Page 2 of 2 Russia joins the war in Afghanistan
By M K Bhadrakumar
not less dangerous ... And we can see that military infrastructure is heading
towards our borders. What for? No one is posing a threat."
Therefore, Moscow has put NATO on the defensive by stretching a helping hand to
Afghanistan. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pointed out at a speech in
Moscow on May 28: "Russia does not claim any veto rights. But I think we have
the right to expect reciprocity if our partners expect us to consider their
interests. Indeed, without such reciprocity, it is hard to see how the
Bucharest summit could have produced an agreement on ground transit to
Afghanistan. It would, after all, have been easy for us to let NATO carry out
its international mission in Afghanistan on its own. But we did not do this ...
Russia will
continue to be involved to such an extent as meets our interests and principles
of equal cooperation."
The directions in which Western "reciprocity" manifests will be absorbing to
watch on the Eurasian political landscape. To be sure, there is an overall
mellowing toward Russia in the European approach. The George W Bush
administration has failed to initiate the deployment plan for anti-ballistic
missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. The forthcoming
Russia-European Union strategic negotiations on a new partnership agreement
promise a new start. These are positive tidings.
But equally, NATO's expansion plan with regard to Ukraine, Georgia and
Azerbaijan still remains on the agenda. Russia-NATO tensions have appeared over
Georgia and Kosovo. Therefore, Russia won't take chances, either.
Parallel to the growing involvement in Afghanistan, Moscow is also stepping up
its military presence in Central Asia. Arguably, the deteriorating situation in
Afghanistan has prompted Moscow to beef up the security of the Central Asian
region. But a distinctive feature is that Russia's move is also in response to
the wishes of the Central Asian states. Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov
recently proposed that the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community must merge into a single body so as
to create a "powerful union capable of becoming a counterbalance to NATO and
the EU".
From the Central Asian perspective, Russia's capacity to play a bigger role in
regional security looks more credible today than at any time in the post-Soviet
era. As influential Moscow commentator Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the
Politika Foundation, wrote in Izvestia newspaper recently, "The strengthening
of ties with Russia today appears much more logical and natural than it did in
the 1990s when, on the contrary, the Western economies were growing, while ours
was steadily declining. The growing energy crisis also works in favor of
integration."
Russia as a status quo power also holds attraction for local governments in
Central Asia. Most important, there is profound disquiet in Central Asian
capitals regarding the Afghan crisis - the US strategy in Afghanistan and
NATO's grit to win the war.
Until last year, Russia and the Central Asian states counted on the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) playing a role in stabilizing the Afghan
situation. But then they began sensing that China was following a complex
policy within the SCO by exploiting it to develop its bilateral links with
Central Asian countries and for penetrating deep into the energy sector, but
all the while applying the brakes on Russian attempts to augment the grouping's
profile as a security organization. (The SCO comprises China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.)
China has virtually put its foot down on a Russian proposal regarding close
CSTO-SCO ties. China disfavors SCO-CSTO military exercises. In sum, Beijing
seems anxious not to create misgivings in Washington. (The CSTO consists of of
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.)
This is not to say that China is indifferent to the stability of Afghanistan.
Far from it. China's preference is to keep its options open rather than be tied
down by the SCO or overtly identifying with Russian interests. After all, China
has huge stakes in Afghanistan. Beijing perceives advantages in directly
cooperating with the US (and NATO) rather than from within the SCO.
Conceivably, Beijing might not be altogether averse to the idea of sending
peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan at a later stage, provided a suitable United
Nations mission could be structured.
That is to say, an important phase of the SCO's evolution as a security
organization lies ahead when Russia assumes its chairmanship in 2008-2009,
following the SCO summit meeting scheduled to be held at Dushanbe (Tajikistan)
in August. From all appearances, there has been some serious rethink in Moscow
as well during recent months regarding the SCO's potential to play an
influential role in Afghanistan, given China's manifestly lukewarm attitude.
The Russian thinking also seems to have veered around to abandoning hopes of
working within the framework of CSTO or SCO but instead to concentrate on a
bilateral Russian-Afghan track.
Afghanistan also does not want to cooperate with either the CSTO or the SCO.
During his visit to Moscow on May 25-26, Afghan Foreign Minister Dadfar Spanta
made it clear that Afghanistan would not be seeking observer status with the
SCO. He let it be known in no uncertain terms that Russia is a low priority for
Kabul in its foreign policy - as compared to, say, China. All in all,
therefore, Moscow would realize that a long journey lies ahead in cultivating
influence in Kabul, which it must undertake all by itself.
Moscow appreciates that the present regime in Kabul of President Hamid Karzai
is unabashedly pro-American and is a participant in the US's regional strategy
that passes as "Great Central Asia Partnership for Afghanistan and Neighboring
Countries", which actually aims at undercutting Russian influence in Central
Asia.
Thus, the weekend's announcement in Moscow far from heralds a joint US-Russian
effort to stabilize the Afghan situation. In fact, there is hardly any scope
for a common US-Russian regional agenda. As Nikonov put it, "We [Russia] and
the Western countries have diametrically opposite definitions of success in our
policy toward the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries. For
Russia, success lies in strengthening of integration ties, rapprochement with
its neighbors and a strengthening of cooperation. For the West, on the
contrary, success means a distancing of these countries from Russia, a
reorientation to external centers of power aimed at preventing 'a rebirth of
the Russian empire'. When political goals are so diametrically opposed, it is
impossible to speak of a common agenda."
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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