremlin politics. In all probability, therefore, Putin's foreign policy will remain unchanged, even if Medvedev may have no use for militaristic attitudes toward the West, or rhetorical tub-thumping.

From India's point of view, Medvedev comes as a mixed blessing. New Delhi would be hard-pressed if Russia were to veer away on an anti-West orientation. Delhi would hate to revisit non-alignment, but a slide toward a new cold war is even less likely under Medvedev. Quintessentially, he is a liberal who would charm the leadership in Delhi.

But then comes the rub. Delhi hardly knows him. There is no shred of evidence to show that Delhi had the foresight to spot him or cultivate him. Beijing, in comparison, didn't take a chance. It stole a march over Delhi. The Chinese leadership got Medvedev over to Beijing, chatted him up despite (or, probably because of) Gazprom's tough negotiating tactic on the Siberian gas heading for China.

Medvedev's rise underscores for Delhi that a new generation is ascending to Russian leadership. The new faces have scarcely any recollection of the romance of Indo-Soviet friendship. Their natural inclination is toward the West. They will prove tough bargainers for Delhi, unlike their Soviet predecessors who ultimately put a friendship tag on transactions with India.

The realization comes starkly home, as a major challenge waits Delhi in restructuring Russian-Indian relations, which remain a sizeable chunk of the unfinished business of India's haphazard transition to the post-Cold War era.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

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