SPEAKING
FREELY Moscow populism and the Great
Game By Uran Bolush
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
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Russia witnessed
mass anti-government rallies on two occasions in
December last year. Frustrated by the victory of
the pro-Vladimir Putin party in what was believed
to be rigged parliamentary elections, Moscow
residents did not hesitate to express their
discontent by going to the streets and demand the
elections to be re-run. Considering the Russian
leadership has ruthlessly extinguished opposition
voices in the last decade, recent events highlight
that changes might have reached Russia's
centralized political system.
The
questions one could pose are: will these events
spur the
advent of other
political forces that might challenge the existing
status quo and undermine Putin's presidential
ambition? In particular, would the rise of
alternative political figures lead to revised
balanced foreign policy of Russia thereby slowing
down its Eurasian project? And how might such
powers as China and the United States react?
Russian foreign policy appears to be
chiefly dominated and contested by two
ideologically opposed camps, one inclined toward
fostering closer relationship with the West, the
other with a Eurasian outlook aimed reinstating
Russia's dominion in the former Soviet republics.
While Russia's grip on Central Asia substantially
declined throughout the 1990s, other powers were
quick to consolidate their regional presence.
China, in particular, embarked on rapid economic
expansion as Central Asian markets lay untapped.
Increased trade with the region was also to
contribute to the development of impoverished and
often unstable Xinxiang province in China's far
west, which stood as a transit gateway to Central
Asia. As Beijing then steadily began promoting
closer political and security relations, only in
2000 did Russia under Putin shift its foreign
policy priorities to Central Asia. China has since
conducted a cautious diplomacy in the region so as
not to appear to be explicitly challenging
Russia's traditional presence.
Meanwhile,
US companies have set up extensive operations
chiefly in the energy sector, whilst the US
government has actively promoted democracy. The US
further gained ground by establishing a military
base in the Kyrgyz Republic, about which resurgent
Russia has grown anxious and attempted to see to
its closure on several occasions. For now, Central
Asia seems to be one of the main power struggle
arenas between the powers.
Russia initiated the Customs Union that includes Belarus and Kazakhstan, and is set to enlarge and create a framework for the Eurasian Union. In his recent
interview, Putin underlined the realization of the
union to be his primary objective in case he is
elected president. Two consecutive terms would
give Putin an ample time to implement and
strengthen the institutional capacity of the
union. But the future Eurasian Union is an
expensive long-term project with no promise of
becoming a cohesive single entity. The union will
necessarily mean diminished national sovereignty
on the part of member states which will likely be
reluctant to give up a portion of their
independence easily.
In addition, Central
Asia is home to weak nations, ruled by
authoritarian leaders, and characterized by
intense inter-clan struggles, regionalism, rising
nationalism and religious extremism. Whether
Russia would be committed to addressing potential
interstate and intrastate conflicts and combat
extremism is an open question. Considering bitter
experiences from the Soviet campaign in
Afghanistan and Russia's war in restive Caucasus,
it is hard to foresee Russian citizens' enthusiasm
to more costly ventures. In any case, the period
of Russian politics driven by one individual may
be coming to an end as the Russian leadership will
have to adjust to changing realities and create
avenues for unhindered participation in state
affairs of opposition parties. Under this
scenario, Putin's presidential ambition could be
undermined and his Eurasian project forced off the
course due to new Russian policy makers pursuing a
more balanced foreign policy. Accordingly,
Moscow's reduced activity in the region will be
felt immediately.
The United States would
certainly welcome the change in Russia's political
life and the establishment of a genuine
multi-party system that would give the American
leadership room for negotiating favourable deals
regarding its presence in Central Asia. Most
importantly, the lifespan of the US airbase in the
Kyrgyz Republic could be extended for several
reasons, even though the US government has
repeatedly emphasized to close it once the
military campaign in Afghanistan reaches
successful conclusion. The base would stay because
of US's energy interests, and Iran's on-going
nuclear programme and its implicit attempts to
export Islamic revolution to Central Asia.
Allowing Iran to become a fully capable
nuclear state and loosing grip on the region's
energy resources to hostile regimes would be
catastrophic to the US. Keeping the base in
Central Asia and establishing extra ones
region-wide are essential to safeguarding its
interests and ensuring long-term presence.
As for China, it might be the major
beneficiary from any possible Russian rollback.
Unlike several Russian - initiated regional
institutions that have remained ineffective, China
has in less than a decade, initiated the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation and achieved tangible
results by promoting closer relations with the
region. Behind the modest success of the
organisation lie China's growing international
role, immense financial resources and its
upholding of regional political status - quo. The
power vacuum might give China an incentive to take
the organisation onto the next level, squarely
aimed at fostering closer integration. It is
argued that if China can maintain its current
growth rate, it will become the largest economy by
2050. Obviously, to sustain its growth, China,
among other factors, will need to have continued
access to energy resources, and Central Asia will
increasingly become one of China's major
suppliers.
On top of that, peace in
Central Asia is of direct relevance to stability
in China's Xinxiang province. As such, China can
be expected to become an active proponent of
regional stability for the sake of its own
security. It is important to note that while often
exaggerated Sinophobia in the region is real,
China, an outspoken advocate of sovereignty, might
be viewed as a viable alternative to Russia, which
in contrast has backed separatism in places such
as Georgia and Moldova, and increasingly turned to
neo-imperialist policies with regard to former
Soviet republics. In this respect, Central Asian
states will need to beware of a potential
diminished Russian role in the region in the long
run and adjust their foreign policies accordingly.
No doubt the international community is
closely monitoring the evolving events in Russia
and waits to see how the government will deal with
opposition movements. Former Soviet Premier
Mikhail. Gorbachev has called upon Putin to step
down only to be faced by rejection and even
accused of instigating the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Whether Putin would find a compromise with
the opposition or resort to coercion is yet to be
seen. But the scale of rallies suggests that
Russia's political life is on the cusp of change.
Uran
Bolush is currently a Master in Public
Policy student at the Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Policy of the National University of
Singapore.
(Copyright 2012 Uran
Bolush.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular
contributors.
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