Russia lays new tracks in Korean
ties By Leonid Petrov
Following the inauguration of a new
president in South Korea, Russia had its own
presidential elections on March 2, with Dmitry
Medvedev anointed as Vladimir Putin's successor.
In North Korea, it has been reported, the grooming
of a new leader is already underway. Nevertheless,
the dynamics of relations between Russia and the
two Koreas will depend not so much on
personalities but on the joint efforts of the
sides.
Relations between Russia and Korea
in the 20th century were saturated with hopes,
victories and disappointments. The Russo-Japanese
War (1904-1905) flared up precisely because of
control over Korea and ended - for Russia - with
the loss of South Sakhalin and ultimately the
headache of the (First) Russian Revolution. The
revenge of August 1945 and the joint
Soviet-American occupation of Korea incurred many
political problems.
The creation of two
separate states on the Korean Peninsula in
1948
led to the civil and international conflict known
as the Korean War (1950-1953), which to this day
has not been fully resolved. The Cold War delayed
the establishment of diplomatic relations between
Russia and South Korea for four decades, while
North Korea even now does not enjoy the diplomatic
recognition of the United States and their
strategic allies in the Asia-Pacific region.
The understanding of the simple fact that
direct contact with both Pyongyang and Seoul gives
Moscow special power in resolving serious regional
issues did not arrive immediately. Only from the
late 1990s did Russia first attempt to make a
Korean policy that regarded North and South
equally.
Coincidence or not, the major
improvement in relations between North and South
Korea also happened at that time. In June 2000,
the North leader Kim Jong-il for the first time
received in Pyongyang the president of the
Republic of Korea, Kim Dae-jung, and a month later
the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin. The
foundation of the new "trilateral relationship"
was laid precisely then. Soon after that, Kim
Jong-il twice visited Russia by train, and the
president of South Korea crossed the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ), separating the two Koreas, by
automobile last year.
No sooner had
Russia-Korea relations entered a new era than
another nuclear crisis burst out on the Korean
Peninsula. In October 2002, the United States
accused North Korea of secretly enriching uranium.
To this allegation more charges were added, such
as testing and selling missiles, trading in
narcotics and counterfeiting US currency. In the
course of this diplomatic row, the economic
interests of North and South Korea were impacted.
An attempt to resolve the escalating discord was
undertaken in the form of six-party talks which
opened in Beijing in 2003. At this forum, where
former Cold War allies and rivals (the two Koreas,
China, the US and Japan) got together, Russia
again found itself caught in the crossfire.
It has already been five years since the
emergence of the latest Korean nuclear problem
(the first was in 1993-1994, until former US
president Jimmy Carter brokered a deal), and it
remains the stumbling block for the development of
the entire region. Despite the temporary
diplomatic breakthroughs (in September 2005 and
February 2007) the six-party process has not
reached its goal. For the international community,
to disarm the North remains a "mission
impossible".
Meanwhile, many joint
projects and plans endorsed by Moscow, Pyongyang
and Seoul remain unaccomplished. It is not
difficult to calculate who profits from this and
who suffers the loss. The trilateral relationship
between Russia, the North and the South include
mutually beneficial economic and military
collaboration. By freezing this triangle, China
and Japan can sit back and relax, while the US
will enjoy additional freedom to maneuver in the
region.
Where does the commonality of
interests lay for Russia and the two Koreas? What
projects can be realized in the near future? How
can they avoid possible conflicts among themselves
and with their competitors in the future?
Commonality in understanding the roots of the
conflict and principal agreement on the ways
leading to its resolution are needed to guarantee
peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. To achieve
this, the new leaders in Moscow, Seoul and
Pyongyang must carefully study the geopolitical
map of the region and demonstrate patience and
endurance in resolving debatable questions.
Colonialism, World War II and the Cold War
are gone but their legacy is a bouquet of
unresolved problems. Territorial claims, in one
form or another, involve almost all countries
adjacent in this region with the exception of
Russia and Korea. The Joint Russian
Federation-DPRK Commission for the Demarcation of
State Borders has recently completed its work by
documenting and marking the 17-kilometer frontier.
This strip of uninhabited and swampy land in the
mouth of the Tumannaya (Tuman-gang) River plays an
exceptionally important geopolitical role. It not
only provides the two countries with land access
to each other, but also prevents Chinese access to
the East Sea (Sea of Japan).
Here, some
50km north of the small port that forms the core
of North's Rajin-Seonbong Special Economic Zone,
the interests of Russia and China are now at
stake. Russia is rapidly repairing the railroad
track, and China (in a similarly speedy manner) is
constructing a new automobile highway, both
leading from their respective borders to the port
of Rajin. Russia, investing at least 1.75 billion
rubles (US$72 million) into this project, seeks to
strongly connect Rajin (and the rest of northern
Korea) to its Trans-Siberian Railroad. China, in
turn, hopes to divert the growing cargo traffic to
its own territory, offering the efficient network
of railroads for delivery of South Korean and
Japanese goods to Central Asian and European
markets. What position will the government of
North Korea take in this clash of ambitions?
The geopolitics of railroads do not end
with this. In May 2007, the first test run across
the DMZ was completed by two passenger trains. Six
months later, a South Korean cargo train repeated
the experiment before traversing this route
regularly. In other words, economic considerations
started prevailing over military fears. As for
Russia's interests, they are currently focused on
the development of the eastern branch of the
Trans-Korean Railway, which sooner or later will
reconnect provincial Rajin with the highly
sophisticated port and railway terminal of Pusan
in the southeastern tip of peninsula. From there
even Japan looks close. The creation of a
128km underground railroad tunnel, which could
connect the "Land of the Morning Calm" with the
"Land of the Rising Sun", is recognized as
technically possible but could cost a hefty $77
billion. Thus, the transformation of the East Sea
into a lake of peace and economic collaboration
coincides with the interests of all coastal
nations.
