The Taliban's shadow hangs over
NATO By M K Bhadrakumar
It may seem the outcome of the summit
meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) at Bucharest, Romania from April 2-4 and
the weekend meet between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and US President George W Bush at
the Black Sea resort of Sochi has gone in favor of
Washington. At least, media commentators in Moscow
assess Russia "lost" the NATO summit.
An
element of anxiety surely crept in. The Bucharest
summit and the Sochi meet are watershed events.
US-Russia relations have reached a crossroads. A
new long-term confrontation may ensue, or the path
opens to partnership relations. The US delegation
conceded nothing to Moscow. The George W Bush
administration carried a tough brief - "there's no
trade-off, period", Bush said as
he
headed for Bucharest. On the one hand, the Bush
administration wants to create a legacy by
transforming NATO as the dominating
political-military force in Europe under American
leadership. On the other hand, it wants this
achieved without a breach with either its allies
or Russia.
There were only two ways such
balancing could be achieved: one, by pushing for a
large-scale breakthrough, and, two, through a
strategic compromise with Russia. Washington opted
for the first. But it's a tough call. In the
process, it failed to secure a NATO Membership
Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia. But it
extracted a pledge from NATO allies that the
matter will be taken up again in December.
Moscow anticipated this outcome. Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "This will not be
unanswered. But we will respond in a pragmatic
way, not like little school boys who were hurt and
fled their classroom slamming the door to cry in
the corner." He hinted the issue is far from over.
"We are prepared for various scenarios," he added.
Again, American diplomacy appears to have
scored a tangible success in getting NATO to agree
to look at a "bolt-on system" connected to the
planned US missile defense shield in Poland and
the Czech Republic. The summit decided to task
NATO to develop options for a comprehensive
missile defense architecture to extend coverage to
all ally territory and populations not otherwise
covered by the US system. The findings will come
up for review at the alliance's 2009 summit. The
NATO leaders realized the "substantial
contribution that the US system can provide".
On the face of it, the European
anti-ballistic missile system has turned from an
American project into a NATO project. This, in
turn, will undermine Russia's ability to oppose
it, because it may now have to deal with the
Western community in the form of NATO. Indeed,
Moscow faces a hard choice - either settle with
Bush in the remaining months of his presidency or
prepare to face the brunt of Senator John McCain
(who has emerged as the front runner in the US
presidential election). The Democrats are no
better, either. Richard Holbrooke, who advises
Hillary Clinton, or Zbigniew Brzezinski, who seems
to guide the Barack Obama team from the backstage,
share McCain's outlook with regard to "revanchist
Russia".
An unnamed Kremlin source
admitted at Sochi that Putin and Bush failed to
overcome differences over the missile defense
system. Putin himself acknowledged at the joint
press conference with Bush at Sochi on Sunday: "I
won't hide the fact that one of the most difficult
issues was and remains the American missile
defense system in Europe ... I want to be
understood correctly: there has been no change in
our fundamental attitude to the American plans."
Significantly, Bush's response contained no
promises of a rethink, no assurances of an
accommodation.
So, is it a new cold war?
Putin says "no". He expresses cautious optimism
that an agreement on missile defense is still
possible. He insists, "There was some positive
progress. Our concerns were heard by the American
side." He believes Bush is "seriously and
sincerely" seeking to resolve the problem and "we
fully support this attitude".
Where is the
catch? Are we missing something? The answer may be
found in the coming months in the tangled
mountains in faraway Afghanistan. Unnoticed by the
security officers clearing the homeless people and
stray dogs around the palatial venue of the summit
in the Romanian parliament building, downtown
Bucharest had a visitor with brooding eyes and
unkempt beard who lingered in the shadows all
through and watched the proceedings - the Taliban.
Once the theatrics surrounding NATO
expansion and the US missile defense wear out and
a reality check inevitably follows, the
existential question will stare all in the face -
the alliance's faltering operations in
Afghanistan.
Russia offered a rope at
Bucharest, which the alliance grasped, while
Washington pretended it didn't quite see that
happening. The significance of the agreement
reached in Bucharest on Friday is yet to sink in.
The agreement concerns transit of NATO's food and
non-military cargo and "some types of non-lethal
military equipment" across Russia to Afghanistan.
NATO supplies will be transported
thousands of kilometers across Russia, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan. Even though the letters regarding
the transit were exchanged between Lavrov and NATO
secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the
ceremony in Bucharest, Russia has treated this as
a matter concerning the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). The topic figured at the
informal meeting of CSTO foreign ministers held in
Moscow on March 28 "because transit to Afghanistan
simply for objective geographical reasons also
calls for appropriate arrangements with many
countries which are members of CSTO", to quote
Lavrov. CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan.
