Two stories dominated the
news-cycle in Moscow last week: the targeted
police investigations against several opposition
leaders on the eve and in the aftermath of the big
rally on June 12, and a direct threat from a
high-level silovik - former security
officer turned politician - against a journalist
from Novaya Gazeta.
Commentators and
bloggers are still arguing about whether these
experimental repressions signify the
long-predicted turn toward forceful suppression of
the protest movements or whether they are merely
episodes in the progressing paralysis of the vast
repressive apparatus under President Vladimir
Putin.
There is, however, a third story
that has attracted much less
attention because it is
developing behind closed doors: the government of
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has lost control
over energy policy-making. This intrigue has no
direct connection to the fluid political crisis
but might have serious implications for the
survivability of Putin's regime.
The
context of the first story is set by the growing
anxiety in the Kremlin about the misbehavior of
Moscow's "creative classes", which translates into
the urge to punish the "trend-setters" and scare
the rest from partaking in street activities. The
result has been predictably counter-productive, as
more people turned out for the June 12 rally than
had been expected before the "turning of the
screws".
Meanwhile, the "celebrities" on
the receiving end of the punishment feel obliged
to demonstrate their defiance. Alexei Navalny
ridiculed the investigators and wrote about
another corruption case involving the pro-Kremlin
United Russia party; Ilya Yashin refused to answer
any questions and posted photos of his vandalized
flat after an illegal break-in by police; and
Ksenia Sobchak remained cool as a seasoned rebel
under pressure.
The investigators are
trying to incriminate the dissidents for not only
inciting riots at the May 6 rally but also
financial irregularities, using as key evidence
the large sum of money found in Sobchak's flat.
Many among the "white ribbons" are very
skeptical about the leaders of street protests,
but these selective repressions inevitably
generate mass support for the "enemies of the
state."
The second story has moved very
quickly from a high drama to an anti-climax.
Dmitry Muratov, the editor of the liberal Novaya
Gazeta, accused Aleksandr Bastyrkin, the chief of
the powerful Investigation Committee, of making a
direct face-to-face threat to murder a journalist.
Bastyrkin flatly rejected the accusation,
but then, facing sharp protests from many
journalists, opted for an apology citing
"emotional stress". Many bloggers see this
compromise as unsatisfactory. However, an
important context of this story is in fact in the
North Caucasus where Novaya Gazeta is conducting
research into the interplay between corruption and
terrorism.
Smoldering civil war in this
region is all but ignored, but in May alone, 50
people were killed and 114 were wounded. The new
interior minister, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, has
initiated a major anti-corruption investigation in
Kabardino-Balkaria while at the same time
reshuffling the key cadre in his own ministry.
A possible escalation of violence in this
turbulent region could add a dangerous new
dimension to the brewing Russian revolution.
The only reliable means Putin has for
checking the instability in the North Caucasus is
by distributing money - which is also his only
strategy for containing the protests from
spreading to the masses of "have-nots" - and the
major source of this money is energy exports.
Hence the salience of the third story, the
main feature of which is the surprise creation of
the presidential commission for strategic
development of the fuel and energy sector.
Experts pondered about Igor Sechin's
departure from the government, reckoning that the
position of Rosneft chairman is too low for his
ambition to control all of the oil and gas
business. Putin's trusted loyalist, Sechin has
indeed managed to outmaneuver his rivals, becoming
the secretary of the new commission, and also
inserting one of his junior aides, Anton Ustinov,
into the group of Putin's advisers.
Now,
deputy prime minister Arkady Dvorkovich and Energy
Minister Aleksandr Novak have to present their
clever ideas about taxing the oil business and
privatizing Rosneft to Sechin for vetting. All
lobbyists, meanwhile, will be metaphorically
camping in Sechin's anteroom.
This
Byzantine degrading of Medvedev's government
signifies not a greater concentration of power in
Putin's hands but a further decline in the quality
of state institutions.
The discourse of
"modernization" has become severely compromised as
merely a camouflage for the archaic and deeply
corrupt system of governance where parochial
bureaucratic interests prevail over what little
economic sense the "systemic liberals" can master.
The pledges to improve the investment
climate ring hollow because legal protection of
property rights is in principle impossible in a
system where "manual management" by the supreme
leader is the ultimate method of resolving
conflicts.
That is where the three stories
come together - the arbitrary application of
police force against protesters and the heavy
pressure on free media are undermining the
residual credibility of state institutions as
effectively as Sechin's sleazy handling of oil
revenues.
This degeneration of the state
is occurring much more quickly than the
organization of the opposition into a coherent
political force. The moderate leaders of the
"white ribbons" are stuck with the dilemma of
asserting the illegitimacy of the parliament and
the president, while at the same time striving to
open a dialogue with the authorities.
They
know that the rigid predatory bureaucratic system
is irreformable - and endeavor to propel its
peaceful evolution toward a competitive and
responsible government. Putin's position of
defender of the habitual structures of
rent-collecting and patronage is more logically
consistent, which does not make it sustainable;
its resource base is shrinking and lies are
becoming intolerable.
The
quasi-repressions against the pseudo-leaders of
the deepening and widening opposition could have
an important unintended consequence: they inform
the stake-holders in Putinism that the risk of
defection is actually rather low, so it is smarter
not to wait for an eruption of the infamous
Russian "bunt" (mass revolt).
Dr
Pavel K Baev is a senior researcher at the
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
(PRIO).
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