Clawing back credibility in Kyrgyzstan
By Yong Kwon
American airmen sometimes call the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan "the
frontier of freedom". While this may be an apt name for the last place soldiers
see before flying into Afghanistan, the Kyrgyz people themselves have not yet
experienced the exercise of political liberty in their short history as an
independent nation.
The political and ethnic crisis that raged through the former-Soviet state this
spring may, however, have provided Kyrgyzstan with a historic opportunity to
become not merely a flyby state but a glowing model of democracy in Central
Asia. Furthermore, this is a new opportunity for the United States to be
engaged in Central Asia as an honest broker and a supporter of democracy while
mending its severed ties with Russia.
The Roza Otunbayeva government has a narrow window of
opportunity between now and October 10 to prepare the country for parliamentary
elections that could transform Kyrgyzstan into the first functioning democracy
in the region. As an interim government, it had already overcome the major
challenge of undertaking the constitutional referendum, which lay the
foundations for Central Asia's first parliamentary republic. In the month
remaining till the vote, Bishkek must hold its own against external pressures
and possibly violent domestic resistance among myriad of other issues.
On July 16, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies outlined three
major issues facing Kyrgyzstan at the moment: the government is bankrupt
because the former political elites fled the country with the national funds,
the civic identity of the country is near collapse after the ethnic riots, and
the state is in need of a completely new political institution.
All of these crises are interrelated and the resolution of one problem could
help rectify other issues. In this process, both the United States and Russia
have roles to play in reconstituting Kyrgyzstan through their unique assets in
the country. They can also look forward to reaping considerable benefits from
the presence of a stable democracy in Central Asia.
Gross imbalance in the distribution of wealth is a common feature in extremely
resource poor states. Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest republics in the Soviet
Union and remains the second poorest state in the former Soviet space.
Compounding the economic difficulties, Kyrgyz political elites have used the
political institutions as a means of securing the country's limited assets.
Alexander Knyazev, an analyst at the Bishkek-based Institute of Commonwealth of
Independent States, claims that former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev and his
family had gone as far as being involved in drug trafficking and employing
mercenaries to protect family interests.
The effects of economic disparity are not only limited to the corruption of the
political process, but also contribute to the ethnic tensions between the
diverse ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan. Demographically, Kyrgyzstan is a young
nation; the US Central Intelligence Agency estimated in 2009 that around 34% of
the entire population was under the age of 15. In order to support their
traditionally large families, this enormous youth population faces the
insurmountable challenge of competing over resources, left behind by the
country's political elites.
Under these circumstances, ethnic clashes become more likely to break out as a
cover for economic competition. Kyrgyzstan's Uzbeks become the easiest targets
as they are economically established in southern Kyrgyzstan while only
comprising 20% of the total population. Yevgeny Minchenko of the Moscow based
International Institute of Political Expertise believes that there will be more
ethnic clashes in the near future as long as the fundamental economic
conditions do not change.
The United States has the means to provide crucial economic assistance to
Kyrgyzstan through its “most favored state” status, indeed the United States is
already extending valuable credit to the bankrupt new government; however,
reckless or over-hasty funding could create the misconception among post-Soviet
states that Washington is attempting to intervene in their domestic politics.
Since the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, Russia and other post-Soviet states
have been wary of Washington's role in pro-democracy movements in the region.
During the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Kyrgyz press decried "the law
of the prairie" imposed by the US State Department on the former Soviet space
[1]. This popular distrust of American foreign policy in Kyrgyzstan persists,
even after six years and the removal of two presidents, because of Washington's
obsessive pursuit of the Manas Transit Center.
Many Kyrgyz people suspect that this was an underhanded plot to strengthen
America's tenuous lease on Manas Transit Center by bribing the presidential
family. Whether or not this was the case, the lack of transparency in
Washington's business activities perpetuates the popular belief that the United
States is willing to compromise its democratic values as long as its strategic
assets are secure. Confidence and trust are absolutely necessary components in
a productive interstate cooperation. The prevailing attitudes and practices of
Bishkek and Washington will hurt both the long-term economic state and
democracy building in Kyrgyzstan.
While contracts from the Manas Transit Center and capital financing from the
United States may provide Kyrgyzstan with a small reprieve, Bishkek requires
more worthwhile economic partnerships if it is to survive the political
experiment. This role can only be fulfilled by Russia as it already has a
firmly established economic presence in Kyrgyzstan. [2]
Russia has been somewhat hesitant to shore up support for the new government.
After refusing to deploy troops to restore order in Kyrgyzstan, President
Dmitry Medvedev publicly criticized Otunbayeva's constitutional referendum,
citing the danger of "extremists" tearing the small republic apart.
Nonetheless, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recognized Otunbayeva's
interim government when the ousted Bakiyev claimed that he had not resigned.
Furthermore, Russia's deep economic ties (starting with hydroelectricity) and
military presence at Kant airbase suggest Moscow's preference for a working
government in Bishkek.
While economic cooperation may bring potential resolution to some demographic
tensions, Kyrgyzstan still remains vulnerable to narco-trafficking criminal
organizations and militant Islamic fundamentalists who benefit from a weakened
central government. And without security, the entire foundation of Kyrgyz
democracy may well be compromised.
Fulfilling its role as a guarantor of regional interstate stability, Russia
plays a key external security role in Kyrgyzstan, repelling guerilla groups
like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) [3]. Russia may not have a
clearly defined policy towards Central Asia; however, as made clear by
Medvedev's criticism of the Kyrgyz referendum, the security of the
former-Soviet space against religious extremists takes priority [4]. Both
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are considered as frontlines against Islamic
militants by the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
[5].
However, just as Russia secured a ceasefire during the Tajik Civil War with
Iranian cooperation, Moscow requires a strong partner in Kyrgyzstan. Although
more or less successful in keeping the war in Afghanistan from spilling over
into its "near abroad," Russian efforts to stem the tide of illegal narcotics
flooding into Russian from Central Asia have been routed.
America's role may be vital to Russia's future plans not only in Kyrgyzstan,
but also in the drug-addled regions of Siberia. With China, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan watching from the sidelines, the United States remains the most
strategic ally for Russia in Kyrgyzstan.
Democracy building rests on the shoulders of Otunbayeva's government and the
newly elected parliament; corruption, nepotism, and ethnic distrust can only be
abolished by domestic forces. However, Kyrgyzstan's ambitious democracy
building project requires funding and security. For Russian and American
foreign policy objectives in the region, those requirements present an
opportunity too good to miss.
Notes
1. Herd, Graeme "Colorful Revolutions and the CIS," Problems of Post-Communism
52, 2 (March/April 2005): 3-18.
2. Brill Olcott, Martha "Eyes on Central Asia: How to Understand the Winners
and Losers" Akihiro, Iwashita, Ed Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Russia and Its
Neighbors in Crisis (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center Hokkaido University,
2007): 3-23.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan invaded Kyrgyzstan from its bases in
Tajikistan in 1999 and 2000, only to be pushed out by aggressive Russian
retaliation.
4. Kazantsev, Andrei "Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea
Region" Europe-Asia Studies. 60, 6 (August 2008).
5. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) acts as a defense pact among
several states in the Commonwealth of Independent States including Russia and
Kyrgyzstan.
Yong Kwon is a Washington-based analyst of international affairs.
This article has been amended from the version published on Sep 2.
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