A recent assassination attempt on a Tatar
mufti, a proponent of moderate Islam, indicates
the escalation of Islamist violence away from its
traditional hotbed in the North Caucasus. At the
same time, it demonstrates the jihadis' extreme
flexibility in forging alliances with forces that
supposedly have entirely different ideological
make-ups.
For many years, Tatarstan and
Bashkiria - two major Muslim enclaves in Russia's
heartland - looked quite different from the
restless Muslim Northern Caucasus. Tatarstan,
which has been ruled by Moscow since the 16th
century, is one of the most
Westernized Muslim areas in
Russia. It was not Islam as such but nationalism
that had been Tatars' intellectual driving force
for the first years of the post-Soviet regime.
While some nationalists thought about complete
independence from Moscow, most Tatars were content
with a modicum of autonomy, which Tatarstan
enjoyed throughout the Boris Yeltsin era.
However, with Vladimir Putin's rise,
Moscow increasingly emphasized the centralism of
"vertical power" and increased its pressure over
what was regarded as a dangerous manifestation of
separatism. First, it removed Rafael Khakimov, the
ideologist of moderate Tatar nationalists and
adviser to Tatarstan president Mintimer Shaimiev,
and, finally, the pension of Shaimiev himself with
a sort of honorary title. The nationalists were
supposedly marginalized or at least became more
pliable in official discourse; however, their
place was taken by jihadis who, in the case of
Tatarstan, displayed a pattern that demonstrated
their flexibility and readiness to being engaged
in broad alliances.
The jihadis started to
emerge in Tatarstan in the late 1990s, and have
become especially strong since the mid-2000s, when
Dokka Umarov promulgated the Caucasian Emirate in
opposition to the independent Chechen republic -
the goal of nationalists who dominated the
resistance in early '90s. Movladi Udugov, at the
time the leading ideologist of resistance, noted
that nationalism contradicted the major premises
of Islam and for this reason should be rejected.
The transition led to the
"internalization" of the resistance, which from
now on could absorb not just Chechens but other
Muslims of various ethnic origins from the
Northern Caucasus as well as a visible number of
Russian converts. While Umarov and his
collaborators asserted that the transition had
deep ideological reasons and nationalism was
absolutely unacceptable for true Muslims, the
reason for the move was in many ways different.
Indeed, it had quite practical implications, for
it increased the pool of potential fighters.
While nationalism had been harmful for
jihadism in the context of the North Caucasus, it
played quite a different role in Tatarstan and
Bashkiria. The jihadis and/or those who had
sympathy with their ideology started to penetrate
the Volga region soon after the promulgation of
the emirate and possibly even earlier and engaged
with their Tatar collaborationists in a direct war
with the authorities. In fact, one Tatar official
noted that the jihadis had been at war with
Tatarstan authorities for almost 13 years. The
conflict continues to escalate.
The event
is important in itself as it indicates the
increasing spread of Islamism in previously stable
areas of the Russian Muslim heartland. But it is
also important from another perspective: It
indicates the increasing coalescence of the
jihadis with Tatar nationalists. Indeed, after the
authorities engaged in the arrest of suspects,
protests took place in Kazan, the regional
capital. The interesting point here is that the
Islamists - with their black banners and the
slogan "There is no god but Allah!" - co-exist
with the groups who want an independent Tatarstan.
The reason jihadis accept nationalism in Tatarstan
is also for pragmatic considerations.
While in the Northern Caucasus Muslim
separatists depleted the rank and file of the
fighters and actually helped Moscow solidify its
position, the story is quite different in
Tatarstan, where nationalists often became natural
allies of internationalist jihadis. The pragmatic
considerations led to actual "de-Islamization" of
the resistance.
Indeed, two of the
suspects in the recent terrorist attack had no
beards. While shaving the beard would be regarded
as a serious Muslim transgression, it was quite
handy for conspiratorial reasons, for it made it
possible for Islamists to blend in with the crowd.
This tactical savvy, when allies against Moscow
are sought in all circles, induces jihadis to make
overtures even to their supposedly sworn enemies -
some Russian nationalists who proclaim that Moscow
should stop "feeding the Caucasus" and call for
separation of the region from Russia.
The
events in Tatarstan and elsewhere demonstrate the
great tactical flexibility of the North Caucasian
jihadis who either reject or accept nationalism,
depending on political expediency - and, here,
North Caucasians instinctively follow Lenin and
either reject nationalism - Russian nationalism as
the ideology of the czarist regime - or eagerly
accept it, as was the case with the nationalism of
minorities Lenin regarded as his allies in his
struggle against the regime.
Dmitry
Shlapentokh, PhD, is associate professor of
history, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences,
Indiana University South Bend. He is author of
East Against West: The First Encounter - The Life
of Themistocles, 2005.
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