No matter how presidential Dmitry Medvedev may act, his late May summit in
Beijing has been discounted in the West as routine, unsubstantial and
overshadowed by the meetings of his predecessor, Vladimir Putin.
The "growing" conflict of interests between Russia and China over various
issues - trade, energy, military sales, to mention a few - has also been the
focus of media coverage. In keeping with this image, (now) Prime Minister
Putin's visit to Paris a week after was described as more "presidential" than
Medvedev's east-bound mission. These assessments miss important aspects of the
evolving and broadening relations between the two largest nations
on the Eurasian continent.
Symbolism and substance
Medvedev's two-day visit to China was designed to reaffirm continuity and
stability in Russia's China policy. In the past eight years, China has had
considerable experience working with Putin as Medvedev served as head of
Putin's 2000 presidential election campaign headquarters, presidential chief of
staff (2003-05)and deputy prime minister (2005-08).
This time, the Chinese side got a closer look at Medvedev and how he and Putin
coordinate policies toward Beijing. In the longer run, Medvedev has to develop
his own line and policy adjustments may be unavoidable. When that happens,
China does not want to be surprised. This was why the summit was "quickly
arranged" on an invitation of Chinese President Hu Jintao right after
Medvedev's inauguration on May 7.
China was Medvedev's first foreign visit outside the Commonwealth of
Independent States; he was the first foreign head of state to visit
quake-ridden China; and a Russian rescue team was among the first to arrive and
was the only foreign team to have found any survivors. Despite the hectic
relief effort preoccupying his hosts, the Beijing summit went ahead with a
normal and predictable outcome: a joint declaration to reaffirm the consensus
on various global issues and the signing of several commercial agreements,
among them a US$1 billion contract for a gas centrifuge nuclear enrichment
plant.
Hu also made a four-point proposal for enhancing high-level trust, promoting
pragmatic cooperation, socio-cultural exchanges, and cooperation in
international affairs. Immediately after Medvedev's Beijing visit, Premier Wen
Jaibao and his Russian counterpart Putin agreed to set up a joint energy
commission at the vice prime ministerial level.
Medvedev's visit, therefore, was both symbolic and substantial for Moscow and
Beijing.
A normal relationship
Despite its lofty title, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership that has
existed since 1996 is a normal relationship with several "bottom-lines",
including non-interference in each other's domestic politics, border security
and stability. Beyond that, it has evolved into a complicated interactive
process that includes both cooperation and competition.
Under president Putin, some contradictions were visible: relatively high-level
trust versus low-level social interactions; frequent diplomatic coordination
versus substandard economic interactions; strong governmental intervention in
bilateral economic relations versus mediocre returns, etc. Fourteen years ago,
former president Boris Yeltsin tossed out the idea of building an oil pipeline
to China. To date, the world's emerging manufacturing giant (China) and energy
superpower (Russia) are still talking. In the past few years, once-thriving
Russian military sales to China have virtually halted.
These issues, or bottlenecks, are not desirable for Russia or China. None of
them, however, has spilled over into other issue areas or become politicized,
thanks to the thickening web of connections and the institutionalization of
governmental contacts. This is substantially different from two other types of
bilateral relations: the "honeymoon" of 1949-60 and the hostility that
dominated relations from 1960-89 when problems were either ignored or allowed
to explode.
Young president as China's 'old' friend
Medvedev's visit occurred as Moscow and Beijing face growing challenges from
the West: a new round of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion
and missile defense, mounting protectionism in the West and surging energy
prices - and China has to deal with Tibet and the Summer Olympic Games in
August. Their respective policies, however, may not be identical.
Even if both oppose US missile defense and NATO's expansion, China may not want
to see a deepening of the Russia-West breach to a point that it has to take
sides. In economic areas, Russia is one the few Western nations that benefits
from high energy costs. Nonetheless, its declining manufacturing capability and
reluctance to become China's "raw material supplier" led to its first trade
deficit with China ($8 billion in 2007) since the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization - a community of nations
including Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan -
needs to infuse new ideas for both internal cohesion and external relations.
It remains to be seen how Medvedev will be able to deal with these problems.
Some of them may be irresolvable, given the growing structural difference
between China's manufacturing capability and Russia's raw-material based
recovery. Russia may have to realize that China is no longer willing to
purchase from Russia a large quantity of air and naval armaments based on
Soviet research and development unless Moscow is willing to elevate China to
the level of India in military sales and technology transfer.
Still, Medvedev seemed to have injected fresh air into a routine and
institutionalized relationship. Despite his youth, the Russian president is
described as China's "old friend", thanks to his co-chairmanship of China's
"Russia Year" (2006) and Russia's "China Year" (2007). At the same time,
Medvedev is widely regarded in the West as liberal and presumably pro-West.
Even Putin, who presided over the recovery of Russia from Soviet ashes, has yet
to have bridged the West and East - the dream of any Russian leader, czar or
communist commissar.
Medvedev has at least four years to build this image. His Russia, however, is
quite different from that of Putin eight years ago. So is China.
Yu Bin is (byu@wittenberg.edu) senior fellow for the Shanghai
Institute of American Studies and regular contributor to the Pacific Forum'sComparative Connections.
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