In the ultimate analysis,
therefore, Russia has acted in consultation with
and on behalf of the CSTO partners. This has
implications, no matter CSTO's standing in NATO
eyes. Moscow made no bones about the fact that
sheer pragmatism had guided its decision. Lavrov
said, "If we pretend to be offended and block this
transit, the efficiency of the combat against
terrorism, which is not very good as it is, will
worsen dramatically; and the only result will be
that in the absence of a restraining factor, all
these drug traffickers and terrorists will feel
freer in planning their actions in Central Asia
and Russia ... Russia's pragmatism and interests
prompt us to support the activities of those who
are trying to deal with the terrorists in
Afghanistan."
But there is more to
Moscow's "pragmatism". The Russian ambassador in
Kabul, Zamir Kabulov, told Vremya Novostei, "The
longer NATO remains in Afghanistan, the worse it
will be for them. But it would be incorrect to
imagine Russia wants NATO out of Afghanistan as
soon as possible, at any cost. We will not let
them out of Afghanistan until they solve the
problems they have created - international
terrorism, unchecked increase in drug trafficking
- and build a strong state there, and rebuild the
economy."
That is to say, Russia will
provide all logistical support to NATO so that the
alliance can focus attention on bleeding itself
white in Afghanistan. An engrossing equation is
developing that may determine the alchemy of
Russia's relations with NATO for years to come.
Whether Washington acknowledges it or not, the
transit agreement gives Russia a role in the NATO
operations in Afghanistan. The criticality of this
role will only increase as NATO's heavy dependence
- 70% plus as of now - on transit through
Pakistani territory becomes more and more
unsustainable.
Russian and NATO
intelligence cannot be unaware that the Taliban
have begun targeting Torkham, the strategic check
post on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which is
also the main gateway for supply convoys for the
alliance's forces. On March 20, a convoy of 40 oil
tankers supplying NATO forces was destroyed in a
series of explosions in a parking lot at Torkham.
No doubt, the Taliban have identified NATO's
supply and logistics systems as its Achilles'
heel. Meanwhile, the willingness of the
democratically elected government in Pakistan to
continue as an ally in the "war on terror" itself
remains to be seen.
What all this adds up
to is that the Bush administration's triumphalism
over the NATO Bucharest summit is going to be
short-lived. How NATO is going to be able to
extricate itself from the colossal muddle in
Afghanistan is a wide open question. Attacks on
NATO troops are now taking place at the rate of
500 per month. With all the heavyweight punches at
the Bucharest summit, Washington failed to get any
significant numbers of additional troops from its
NATO allies.
The commitment by France,
Britain, Poland, Spain, Romania and others add up
to 2,000 to 2,500 troops, according to the White
House, but the commanders in Afghanistan say they
could use in immediate terms as many as two or
three brigades, equal to some 10,000 troops. The
US will have to make up the shortfall.
The
US spokesman put on a brave face, claiming that
"regardless of the situation in Iraq", Washington
is committed to Afghanistan for the long haul. But
then there is yet another side to it - the
financial drain. The operations currently cost the
American taxpayer US$100 million per day, which
works out to $36 billion annually. The US is
nowhere near the end of the tunnel after having
spent $127 billion in the war in Afghanistan since
2001.
Above all, the political chessboard
is dramatically shifting. The proposal made by
Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov at Bucharest
for the resuscitation of the "six plus two"
contact group underscored this. Ironically, "six
plus two" was created in the 1997-2001 period
under the United Nations auspices for promoting
reconciliation between the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance groups. It comprised China,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and
Pakistan and the US and Russia.
Karimov
suggested an expanded format of "six plus two",
including NATO, should work on a potential roadmap
leading to peace in Afghanistan. Curiously, even
as he was addressing the NATO leaders in
Bucharest, a spokesman of the erstwhile Northern
Alliance revealed in Kabul that they had already
commenced secret talks with the Taliban. "We are
both Muslims, we are both Afghans, and we are both
dissatisfied with the [Kabul] government's
performance," he reportedly claimed. He implied
NATO is the outside party.
Karimov's
proposal will be attractive to many NATO member
countries, which remain skeptical about the US's
so-called "comprehensive strategy" in the war and
are inclined to exploring an exit strategy. (Der
Spiegel reported that a German paper outlining an
"exit strategy" figured in closed-door discussions
at Bucharest.) At any rate, Washington will be
irritated that the Uzbek proposal implicitly seeks
a voice for Central Asian countries (and Russia
and China) in NATO's war in Afghanistan.
To be sure, Moscow is keenly taking note.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko
told Interfax news agency in Moscow last week that
Russia would be willing to deepen cooperation with
NATO over Afghanistan, but this would not happen
"if each other's lawful security interests are not
taken into account". He added in good measure,
"There is no trade-off and there cannot be one."
Russia's transit deal might appear to
involve only NATO's food and non-military
supplies. But then, as the soldier in George
Bernard Shaw's play Arms and the Man would
say, chocolates are more important than
ammunition. Grushko is justified to anticipate
NATO's European members - and even Washington -
will eventually appreciate Russia' s goodwill.
Until that happens, Moscow wouldn't conclude who
lost and who won at the summit in Bucharest.
M K
Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat
in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years,
with postings including India's ambassador to
Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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