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    Central Asia
     Jan 6, 2009
Page 1 of 2
Diamond cartel meltdown
By John Helmer

MOSCOW - With the end of 2008, the last of the legendary diamond cartel deals has sunk back into the murk from which it originated when Cecil Rhodes created his African Diamond Syndicate in 1873.

Following a ruling three years ago by the European Commission (EC), Africa's De Beers and Russia's diamond miner Alrosa have wound up a series of trading agreements - secret and open - that date back almost 50 years. Although the EC ruling, which threatened such agreements, was subsequently overruled by the European Court of Justice, De Beers and Alrosa decided separately that their best interests would be served if, from now

 

on, they produced and traded competitively. From January 1, Alrosa no longer sold and exported a fixed quantity or value of rough diamonds each year to De Beers.

At the peak, in the 1990s, De Beers was buying more than US$1 billion worth of Russian rough from Alrosa through official channels, while also doing profitably on the leakage, or unofficial trade.

Before January is out, it will also be clear whether the Russians have decided to roll up De Beers's coat-tails, and oust Archangel Diamond Corporation (ADC), a De Beers-controlled Canadian subsidiary, from its position as co-owner and operator of the newest of Russia's diamond mines in the Arkhangelsk region, in the northwest of the country.

Does this mean that the Russians believe that Alrosa, which accounts for about one-quarter of the global supply of mined diamonds, is better positioned to weather the market-wide collapse of diamond value than De Beers, which controls about 40% of diamond output? Because Alrosa is backed by Russian state financing, treasury guarantees, and the capacity of the state stockpile to absorb Alrosa's diamonds until they can be sold, the answer is a tentative yes. Therein lies the potential for a revolution in international diamond clout.

By contrast, De Beers long ago disposed of its diamond stockpile and reorganized its corporate strategy to emphasize profit-making at the end of the diamond pipeline where diamond jewelry is sold, mostly to Americans, followed by Japanese and Chinese. Mining in territory that is potentially hostile politically, and competitive financially, De Beers is now only as strong as the family that controls the company.

Luxembourg-registered De Beers, with its roots deep in South Africa, is owned and controlled by Nicky Oppenheimer and his son Jonathan, directly and with a cross-shareholding in the Anglo American Corporation. A 15% stake in the De Beers holding company is also held by the Botswana government. The Oppenheimer father and son face a vote of confidence by the Anglo American board later this year, and if that goes against them a rack of family dominoes may start to fall.

Alrosa, on the other hand, is wholly state owned, with just over 50% of the closed-issue shares held by the federal government in Moscow, and 32% of the shareholding held by the Sakha republic government in the Russian far east. The company's financial weaknesses must be measured against the depth of the Russian treasury's pocket. In the longer term, its strength lies in unmined diamond reserves. These were publicly valued this year at about $110 billion. De Beers' diamond reserves are not reported. Anglo American, which reports detailed reserves data for all its mining divisions, omits to state the diamond reserves it claims through its stake in De Beers and publishes no diamond reserve data by volume and or value.

Two-thirds of De Beers's annual production of diamonds is mined in Botswana; 30% in South Africa; and the remainder in Namibia, Tanzania and Canada. Alrosa's Russian production is virtually all mined in the Sakha region. The Russian company also earns income from the sale of its share of diamonds mined in Angola, where one mine is operational and two are in development.

While the published production and financial data of the two diamond giants can't be compared precisely, De Beers says its annual sales from rough diamonds, as of 2007, amounted to about $6 billion. In the same year, Alrosa reported a comparable aggregate sales figure of almost $3 billion. In 2008, sales by the two companies were shrinking at different rates - De Beers apparently faster than Alrosa. By year's end, the two control control about two-thirds of global diamond production and exports of rough.

The prospects for 2009, according to estimates given at a diamond industry conference in Antwerp in November, are for a contraction of at least 10% in demand for diamonds in the retail jewelry market, with a deeper decline in the US and Europe; a reduction of about 20% in demand for loose polished diamonds in the wholesale market; and a 35% fall in the demand for rough diamonds from the minehead.

While diamond jewelers claim that a 10% downturn isn't the end of the word for them, a cutback or loss of one-third of diamond mine production is more serious for the mining companies.

