Nazarbayev's free-trade goal offers
Central Asia a future By Roman
Muzalevsky
Meeting with ambassadors on
March 2, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev
suggested that Central Asian states launch a
common free trade zone, saying the region "enjoys
a vast potential to be a global center". The
initiative comes on the heels of an earlier
proposed plan to create a Union of Central Asian
States, which would evolve as a node of global
energy security, uninterrupted trade flows and
continental stability.
Some view the
initiative as a way to help regional countries
strengthen their sovereignty in the face of
internal and external challenges and shape the
region's future in concert. But thus far
such regional
initiatives have been unsuccessful due to poor
inter-state cooperation and frequent bickering.
Here, history seems to be repeating
itself. When the Russian empire was advancing into
the feudal khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand
in the 19th century, its army faced no formidable
opponent in the Central Asian lands. Frequent
inter-khanate clashes, lack of regional vision,
and industrial and technological backwardness had
not only made life difficult for subjects of the
khanates but had also helped carry the day for the
would-be masters, first in the face of Tsarist
Russia and later the Soviet Union.
About
150 years later, the newly independent states of
Central Asia continue to fear not only the agendas
of outside powers but also those of each other.
The lack of political liberalization and economic
modernization has meanwhile hindered their
integration into the global economy. If and how
the states should self-organize to deal with
internal and external challenges is still a
question mark.
But it should not be. The
region's geography and history, geo-economic
trends, challenges and future potential call for
such integration naturally. The Central Asian
states suffer from their landlocked status and
lack of cross-regional infrastructure links. The
lack of cooperation from within Central Asia and
the region's relative isolation from without has
impeded efforts of these landlocked countries to
revive their historic roles of being Silk Road
corridors at the time when rising China and India
are rapidly reshaping the economic landscape of
Eurasia.
Some form of integration would
make it easier to cope with common challenges such
as the effects of the global financial crisis, the
planned withdrawal of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization from Afghanistan, extremism and
terrorism, narco-trafficking, illegal migration,
water and energy issues. It would also pave the
way for development of the intra-regional security
framework to tackle home-grown and imposed risks.
Such framework is in demand, as became
evident in June 2010 when neither the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO - comprising
Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) nor the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO - including China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan) responded adequately to the ethnic
violence between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz in Osh,
Kyrgyzstan.
As the two giants on Central
Asia's borders, Russia and China lead the SCO,
which is promoting economic, transportation and
security initiatives. Russia, in turn, sets the
agenda for the CSTO - a "half dead, half alive"
organization whose members distrust each other and
Russia's policies in particular.
Uzbekistan, for example, has long been
wary of Russia's regional role, while Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan have recently squabbled with Moscow
over the unpaid compensation for Russia's military
presence on their territories. But despite this
mistrust, the regional authorities rely on the
CSTO "alliance" to preserve their regimes and to
prevent external aggression, especially as the
United States plans to withdraw from Afghanistan
by 2014.
There are, of course, hurdles on
the way toward intra-regional security and
economic integration. The Central Asian states
have still not resolved long-standing water and
energy problems, territorial claims and border
delimitation issues. They display varying paces of
economic and political development.
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, for instance,
have achieved more progress in advancing political
and economic modernization. Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan lag behind. Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, the regions' largest economies with
2011 gross domestic product figures of US$216
billion and $94 billion respectively, not only
demonstrate different paces and models of economic
development but also engage in rivalry over
primacy in the region.
All regional states
are also in the process of consolidating their
newly-gained sovereignty, displaying a strong
sense of nationalism and resistance to integration
initiatives, either intra- or extra-regional.
Finally, there are already regional post-Soviet
structures including Central Asian states, which
are perceived as duplicates of any possible
intra-regional integration initiatives.
Some include the Eurasian Economic
Community (involving Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; Uzbekistan joined the
body in 2006 but then suspended its work in 2008)
and the Customs Union (comprising Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan is interested in
membership), which serve as the platform for the
proposed Eurasia Union initiative in Post-Soviet
space.
But pressures toward
intra-integration are there. In 2007, Kazakhstan
proposed creating the Union of Central Asian
States, signing an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to
create an "International Supreme Council" and the
Treaty of Eternal Friendship with Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan.
The treaty was supposed to
serve as the foundation for the Union, which is
allegedly modeled on the European Union to deal
with border, trade, and security issues in the
region with 55 million consumers. Nazarbayev thus
explained the rational for the union: "In the
region, we share economic interest, cultural
heritage, language, religion, and environmental
challenges, and face common external threats. The
founding fathers of the European Union could only
wish they had so much in common. We should direct
our efforts towards closer economic integration, a
common market and a single currency."
He
concluded that "further regional integration will
lead to stability, regional progress, and
economic, military and political independence" and
that this is the only way for the region "to earn
respect in the world and "achieve security".
Why Kazakhstan proposed such an initiative
and why Uzbekistan remains passive is
understandable. Kazakhstan is the largest and most
dynamic regional economy, with a persistent record
of integration initiatives, positioning itself as
the pivot country with a "multi-vector policy" and
global vision for the region, of which it is
increasingly an economic engine. Uzbekistan, on
the other hand, has long pursued an isolationist
course.
Turkmenistan's policy of
neutrality raises further questions about success
of regional integration initiatives. Perhaps, the
proposed free trade zone and cross-regional
infrastructure projects facilitating access to the
Indian Ocean and new markets will lay the
foundation for the envisioned union.
The
scope and number of cross-regional infrastructure
initiatives are growing. Some energy initiatives
include the launched
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas
pipeline extending across the region over 1,833
kilometers; the planned
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas
pipeline; and the Central Asia-South Asia
electricity scheme (CASA-1000) to bring
electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
TAPI and
CASA-1000 projects are estimated to cost $4
billion and $1 billion, respectively, and deliver
up to 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas and
1,000 megawatts of electricity annually.
Some transport initiatives, in turn,
include the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Persian
Gulf and the
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway
lines, as well as the Tajik-Pakistani agreement
allowing Tajikistan to use the port at Gwadar and
China's plans to consider building a railroad
through Afghanistan to the Afghan-Tajik border.
The case of Tajikistan merits a close look
because the alleged railway and economic blockades
by Uzbekistan isolate Tajikistan from the northern
routes, prompting Dushanbe to develop southern
transport and energy corridors. As a downstream
country, Uzbekistan is concerned that Tajikistan's
upstream hydro-electric projects will damage the
environment and Uzbek agriculture, which is
heavily dependent on cotton cultivation.
Tajikistan, in turn, says the projects are
intended to address its energy deficit and reduce
dependence on unreliable energy imports from
Uzbekistan.
Uzbek President Islam Karimov
has reportedly convened a Security Council meeting
recently, for the first time since 2009, to
discuss the state of Tajik-Uzbek ties. Resolving
regional water and energy issues remains a key to
unleashing the enormous potential of regional
cooperation in trade, energy and transport.
If Central Asia states do not wish to fade
into the annals of history, as did their
predecessors in the 19th century, they should
embark on genuine regional integration initiatives
in the 21st to strengthen their statehood in the
age of globalization and amid the rapidly changing
landscape of Eurasia. A common free trade zone
could well offer such a platform at a time when
the Union of Central Asian States may seem like a
premature venture to regional countries.
Roman Muzalevsky is an
international affairs and security analyst. He can
be reached at muzalevsky@hotmail.com.
(This article first appeared in Jamestown.org.
Used with permission.)
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