A similar truth applies to the
trade in petroleum, natural gas, and electricity.
In 2007, the volume of the export of "black gold"
from Russia to South Korea reached 38.13 million
barrels (2.7 times more than in the previous
year). The relative proximity of the Russian oil
and gas fields is an attractive factor for Korean
companies who actively search for alternatives to
Middle East oil suppliers. This year South Korea
will for the first time start importing natural
gas from Russia. The expected volume of delivery
during 2008 is 1.5 million tons (or 5.1% of South
Korea's annual demand).
Should there be a
special inter-Korean agreement, the delivery of
oil and natural gas to the Republic of Korea could
be arranged through the North. However,
understanding that it will take years before such
an agreement is negotiated and signed, the Russian
monopoly GAZPROM is now designing an underwater
gas pipe going directly to South Korea.
The prospects for the export of Russian
electrical power to the countries of Northeast
Asia also depend on political will and stability
in the region. At present the Far-Eastern division
of the Russian government-controlled Unified
Energy System is considering several different
projects which are aimed at helping North and
South Korea to satisfy their energy needs.
According to one plan, Russia will direct
electricity to the South via North Korea.
The high-voltage electrical power lines
will be fixed very high above the ground to make
any illegal tapping into, or interruption of,
electricity by the North unlikely. Neither will
South Korea be able to exert any pressure on the
North. Power allocated for the North will go along
a separate line because the electrical grids in
the two Koreas are technologically different.
Another plan suggests that Russia will be able to
provide 800 MW of electric power to North Korea in
substitution of the energy promised by South Korea
to that country. Certainly, a trilateral agreement
would be needed to realize this. In the meantime,
the Unified Energy System is exploring the more
stable markets of northeastern China and Japan.
Trade relations between Russia and Korea
are steadily growing. According to customs
statistics, last year Russia recorded the sharpest
increase of South Korean imports (56.2% more than
in 2006). Due to the inflow of "petro-dollars" the
new class of nouveaux riches in Russia began
actively buying Korean automobiles, cell phones,
television sets and LCD monitors. South Korea
exported to Russia goods worth US$8.1 billion
(including $3.296 billion of automobiles, $859
million of mobile phone equipment, motor vehicles
and spare parts worth $659 million). As for trade
with North Korea, in 2006 Russia occupied third
place after China and South Korea and absorbed 9%
of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on
imports.
Russia and Korea are becoming
more connected by major investment projects. Last
year the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first
assembly line in North Korea, specializing in the
production of medium-size trucks named
"Taebaeksan-96". This year it is expected that
South Korean Hyundai Motor Co will finally
announce the beginning of construction of a new
motor vehicle plant in Russia. Presently, Hyundai
is assembling 56,000 automobiles per year at the
Taganrog Motor Vehicle Plant. However, the growing
popularity of Korean cars in Russia is likely to
motivate the company to invest an additional $400
million into the construction of a new plant
producing up to 100,000 automobiles per year.
Alternatively, the feasibility of building a
factory producing spare parts in the Saint
Petersburg or Nizhniy-Novgorod regions is also
being discussed.
Conventional armaments
have always been a special item in Russian-Korean
commercial relations. Following the US, Russia is
the second largest supplier of weapons for "Third
World countries" (28% of all sales). In 2007,
Russia earned $8.1 billion from this trade. In the
same year, after spending $600 million for this
purpose, South Korea occupied ninth place among
the most important buyers of weapons in the world.
In the period 1999 through 2006 the total cost of
weapons acquisitions made by South Korea was
between $6.7 and $7.8 billion. To avoid the
possible conflict of interests in its deals with
North Korea, Russia has always limited the
supplies to short range tactical weapons, which
can be used predominantly for defensive purposes.
Among the most difficult but negotiable
issues of "trilateral policy" remains the problem
of external debt. During the Soviet era the North
incurred the debt of approximately $8 billion,
which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot
repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most
negotiations on the new aid and development
programs. The other side of the story is that in
January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic
relations with Republic of Korea, Moscow received
$3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year
loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this
loan largely unpaid.
The new Russian
government in the 1990s provided South Korea with
armaments worth $150 million to be counted as
payment-in-kind for the remaining debt. In 2003,
after bilateral negotiations on this issue were
completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled
and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over
in the next 23 years. Thus, taking into account
its own debts to the South, Russia could easily
write off at least $1.3 billion of its debts owed
by the North. Again, for true resolution of this
question a certain agreement between all three
parties is needed.
Russian-Korean
trilateral relations are based on a solid footing
and replete with opportunities that can benefit
each party. But will the year 2008 see a turning
point in their collaboration? The new
administrations in the Kremlin and Seoul's
presidential Blue House, together with the new
generation of leaders in Pyongyang, can radically
change the political climate in the region. It
does not really matter who is elected president or
assigned to be heir and successor.
A
simple strengthening of economic and military
relationships between the three countries will
contribute to the peaceful solution of the Korean
nuclear problem and prepare the basis for durable
peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. If Moscow,
Pyongyang and Seoul reach a mutual understanding,
coordinate their policies, and preclude their
rivals from destroying this unity, the many hopes
of the Russian and Korean peoples have a good
chance of materializing in the coming four to five
years.
Leonid A
Petrov, PhD, is a research associate,
Division of Pacific and Asian History, Research
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian
National University.
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