Page 1 of 2 Medvedev's wishful thinking
By M K Bhadrakumar
There was an element of hyperbole when a Moscow news service airily speculated
this week that Catherine the Great's historic dream of gaining access to the
warm waters of the Arabian Sea was nearing realization even as Russia was
getting ready to propose to Pakistan an "extensive road and rail system being
largely bankrolled by Moscow" to connect Central Asia with Pakistan's sea
ports.
The Moscow commentator was anticipating the agenda of discussions at the
quadripartite summit of Russia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, hosted by
President Dmitry Medvedev
at his vacation home in the picturesque Black Sea resort of Sochi on Wednesday.
For good measure, the commentator added that "Any apprehension Islamabad may
have over granting docking privileges [for Russian ships] in the ports of the
Arabian Sea will be offset by the monetary benefits connected with the leasing
rights." He then began fantasizing about the appearance of a Russian naval
outpost in the Arabian Sea:
For Russia, although access to Pakistan's
ports on the Arabian Sea promises lucrative economic dividends, it is tempting
to ask whether the leasing privileges will acquire any sort of a military
dimension.
With Russia's naval force lacking an outlet in the Middle East/Central Asian
waters, a Russian naval base off the coast of Pakistan would place Moscow smack
in the middle of highly unstable territory as US military incursions into the
border zones between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the hunt for suspected
terrorists continue unabated. At the very least, a Russian security presence in
and around the Arabian Sea would help to thwart heroin shipments from reaching
Russia via Afghanistan.
This might appear an hilarious case of
counting chickens before the eggs are hatched - and even by Russian standards
it was too much swagger considering that Russia's post-Soviet bluewater navy is
barely keeping body and soul together.
But all the same it underscored the thought processes that envelop Medvedev's
initiative in forming a quadripartite regional forum.
Tajiks on tight leash
The Russian initiative first surfaced last year in June in Yekaterinburg when
Medvedev sat down with his Afghan and Pakistani counterparts. A month later,
the format was expanded to include Tajikistan, and the four presidents
confabulated for the first time in Dushanbe, the Tajikistan capital.
The Sochi summit on Wednesday decided that Dushanbe would be the venue of their
next round also. Quite obviously, Moscow is pinning down Tajikistan to a 100%
political commitment to the quadripartite format.
Interestingly, Moscow's latest Central Asian initiative bypasses the two key
players in the region - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - while it is riveted around
Tajikistan, the weakest link. The delimitation of the format gives some clues
as to Russian regional policy objectives.
It is at once evident that Russia wants to keep Tajikistan, where its biggest
military base anywhere abroad is located, on a tight leash. Dushanbe has been
of late trying to break loose from Russian domination, and the US has been
astutely encouraging this trend - as indeed it has in all the Central Asian
capitals. Last year, Dushanbe suddenly began demanding US$300 million in annual
fees for leasing the military base to the Russians, who have been having a free
ride so far. Besides, Tajikistan has been forging links with Iran, France,
China and the US as a sort of counterweight to Moscow.
Moscow's quadrilateral initiative is an attempt to reverse trends that dilute
the Russian influence in Tajikistan. The Sochi summit paid much attention to
the four countries undertaking joint projects in the field of energy. The
flagship is the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) 1,000 MW energy project whereby
Tajikistan will export electricity to Pakistan via Afghan territory. CASA will
export the hydropower generated by Sangtuda-1 plant in Tajikistan, of which 75%
is owned by Russia.
As things stand, Tajikistan is indebted to Russia since Sangtuda-1 cannot break
even without tapping foreign markets with export of electricity. In short, CASA
is a win-win for all participants: Russia makes good money and keeps control of
the project (which is vital to the Tajik economy), while locking in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, which face energy shortages, within a regional cooperation grid
that Moscow controls.
Conceivably, Dushanbe will have no option but to reciprocate to such a lifeline
for the Tajik economy by accepting Moscow's lead role in regional security
issues. This involves the status of the Russian military base in Tajikistan as
well as an unequivocal foreign policy orientation by Dushanbe in favor of the
Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as the principal
vehicle to safeguard regional security.
