Tajikistan and Iran last week concluded
the ninth meeting of the Joint Economic Commission
in Tehran, where the two countries signed five
agreements in the hydroelectric, oil and health
sectors. The issues of water and
hydro-electricity featured prominently in the
discussions, including agreements reached
concerning the proposed Ayni dam in Tajikistan and
the nearly completed Sangtuda-2 dam, also in
Tajikistan.
According to Iranian Minister
of Energy Majidi Namjou, both parties have agreed
that Sangtuda-2 will be completed with money from
Iran's National Development Fund. Iran expected
the initial cost of the dam to be US$180 million;
however the price tag has increased by $70 million
and it remains unclear if and how the money will
be paid back. As it stands now, Iran plans to recoup
its investment over 12.5
years, after which full ownership of the dam would
be transferred to Tajikistan.
Perhaps the
most notable outcome of the meetings was a
negotiation concerning a potential pipeline for
the export of 1 billion cubic meters of potable
water from Tajikistan to Iran. Tajikistan is rich
in water resources, and since independence the
issue of exporting water to other countries in
Central Asia and the Persian Gulf has been raised
periodically. However, Tajikistan's civil war and
the subsequent years of tenuous stability have
dissuaded investors.
Iran has expressed an
interest in Tajikistan's water in order to supply
the arid eastern provinces of what was formally
known as Khorasan (as of 2004, this province was
divided into South, North and Razavi Khorasan).
According to local officials, Razavi Khorasan is
especially in need of extra water to accommodate
the 30 million pilgrims who come to visit the
Shrine of the Imam Reza in the city of Mashhad
each year.
In Tajikistan, the most likely
source of water for such a project would be Lake
Sarez, the 17-billion-cubic-meter lake that formed
in 1911 after an earthquake. Sarez is a huge
source of potable water in the comparatively dry
region of Central Asia, but the fact that it is
contained by a 550-meter natural dam has caused
concern.
Were the dam to give way, up to
an estimated 5.5 million downstream residents of
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan could be killed, and a 50-200 meter
wave of water would reach as far as the Aral Sea.
Geologists have determined three scenarios, which
could lead to such a breach: a repeat of the sort
of seismic activity that initially created the
reservoir, an increase in the water level and
influx of sediment from surrounding mountains.
The potential danger posed by Sarez was
recognized by the Soviet authorities who
controlled the reservoir and surrounding area
directly from Moscow. At present, a special permit
is required to visit the area and the Tajik
government in partnership with international
donors has established an early warning detection
center on the shores of the lake that is staffed
24 hours a day and seven days a week by nine
technicians.
From the government's
perspective, exporting water from Sarez would not
only be profitable (Tajikistan's officials
estimate yearly revenues of up to $100 million),
but a reduction of the volume of water would also
mitigate the potential risk of a catastrophe.
However, some experts are skeptical about
the plausibility of a water pipeline from Sarez to
Iran. Anvarjon Kamolidinov, a Tajik water expert,
estimates that the cost of such a pipeline could
reach $42 billion. At the same time, he suggests
that a similar pipeline from the Panj River in
southern Tajikistan would be both cheaper and more
technologically feasible.
Downstream
countries like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan have also raised concerns, adding to
an already tense situation between Tajikistan and
its neighbors over water. Murod Aminjonov, an
expert on Tajikistan's water issues says, "The
five countries of Central Asia should negotiate
together. Currently Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
are fighting our [Tajikistan's] attempts to
reservoir our own water. How will we export [an
additional] 1 billion cubic meters? We will be
forced to give our own water to Iran, but if we do
this half of the Vakhsh Valley will be waterless."
According to Abbas Bayani, Iran's economic
attache in Dushanbe, to increase the economic
viability of the project Iran and Tajikistan have
discussed making a water pipeline merely one facet
of a larger "joint corridor" that would connect
not only water pipelines, but electricity lines
and even a gas and oil pipeline between the two
counties via Afghanistan.
Iran at present
produces a surplus of 10,000 megawatts of
electricity annually and has expressed a
willingness to supply Tajikistan with up to 500
megawatts of that surplus in the summer months.
However, even if such a corridor were
economically viable, the issue of ever-widening
sanctions against Iran looms large over
negotiations. In spite of American encouragement
to observe sanctions against Iran, so far
Tajikistani officials and businessmen have shown
little interest in doing so. In fact, this week
Gul Sherali, Tajikistan's Minister of Industry and
Energy, formally announced his country's
willingness to purchase crude oil from Iran.
Still, given the magnitude of projects
such as the proposed Ayni dam and envisioned
"joint corridor", outside investment would likely
be required. Neither cash-strapped Tajikistan nor
Iran's National Development Fund, with a budget of
$55 billion (20% of which is spent on foreign
projects), would likely be able or willing to foot
the bill.
To complicate matters, the most
recent hydro-electricity agreements between the
two counties involve the Iranian firm Khatam
al-Anbiya Construction (KAA), controlled by the
Revolutionary Guard Corps. KAA is sanctioned by
both the United States and the United Nations, who
describe the company as "involved in large scale
civil and military construction projects and other
engineering activities ... In particular, KAA
subsidiaries were heavily involved in the
construction of the uranium enrichment site at
Qom/Fordow."
If fears of widening
sanctions are not enough to dissuade Tajikistan's
government from cooperating with the KAA, in April
a dam in Kerman, Iran, built by the Islamic
Republic collapsed shortly before it could be
unveiled, raising the question of the firm's
competency. No one died in the ensuing flood;
however, it was an embarrassment for the Iranian
officials who shortly before had heralded the
completion of the dam as a "national achievement".
In spite of the collapse, at least
Tehran's confidence in the KAA has not wavered.
Last week, Iranian officials canceled a $2 billion
contract with the Chinese firm Sinohydro Group to
build the Bakhtiari dam in Lorestan. Instead, they
awarded the lucrative contract to the KAA.
As is the case with its plan to supply
electricity to Pakistan, Tajikistan might be
better off providing for its domestic needs before
pursuing export strategies. While, as a whole,
Tajikistan possesses much of Central Asia's water
wealth, paradoxically 43% of rural Tajiks do not
have sufficient access to potable water.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
