On
naval ties, Russia signals as China
blusters By Stephen Blank
Historically, naval exercises have at
times played a key role in diplomatic signaling.
One can only look back at the Franco-Russian naval
exercises in 1891-1892, which portended the
creation of the Double Entente and the
Franco-Russian alliance.
Bearing that in
mind, what do the Russian-Chinese naval exercises
of April 22-27 tell us? First of all, it appears
that there was far more commentary in the Chinese
press than in the Russian one about these
exercises. Second, although both sides announced
the exercises only on March 29, they were the
result of an agreement between both sides' navies
and armed forces in April -August, 2011. The
Russian press claimed the earlier date and the
Chinese and Taiwanese claimed August.
Third, these exercises appeared in the
context of a growing
frequency of exercises
in Asia by Chinese, Russian and US-Asian forces
and amid the reorientation of US forces to East
Asia, a change that Beijing has publicly labeled
as unfriendly and hostile.
Whereas US
forces were conducting exercises with the
Philippines just before these Sino-Russian
exercises; only 10 days before these bilateral
Sino-Japanese exercises the Russian air force flew
some 40 bombers near Japan's frontier as a Russian
exercise.
Furthermore, this exercise
consisted of simulated cruise missile launches.
Consequently, even if the exercises were planned
before the US policy initiative and the divisive
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional
Forum of 2011, it is easy to see why the Chinese
military media in particular emphasized the unity
of the two sides and the implicitly anti-American
aspect of these exercises.
Indeed, the
Chinese Press reported chief of the General Staff
Chen Bingde's statements that bilateral military
cooperation was an important aspect of the overall
cooperation between Russia.
These
exercises represented a sign of the "unshakable
determination" to implement the two governments'
strategic partnership and strategic mutual trust
between the two militaries, strengthen the two
navies' capacity to deal with new threats (ie the
US) and a willingness to work together to
safeguard regional peace and security.
Such remarks suggest the greater
willingness of the Chinese military to take a hard
line against the US. But the Russian military
remained more circumspect with regard to naval
issues. Instead, the Russian military's public
response was political in nature.
On May
3, General Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General
Staff, announced a new argument, but one that was
long argued by Beijing, that the US missile
defenses were objectionable because they will also
target China's nuclear potential, an argument that
has rarely figured in Moscow's public
argumentation against those missile defenses, and
a solicitude for China's nuclear capacity that is
undoubtedly politically mandated given what we
know of Russian defense thinking.
The next
day Makarov announced that there would be more
bilateral exercises.
This was President
Vladimir Putin's way of sending a discreet but
unmistakable signal as opposed to the rather more
blustery tone of the Chinese military.
Russian generals do not make these kinds
of statements and announcements without strict
political guidance. Thus, Moscow is signaling to
both Beijing and Washington that too much US
pressure on missile defenses, on checking China in
Asia, and on exporting democracy will lead Moscow
closer to Beijing even though most analysts
recognize that Russian security in the
Asia-Pacific depends on the maintenance of an
equilibrium and balance between the US and China,
not on Russia's "leaning to one side".
Indeed, Makarov's statements did not
silence the debate in the Russian media, nor did
the generals in China silence the civilian
analysts there.
Thus, an April 28 article
by Vasily Kashin of the Center for the Analysis of
Strategies and Technologies explicitly waned
against China's growing economic, political and
military power and influence. Kashin explicitly
referred to a Chinese debate in the mass media and
expert sources over switching to the creation of
military-political alliances and tougher
opposition to the West.
Thus, Kashin
confirmed earlier reports that there were those in
Beijing interested in formulating a closer
military-political alliance with Moscow and
presumably vice versa even though that would lead
in his view to placing Russian politics under the
shadow of that bilateral competition between
Beijing and Washington.
Kashin certainly
implied that this outcome would do Russia no good.
A Chinese commentator, Hai Tao, also cautioned
against reading too much into these exercises.
But it is clear that these exercises also
signaled improved Chinese naval capabilities such
as naval replenishment at sea and thus constituted
a sign to Asia and the US of those enhanced
capabilities.
But those capabilities could
also conceivably threaten Russian equities and
interests. Putin's recent remarks that Russia
hopes to catch the wind of China's sails may yet
come through in ways that he certainly did not
mean or intend.
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