For the time being, there has been no policy response from De Beers, except for a report on how to sustain demand at the retail end by focusing on even more expensive luxury applications of diamonds for the steadily expanding class of rich Chinese and Indian consumers - "the new maharajas" they are termed in the report, entitled "Luxury Considered" [1].

According to Stephen Lussier, executive director at De Beers and head of marketing strategy, "The scarcity value of diamonds is increasing as more wealthy investors buy traditional jewelry as a hedge against struggling stocks and inflation".

Alrosa is also moving in the direction of luxury branding but is keeping its plans secret. More openly, the Russian diamond miner is taking steps to secure its current and future mining operations against the demand crash.

The first test was announced last month, when the state-controlled bank VTB extended a $1.6 billion loan to enable Alrosa to clear its most pressing foreign dollar-denominated debt. The inclusion of Alrosa in the Kremlin's list of Russian companies to be supported through the crisis followed on December 25.

A decision on whether Kremlin permission for De Beers to operate the Arkhangelsk region diamond mining project will be withdrawn can be expected shortly. This follows an ultimatum, issued last month by De Beers, for the Russians to accept an agreement for a joint venture between De Beers and LUKoil; or else De Beers will walk out of Russian diamond-mining for good.

Sources close to De Beers claim the ultimatum was a bluff by senior executives in London, in order to halve the $100 million payment which De Beers must pay LUKoil if the agreement is finalized with the Kremlin. These executives believe that falling global demand, declining diamond prices and a growing shortage of cash oblige De Beers to seek a modification of the terms of the agreement, signed with LUKoil last April.

But some De Beers executives are reportedly more pessimistic. After a recent review of project costs, they are proposing to abandon the Arkhangelsk project altogether. Reportedly, they expect they will be able to pass the blame to Moscow, and that LUKoil and the Russian government will oblige them by ignoring the ultimatum's New Year deadline.

The ultimatum came in a press release from De Beers's Toronto subsidiary, Archangel Diamond Corporation (ADC), labeled "notification of a Termination Event". The text, issued on December 8, is as follows:
Investors will be aware that the severe and adverse economic conditions have had a dramatic impact on exploration and mining projects on a global basis. These conditions are also seriously affecting the diamond industry, including current and planned diamond mining operations. In light of these events, Archangel Diamond Corporation ("Archangel"or the "Corporation") (TSXV:AAD) has considered its position relating to its proposed acquisition of a 49.99 per cent equity interest in OAO "Arkhangelskoe Geologodobychnoe Predpriyatie" ("AGD") pursuant to the Share Purchase Agreement ("SPA") between OAO "LUKOIL", the Corporation and De Beers SA dated April 15 2008, as amended and other transaction agreements signed at that time, and all as described in the Corporation’s news release dated April 16, 2008.

Together with its wholly owned subsidiary, Archangel has today [December 8] notified OAO "LUKOIL" ("LUKOIL") of a Termination Event. Under the terms of the SPA, a Termination Event includes a Material Adverse Change. Such term means, in the context of a Termination Event, a material and adverse change in or effect on the Verkhotina Business or assets relating to the Verkhotina Business or operations or condition (financial or otherwise) of AGD. Pursuant to the SPA, if such Termination Event is continuing thirty days after notification thereof, then Archangel and/or its wholly owned subsidiary may terminate the SPA within the period of five business days after such 30 day period. If the SPA is so terminated, this will result in the other transaction agreements being terminated.
While this gives LUKoil until mid-January to come to agreement

Continued 1 2  


Kremlin writing on the wall for Mittal
(Oct 10,'07)

India's flawed diamond dream
(Feb 5,'08)

Russia toys with diamond cuts
(Feb 13,'03)


1. South Asia descends into terror's vortex

2. Waking from Lever-Lever Land

3. Pakistan's spies reined in

4. Loaned, sold, gone - and doomed

5. Palestine and Israel: A ring of terror tightens

6. Illusory dollars for a real crisis

7. Why Pakistan's military is gun shy

8. The highs and lows of Sino-US relations

(Dec 24, 2008 - Jan 4, 2009)

 
 



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