The Eurasian steppes
historically represented a serious security
dilemma for Russia's rulers; without natural
barriers to hinder the advance of invaders, the
flat Russian borderlands proved nearly impossible
to defend using pre-modern means. In the
post-Soviet era, the new Russian Federation no
longer needs to fear steppe horsemen or Western
European troops marching towards Moscow, but
controlling the Eurasian landmass still represents
a major administrative challenge.
In order
to best maximize its own interests alongside other
political heavyweights that hold stakes nearby,
the Kremlin must create a coherent and cohesive
foreign policy that spans several pivotal and
conflict-ridden regions. With all things
considered, it is only natural that Moscow's
foreign policy has evolved to be
pragmatic with a
long-term outlook.
Looking out at the
world from inside the Kremlin helps explain quite
a few things about Russia's foreign policy
behavior that is not so obvious from outside its
walls. For example, Professor Daniel Drezner asked
in a Foreign Policy blog in January why Russia is
"freaking out" when the Barack Obama
administration has done so much towards the
"reset". [1] In particular, the article probes why
China is not being as rhetorically aggressive as
Russia when the administration's "pivot" appears
to be directly confronting Beijing's foreign
policy.
Drezner forwards several
hypotheses ranging from Russia's diplomatic style
to internal weakness stemming from institutional
dysfunction and demographic decay. While these
conditions may all be peripherally valid, the
article fails on one basic presumption: that there
actually has been a Russia-US reset.
Listening to Washington's rhetoric on
relations with Russia, it sounds as though the
Obama administration went to great lengths to
appease Moscow. In reality, the most significant
step the current White House took in improving
relations with the Kremlin has been the
ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START). While an important landmark in
US-Russian relations, significant portions of the
treaty were already formulated under the George W
Bush Administration; in other words, it does not
symbolize the "reset" that President Barack Obama
forwarded when he came into office.
What
the Russian leadership expects (or rather
expected) from a "reset" is a change from the
Bush-era policy of unilateralism and showing
"commitment to the notion that Russia can be a
viable and trustworthy partner to the United
States regardless of the state of Russia's
domestic affairs". [2]
Considering the
events of 2011, the Obama administration has not
executed foreign policy in ways that would appear
to be fundamentally different from the preceding
administration nor has it refrained from
commenting publicly on Russia's domestic
conditions (albeit in reaction to Moscow's own
statements).
From presidential candidate
Putin's perspective, the Libyan bombing campaign
was a repetition of "Western" unilateralism under
president George W Bush, even if the US managed to
get an endorsement from the United Nations. Since
an abstention on Libya was clearly not strong
enough of a message to Washington, is it any
wonder then that Moscow is so firmly against
(alongside Beijing) any signs that may indicate
Russian approval of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) intervention in Syria? The
Russian leadership is not "freaking out" as
Drezner suggests, it is simply reacting to past
experience.
Ultimately, the US has no
leverage over Russia because Washington has become
a superfluous constant in areas where Moscow feels
the need to expend greater attention. A key
example is Northeast Asia.
Putin has long
looked to the Far East as a key area of engagement
for the Russian Federation. The giant Eurasian
state's reorientation towards Northeast Asia is
not only a natural response to the rapid economic
growth in the region, but also an economic
necessity as gas fields in Western Siberia become
slowly depleted. Since Russia will not be able to
easily extract the resources under the East
Siberian permafrost without international
investment and cooperation, relations with key
economic players in the area must be vastly
improved.
Naturally China is at the center
of Russia's attention. Both as a partner in
development, but also as a key market for the
mineral wealth soon to be excavated. Therefore,
standing with Beijing on key areas on contention
such as Iran and Syria plays a dual role of
securing Russia's long standing goal of balancing
the influence of the United States in the Middle
East and securing channels for further cooperation
with the People's Republic of China.
However, Moscow does not want to be overly
dependent on exports to China; ties with South
Korea and Japan also need to be developed. Even
here, among the closest allies of the US in the
region, the Russian leadership does not need to
mind the state of its relationship with
Washington. Both Japan and South Korea are
increasingly anxious about their over reliance on
Middle Eastern oil being delivered over
contentious sea lanes.
In particular, the
widening of sanctions on Iran and rising tensions
on the Straits of Hormuz have rattled both
countries (See East
Asian energy dilemma over Iran Asia Times
Online, January 24, 2012 ). Unsurprisingly,
Moscow's plans to develop infrastructure for the
extraction of mineral resources in the Russian Far
East have already created "conspicuous fixation
for Russian suppliers". [3]
In fact, plans
to develop a pipeline to South Korea through North
Korea have been given a nod of approval by Kim
Jong-eun and will proceed as planned. [4] Once the
pipeline is established, one can expect more
concrete plans for the construction of gridlines
and railways on the Korean Peninsula (connecting
to the trans-Siberian railway) to come forward as
well. Such development would open South Korea to
overland shipping to Europe, significantly cutting
the cost of exports.
The key piece of the
puzzle is North Korea. Since the mid-1990s, Moscow
had looked to Washington's leadership to maintain
stability on the Korean Peninsula and coax
Pyongyang into negotiations. However, the US has
simply opted out of that role by giving China the
chance to develop closer ties with North Korea
through economic cooperation and providing aid.
This is despite Pyongyang's acceptance of
negotiations on its nuclear project with
Washington alongside talks for food aid. Recent
reports suggest that China has delivered 500,000
tons of food aid to North Korea. [5] If true,
Washington's already diminished leverage over
Pyongyang, alongside America's importance to
Russia's development strategy, has been further
reduced.
In terms of developing ties with
Japan, Tokyo already wants to find a resolution to
the Kurile Island dispute in order to re-orient
its defense posture from facing Russia to develop
naval and air power to better confront China. The
necessary conditions for a resolution favorable to
Moscow have already been laid down.
As
evident in these key areas, Russia does see the
need to link its interests to that of the United
States as it had during the 1990s and the early
2000s. More than a reflection of Moscow's
insecurities, recent developments actually show
how much Washington's policies have reduced its
position in the world.
At the same time,
Russia's policies are largely reactive and not
based on irreversible misgivings about the United
States. As such, specific policy alterations on
key issues such as Iran or North Korea could
change the Russian Federation's outlook and
rhetoric towards the United States.
For
now, as the unusually frosty cold front blows over
Eurasia, the Russians have come boldly forward
against the United States for very pragmatic
reasons. Considering how synonymous the Russian
winter is with the myth of indomitable Russia, one
must wonder whether it will favor Moscow once
again.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
