The clearer the larger implications of Russia's latest adventure in the
Caucasus become, the more the Russian leadership's actions, in August, look
dysfunctional. A growing number of repercussions from Russia's overreaction to
Georgia's deeds in the breakaway region of South Ossetia have, by now, added up
to a significant loss in Moscow's international standing.
To be sure, further escalation in Moscow's already strained relations with the
United States had been, most probably, expected and, perhaps, desired by many
politicians and pundits in Moscow. Yet, as becomes more obvious with every
passing week, other setbacks in Russia's international relations are
increasingly outweighing any gains that its leadership may be reaping from its
show of military strength, diplomatic stubbornness and political resoluteness
with regard to the two
small separatist territories in Georgia - South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Whether it's the elites of Western and Eastern Europe, or the leaders of
Central and Southeast Asia - most international actors of relevance to Russia's
foreign affairs reacted with open or cryptic disapproval. Whereas many European
comments have been hardly less critical than American assessments of Russia's
behavior in the Caucasus, Asia's leaders followed a line of demonstrative
neutrality.
The latter even concerns countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia and Uzbekistan,
which have been among the closest allies of Moscow in the post-Soviet sphere.
In Ukraine, as a result of Russia's actions, the population's hitherto low
support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership has markedly risen.
As East Europeans are again becoming fearful of Russia, pro-Russian political
factions and interest groups in Kiev, Budapest, Sofia or Warsaw are loosing
ground.
Moreover, in the Baltics, Ukraine or Central Asia, these countries' significant
Russian diasporas are viewed with growing suspicion that, one day, the
minorities may transform into "fifth columns" of Moscow.
Instead, Russia gets open support for its actions in Georgia, and its
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, from the leaders of Nicaragua and
Venezuela - countries of, at best, secondary relevance to its international
affairs and economic interests.
Against this background, it looks as if Russia's political and military leaders
made a huge mistake when they first provoked Georgia and later reacted to
Tbilisi's attack on Tskhinvali the way they did. Russia's patriots, it would
appear, miscalculated the impact that these actions would have on their
nation's international standing. They were playing against their own interests.
Or did they? Perhaps, the logic of Russian behavior towards Georgia over the
past months was an entirely different one? Could it be that its results are, in
fact, in accord with salient interests of numerous political actors in Moscow?
Why did these events happen shortly after President Dmitry Medvedev's election
and before he managed to consolidate his new position?
Ever since Medvedev's nomination as a presidential candidate, in both Western
countries and pro-Western circles throughout Russia, there have been hopes that
his ascent would usher in a "thaw" in Russian domestic and foreign affairs.
Being one of the youngest political leaders in the upper echelons of the
Kremlin hierarchy, Medvedev is without a CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet
Union) or KGB background.
Having already developed a relatively pro-Western profile through his public
statements before his election, Medvedev's advance to the Kremlin noticeably
improved the tone in Russian-West relations and signaled a re-liberalization of
Russian public life.
This is in contrast to former president Vladimir Putin's tenure, which was
marked by a constant deterioration of Russia's democratic credentials and
relations to the West. Medvedev managed, in his first weeks as president after
being inaugurated on May 7 this year, to change the mood in Russian public life
and quickly set up trusting relationships with various European leaders. Some
of his first domestic initiatives, such as his ardent support for small and
medium businesses, a militant stance against corruption and repeated calls for
action against skinhead violence by Russia's security services, pointed in the
same direction.
While welcomed by many in Russia and the West, these tendencies, however,
jeopardized a number of interests that had come to dominate Russia under Putin.
These include legions of security service and army officers now populating the
offices of Russia's state organs and companies, various politicians supportive
of authoritarian and anti-Western policies, as well as a wide array of prolific
pundits who provide extravagant interpretations of current Russian and world
affairs.
It was under Putin's neo-Byzantine political system that these factions
thrived. With the promotion of Medvedev, Russian public life had the potential
of being normalized. In an outwardly open and domestically democratic country,
there would be fewer political opportunities for these actors, and no high
positions on the social ladder left to occupy.
Following the five-day war against Georgia this August, things are in their
place again: Russia and the West are on the brink of a new cold war. Public
discourse is about the need for the Russian state to be strong enough for such
a confrontation. Medvedev's initially stated aims - opening and democratizing
the country - would now appear to be a dangerous luxury in this new political
context. While the Russian nation loses from being again driven into the
position of an international pariah, many influential people in Moscow,
especially the constituency of radically anti-American politicians and pundits,
win.
In view of the dismal result of Russia's recent policies in the Caucasus, the
question suggests itself as to whether Medvedev has been indeed shaping them,
or whether he was forced to follow a script he did not write.
Once Russian passports were handed out to South Ossetians and Georgia was
provoked to attack them, there was little choice for the Russian president than
to react the way he did. Moreover, it looks as if Medvedev, at first, hesitated
to use force. It was Prime Minister Putin who, while attending the Olympics in
Beijing, first commented on the Georgian actions, and, on short notice, flew
directly to the North Caucasus to take command.
Perhaps we will never know for sure to what degree Medvedev acted or reacted
during and after the Russian-Georgian war. However, the dubious pre-history and
doubtful gains of Russia's disproportionate military action in Georgia give
reason for thought.
They suggest that the reasons behind the war might have had more to do with
internal struggles in Moscow than with Russia's foreign policy aims or its
interests in the Caucasus.
Dr Andreas Umland is editor of the book series Soviet and
Post-Soviet Politics and Society and administrator of the web site
Russian Nationalism.
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