BOOK REVIEW Tell-tale travelers' tales Russia and Iran in the Great Game by Elena Andreeva
Reviewed by Dmitry Shlapentokh
Russia's relationship with Iran and the Middle East is one of the hot subjects
of international affairs. But it is not due to Russia's importance, as during
the Cold War, but because of the importance of Iran.
There are many signs of Russian-Iranian rapprochement, and people see this as a
tradition that began with Russia's flirtation with Iran at the beginning of
Soviet rule many decades ago, when the new, emerging Soviet elite was looking
for alliances in its
conflict with the mostly unfriendly West.
The rise of tensions between Tehran and Moscow in the post-World War II era
related to changes in Iranian policy. Under the late Shah of Iran (deposed in
1979), Iran became one of the United States' most staunch allies, and Iran was
seen by Moscow as more a part of the West than the East.
After the Iranian revolution of 1979, the situation started to slowly change.
While Iranian leaders saw the Soviets as evil, they were not as evil as the
Americans. And by Mikhail Gorbachev's time in the mid-1980s, and especially
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, real rapprochement developed.
This was especially so in Russia, where the idea of a strong alliance with Iran
became quite popular, especially among those who espoused "Eurasianism", the
quasi-philosophical and political doctrine espoused by Russian emigres in the
1920s. They believed that as Russia was a unique blend of Orthodox Slavs and
Muslim Turkic people, its main friends should include people of the East.
In the interpretation of Eurasianism in the 1990s, the Iranians emerged as the
major allies of Orthodox Russians in their confrontation with the main evil -
the US. However, at the beginning of the new Vladimir Putin/Dmitry Medvedev
rule, the popularity of Eurasianism is in decline.
There are many reasons for the cooling of Russian fascination with Eurasian
"symbiosis". One is increasing tension between Russians and Muslims of various
ethnic origins inside Russia; this is translated into the Russian relationship
with Iran.
However, the idea of a Russian alliance with Iran is still around, even if only
for pragmatic reasons: Iran could be a good bargaining chip in Moscow's
dealings with the West, and a market for Russian weapons and other goods.
At the same time, increasing numbers of Russian nationalists look at Iran with
suspicion and they see the West - mostly "Old Europe" - as more attractive,
regardless of Russia's friction with the European Union.
These differing views are reminiscent of the divisions in the Russian elite in
the middle and late 19th century - the point at which the reviewed book picks
up. Its focus is the image of Iran that emerged in the works of Russian
travelers in the country, and the author frames her narrative in the context of
Russian intellectuals divided into two camps - Slavophiles and those disposed
to the West.
While Slavophiles believed in Russia's uniqueness as a Slavic Orthodox
civilization, the "Westernizers" placed Russia in the context of the West. This
division of 19th-century Russian thought is well known to anyone who has even
the most superficial knowledge of Russian intellectual history.
Still, the author brings her own interpretation to these divisions. She implies
that it was not just the Westernizers who turned against Iran after visiting
the country. She says that even Slavophiles who visited the country to some
degree became Westernizers.
No one, it seems, was ready to identify with the Iranians, or Orientals in
general. The Russian observers' endless emphasis of "we Europeans" indicated
both a subconscious uneasiness to see in Iran what could also be found in
Russia and, in the case of a choice needing to be made, the decision to stick
with Europe rather than the East.
This subconscious uneasiness, and possibly even self-hatred, led to parallels
of their observations of Iran to those made by 19th-century Western travelers
to Russia. This comparison could have made the book much more interesting and
could have provided an additional backdrop for the author's sound points and
fascinating material.
The image of Iran that emerges in Russian travelogues is strikingly similar to
that found in the famous French aristocrat Marquis de Custine's descriptions of
his travels in Russia. Both Custine and Russian observers found the land in
which they traveled exotic, obviously different from Europe and they found the
natives "handsome and charming", the architecture picturesque.
Strangely, there was no fascination with Oriental wisdom or erotic pleasures -
so much a part of the "positive" image of the Orient.
The only difference between Custine's vision of Russia and the Russian
travelers' vision of Iran is that Custine saw Russia as potentially quite
dangerous for Europe; Russian observers were free from this fear regarding
Iran.
They implicitly saw Iran as a weak Oriental country that needed to be colonized
and civilized. This comparison with Europeans' - for example Custine's - vision
of Russia and the Russian vision of Iran could have considerably improved the
book, which is a solid work of scholarship.
The book is based on several hundred travelogues and other sources found in
libraries and archives in both Iran and Russia. It is written in a lively style
and makes enjoyable reading. It would be of interest not just for those
interested in Russia's intellectual history, European "Orientalism" and Middle
Eastern studies, but also for those who study present-day Russia's relationship
with Iran.
Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism by Elena
Andreeva. Routledge; 1st edition (July 18, 2007). ISBN-10: 0415771536. Price
US$150, 288 pages.
Dmitry Shlapentokh, PhD, is associate professor of history, College of
Liberal Arts and Sciences, Indiana University South Bend. He is author of
East Against West: The First Encounter - The Life of Themistocles, 2005.
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After the Iranian revolution of 1979, the situation started to slowly change.
While Iranian leaders saw the Soviets as evil, they were not as evil as the
Americans. And by Mikhail Gorbachev's time in the mid-1980s, and especially
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, real rapprochement developed.
