Page 2 of
2 Russia
loses hold on Tajikistan
pivot By M K
Bhadrakumar
In fact, China Metallurgical
won the contract for mining the Aynak copper
deposit in Afghanistan by offering a US$2.9
billion investment, outstripping the second-place
bidder by 70%. The offer included construction of
a rail line of up to 800 kilometers, a
400-megawatt power plant, a coal mine to fuel it
and a smelter for the copper.
Simply put,
China has high stakes in the geopolitics of the
region, and the security and stability of
Tajikistan in particular has become a top priority
for Beijing. Unsurprisingly, China has stepped up
its military cooperation with Tajikistan the recent
years - the latest
visitor from China was Chen Bingde, chief of the
General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.
During his meeting with Tajik Defense
Minister Khayrulloyev in Dushanbe on June 6, Chen
said the overall development of China-Tajikistan
relations have helped the "continuous progress" of
military-to-military ties between the two
countries. Chen was quoted as saying, "The Chinese
side is ready to make joint efforts with
Tajikistan to elevate the practical exchange and
cooperation between the two armed forces in
various fields to a new level."
Chen's
visit coincided with the SCO military exercise
"Peace Mission 2012", held in Khujand, Tajikistan,
last month. A 369-strong Chinese contingent took
part in the exercise, including army aviation
troops. The PLA Daily described the exercise as of
"far-reaching significance" for "deterring the
three forces (terrorism, separatism and extremism)
and maintaining regional peace and stability."
Again, during the SCO summit last month in
Beijing, Rahmon paid a week-long visit to China,
receiving a red-carpet welcome. According to the
Tajik statement, various agreements were signed
during the visit in the nature of a Chinese grant,
concessional loans and technical assistance
totaling around $1 billion. The statement said,
Ten new instruments of interstate,
intergovernmental and interagency cooperation in
such fields as energy, industry, road
construction, geology, agriculture, banking,
television and radio communications and other
industries were signed in the presence of the
President. A number of agreements between public
and private companies from China and their
counterparts from Tajikistan were
reached.
China will be building a big
cement plant with annual production capacity of 3
million tonnes at an estimated cost of $600
million in the Shahritus region in southern
Tajikistan. The first stage of the plant with a
production capacity of 1 million tonnes will be
commissioned next year.
The Tajik
leadership is conscious that China has by far
outstripped all other external players in making
investments in Tajikistan. Dushanbe has
reciprocated Beijing's goodwill by concluding an
agreement last year to settle Tajikistan's border
dispute with China.
In sum, Russian
experts have belatedly woken up to the reality
that the ground beneath Russia's feet in
Tajikistan has dramatically shifted in the recent
years. In the Novosti commentary, Khramchikhin
acknowledged that the Tajik leadership might well
have "opted for the protection of Beijing." He
concluded,
That would signal a whole new ball
game and a new geopolitical reality. The Chinese
political scientist Wu Sezhi said two years ago
that "the creation of the SCO meets the
political and economic interests of China in
Central Asia and increases its influence over
the former socialist republics. Their role as
objects of geopolitical strategy for the United
States and Russia is diminishing, and they are
showing growing confidence in China."
Clearly, the rivalry between Russia and
China in Central Asia is not just inevitable, it
has already begun.
Playing
catch-up From Moscow's viewpoint, it is a
bitter pill to swallow to see its little brother
drifting away toward obscure friendships.
Yet the Chinese regional policy is not
driven by any animus against Russia as such; on
the contrary, its leitmotif is to keep the US out
of Central Asia, something in which China and
Russia have a convergence of interests. However,
Beijing doesn't regard Central Asia as Russia's
exclusive "sphere of influence" and is going about
robustly advancing its strategic interests and in
the process, paradoxically, it is augmenting those
countries' strategic autonomy vis-a-vis Moscow.
China has a strong motivation to invest in
the region, which is its immediate neighborhood.
Neither Russia nor the US can match the Chinese
investment or its level of interest in forging
comprehensive partnerships with the Central Asian
states. Equally, Russia and US cannot cope with
China's "stealth power", which is unobtrusive and
calm - and lethal. The point is, China can put a
lot more in than Russia or the US and yet it
doesn't need something out of it right away -
unlike its competitors who are keen to realize
returns on investment.
Thus, China is
well-placed to meet optimally the rising national
aspirations of the Central Asian states whereas
the US can at best offer a transactional
relationship and Russian involvement remains
episodic, interspersed with unexplained periods of
benign neglect.
China cannot be expected
to stay out of Tajikistan in deference to Russia's
sensitivities. Conceivably, the post-2014 scenario
in Afghanistan will only prompt China to
accelerate its engagement of Tajikistan in the
field of security and military cooperation.
The only realistic policy option for
Russia will be to follow Chinese footfalls and
attune its own policies to the rising curve of
nationalism in the Central Asian region. The
Central Asian leaderships - not only Rahmon - have
become adept at defining their self-interests and
their countries' national interests and are today
skilled enough in statecraft to determine what is
in it for them in their dealings with external
powers.
Russian policies, on the other
hand, remain rooted in time past. It has run into
the headwinds of Tajik nationalism. This was not a
dominant political force in the recent decade but
many factors have contributed to its revival and
its increased appeal, as it used to be in the late
Soviet and early independence days.
The
principal reason for this is the hegemonic
policies pursued by Uzbekistan, which relentlessly
humiliates the Tajiks' distinctive identity and
their ancient roots in Central Asia. The Tajik
nationalists always harbored the grievance that
Moscow practiced overt discrimination against the
Tajiks in favor of the Uzbeks.
The Tajik
perception is also that its Central Asian
neighbors have exploited its raw materials. Last
but not the least, at a time of great fluidity
both internally (when local patron-client networks
are once again on the ascendancy) and externally
(when the 2014 drawdown in Afghanistan looms
ahead) it is only natural that the leadership
leans toward playing on nationalist feelings to
enhance its position.
Besides, Dushanbe's
attention is wandering lately toward the US
playing catch-up with the Chinese juggernaut. It
needs time to figure out Washington's recent
flurry of engagement and to balance its ties to
get the best out of China and the US.
The
odds are that Tajikistan will choose to renew the
lease for the Russian base on the basis of revised
terms. But it will also have moved into China's
orbit, thanks to Beijing's generous no-strings
soft loans, which are desperately needed for
development, military support and floods of
investment from Chinese firms.
Tajikistan
is on the way to becoming a "pivot state" against
the post-2014 Afghan backdrop, traditionally close
to Moscow but now hedging more toward China while
exploring what leverage it can get out of the
engagement with the US. The Tajiks are no doubt
aware that Russia may again become a superpower,
and the US still remains a superpower; but then,
China is the unique resident superpower.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His
assignments included the Soviet Union, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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