A second lead project Russia is advancing within the quadripartite format is in
the field of railways. Dushanbe would have preferred to build its communication
links with its southern neighbors - China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran -
without Russian guidance. Moscow, however, is forcefully taking charge. The
proposed 1,340-kilometer rail and road system envisions connecting Pakistan's
Chitral region via the Durrah Pass into Afghanistan and with Dushanbe. Russia
has mooted it as an extensive road and rail link from Islamabad to Dushanbe and
Ferghana valley.
Moscow estimates that the communication link will give Russia access to
Pakistani ports and in return Pakistan will get access to Central Asian markets
and the ''rich Siberian regions through road and rail".
In essence, this seems to be Moscow's response to the United States' so-called
Great Central Asia strategy, which aims at drawing the Central Asian region
away from the orbit of Russian influence. However, both the Russian and
American strategies sound grandiose on paper, but at least in the foreseeable
future neither seems within the realms of possibility as they seem fated to
neutralize each other.
Also, the paradox is that neither the Russian nor American strategy is backed
by the financial clout needed to translate the stuff of dreams into reality on
the ground, whereas the one country that does have the surplus capital, China,
is keeping its own plans and ideas about regional integration to itself.
Without doubt, Moscow is rattled that its influence is waning in a wide arc
stretching from Kazakhstan to Iran and thinks that it must do something about
it.
The latest evidence of shrinking influence is Turkmenistan's defiant decision
last week to allow American oil majors into its gas sector, which might at last
pave the way for the realization of the US's trans-Caspian energy pipelines,
especially Nabucco, bypassing Russian territory and heading directly to Western
markets - something that Moscow all along has been opposing tooth and nail.
The US has also repaired its relations with Kazakhstan. Here, the upcoming OSCE
summit in Astana becomes a major forum for the two countries to work closer
than ever on issues of regional security. It is a safe bet that American
diplomats will strain every nerve to bring Kazakh policies into harmony with US
strategy in Central Asia and the post-Soviet space in general.
Similarly, the US is steadily advancing its influence on the political scene in
Kyrgyzstan even amid the extreme volatility there at the moment. The project to
bring in the OSCE as the main provider of regional security has been a
masterstroke in sidelining the CSTO.
The US is pushing its OSCE project while blithely ignoring Moscow's disquiet
and is sidestepping the Kyrgyz public's outcry against foreign intervention in
internal affairs. Unsurprisingly, in the process Washington has succeeded in
getting its military base in Manas delisted as a point of controversy.
Kyrgyzstan must be counted as a signal victory for the US regional strategy of
engaging Russia within the ambit of an overall ''reset'' of ties. The single
biggest success of American diplomacy in Central Asia, however, has been the
normalization of relations with Uzbekistan, which arguably is the key country
on regional security issues.
All roads lead to Kabul
Tashkent is perceptibly warming up to the US invitation for it to play a more
active role in the stabilization of Afghanistan and to the steady build-up of
Navoi as the strategic hub of the so-called Northern Distribution Network [NDN]
handling of military supplies for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in the Afghan war. Navoi as an important transshipment hub helps the US to
shift the locus of the NDN away from Russia (though which it passes) toward the
route through the Caucasus - via Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan - that
would reduce the dependence on Moscow's cooperation.
Thus, the reasons are not far to seek why Moscow is compelled to turn to
Tajikistan (rather than Uzbekistan) as the anchor sheet of its attempt to stem
the drain in regional influence.
Moscow's choice of Tajikistan as its number one partner with regard to the
Afghan problem cannot be faulted since Tajikistan is strategically placed and
is perhaps the most crucial Central Asian player in Afghanistan, given the long
common border stretching for 1,206 kilometers (as against Uzbekistan's 137 km;
Turkmenistan's 744 km; or China's 76 km) and the presence of the big Tajik
community within Afghanistan, which also happens to be a politico-cultural
affinity that Dushanbe shares with Tehran.
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