Thoroughbred
loose on the Kyrgyz
steppes By M K Bhadrakumar
The great game in Central Asia has a
history of occasionally turning rough. Turkey may
have become its latest victim.
Prima
facie, there is nothing linking Turkish President
Abdullah Gul's health condition, an English stud
horse by the name Islander One and the extension
of the lease for the United States air base at
Manas in Kyrgyzstan.
But Gul, being a
gifted politician, apparently sensed there could
well be, and after landing at Bishkek on the eve
of the summit meeting of the Cooperation Council
of Turkic Speaking States (CCTSS) taking place in
the Kyrgyz capital on Thursday, he had the
premonition that a political storm was about to
break out in
the steppes, and he
quickly made himself scarce.
Without
attending the summit of the CCTSS, despite it
being the flag-carrier of Turkey's regional
diplomacy in Central Asia, Gul expressed regret to
his hosts that he was suffering from a recurring
ear ache and needed to return forthwith to Ankara
for medicare. And he abruptly ended his visit.
Sheer originality On Thursday
the storm did break out. Kyrgyzstan's government
disintegrated irreversibly through the day when
two of the coalition partners quit the ruling
alliance, alleging serious corruption charges
against Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov. The most
serious allegation against Babanov is that he
accepted as a bribe an English thoroughbred stud
horse worth US$1.3 million from a Turkish
construction company that has been awarded
contracts for building an air traffic control
tower and runways at the Manas air base.
Babanov claims he bought the stud horse
for only $20,000, while the Turkish company says
it won the Pentagon contract on its own steam as
an experienced military contractor; but it seems
there are no takers in the Kyrgyz political class
for these versions. Indeed, the connection
between the stud horse and the Turkish government,
if any, remains unclear. Nor is it clear whether
the Turkish contractor was keeping the Pentagon in
the loop that it was spending quality time and
money making friends and influencing people in the
Kyrgyz power structure, which is all for the good
of the Manas base. The Pentagon is wisely keeping
mum.
The air base has been embroiled in
salacious controversies and sleaze several times
in the recent years, but this one probably beats
them all in sheer originality - a British stud
horse doing political canvassing for its upgrade.
The Pentagon has been hoping against hope
that the lease for Manas would be extended beyond
2014 when it expires, but against the shadow of
the latest controversy, it seems unlikely that any
serious Kyrgyz politician would want to jeopardize
his career by reversing the initial thinking of
the Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, which is
to convert the military base into a civilian
airport and get rid of the American servicemen.
With the collapse of Babanov's government
on Thursday, Kyrgyzstan is probably plunging into
protracted political instability. Of course, the
stud horse provides a pretext; Kyrgyz politics was
becoming turbulent lately. Simply put, Kyrgyz
politicians have not been able to adapt themselves
to the parliamentary system of government that was
introduced two years ago - ironically, on the
insistence of the US advisors of the then interim
president, Roza Otunbayeva.
Ever since the
abortive "color revolution" in 2005 (known as the
Tulip Revolution), a steady process of
fragmentation of the Kyrgyz political economy has
been going on, and things have come to a pass that
no political party can today aspire to get more
than 10% to 20% of the seats in parliament, and
coalition governments and chronic in-fighting
amongst (and within) the political parties has
become the order of the day.
Provider
of security With Babanov stepping down,
the locus of power shifts to President Atambayev,
who will play a key role in the selection of a new
prime minister. Much executive power may accrue to
Atambayev, since in all likelihood Kyrgyzstan may
have to settle for a minority government that will
be bogged down in the struggle to survive.
Meanwhile, a major decision like the extension of
the lease for Manas will become problematic to
steer through a rambunctious parliament.
At any rate, Atambayev never appeared keen
on a permanent US military base on Kyrgyz soil.
This is so especially now, after having
satisfactorily negotiated three significant
agreements with Russia last week, which ensure
deep long-term engagement by Moscow in the
Kyrgyzstan's economy and security. Arguably, at
this point, Atambayev may even be quietly pleased
to see the back of Babanov and have a shot at
holding the levers of power in his firm hands -
with the high likelihood of Russian support, of
course.
The three agreements negotiated
between Moscow and Bishkek last week envisage,
first, Russia's participation in the construction
of the massive multi-billion dollar Kambarata-1
hydropower plant on the Verkhny Naryn cascade.
This is not a matter of dam construction alone or
spending a few billion dollars on it by Russia. To
cut a long story short, a Russian official has
been quoted by Kommersant newspaper as saying:
The engagement in this strategic
economic sector of Kyrgyzstan will build up the
significance of Moscow's partnership with
Bishkek and strengthen the Russian influence on
the geopolitics of the entire region.
The second agreement visualizes
Moscow writing off almost the entire $500 million
that Kyrgyzstan owes as debt to Russia.
Conceivably, part of the debt could be offset
against Russia acquiring stakes in Kyrgyz assets
such as the Dastan torpedo plant. The Russian
energy leviathan Gazprom is also looking for a
still bigger presence business in Kyrgyzstan.
The third agreement relates to the
extension of the Russian military bases in
Kyrgyzstan for 15 years beyond 2017, with
provision to extend the agreement. To all extent
and purposes, Russia is consolidating its military
presence in Kyrgyzstan and in turn becoming the
provider of security for that country. The
contentious issue of the rent for the Russian
bases seems to be resolved.
Put
differently, the strengthening of Atambayev's
hands following the collapse of the government and
the disarray in the Kyrgyz party politics could
work to Russia's advantage. Moscow can be expected
to remind Atambayev to redeem at the earliest his
pledge that Manas base will be converted into a
civilian airport. The US has its own lobby amongst
the Kyrgyz political parties - and civil society
groups - and was counting on the Kyrgyz
parliamentary system to diffuse the
decision-making authority, but that may not help
unless the country has a functioning parliament
and government.
A Maginot Line in the
steppes Meanwhile, Moscow is working on
Kyrgyzstan's request to join the customs union of
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which will make
Bishkek a strategic ally. Atambayev is a votary of
Kyrgyzstan's greater integration with the
Moscow-led regional processes. As things stand,
Moscow already views Kyrgyzstan as its closest
partner in Central Asia, next only to Kazakhstan.
There is a sense of urgency in Moscow over
firming up the strategic alliance with Bishkek, in
response to recent moves by the US to establish a
long-term military presence in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. The US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton is planning to visit Dushanbe and Tashkent
on October 21-22. This will be her second visit to
Central Asia in successive years, underscoring the
high importance attached by Washington to cull out
a "sphere of influence" in the region, keeping in
view the imperatives of the long-term US military
presence in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
have been targeted as the key countries in the US
regional strategy.
Russian pundits see the
recent talks between visiting US officials and the
Uzbek leadership in Tashkent as aimed at setting
up a rapid deployment centre in Uzbekistan, which
could eventually become a US military base, where
North Atlantic Treaty Organization military
equipment could also be stored following the
drawdown in Afghanistan during 2013-14.
The Russian experts view the decision by
Tashkent to suspend its membership of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as
a preliminary step in this direction. The CSTO
expressly forbids the setting up of military bases
by outside powers on the alliance's territories
without the approval of all the member countries.
Thus, Moscow has actually taken a big
decision to construct the Kambarata-1 hydropower
plant in Kyrgyzstan disregarding Tashkent's known
opposition to the construction of dams in the
upstream rivers in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,
which supply water for Uzbekistan's needs. In
short, Kyrgyzstan becomes a sort of Maginot Line
in the Russian strategy in the southern tier of
Central Asia. On the one hand, Moscow is preparing
to sit out Tashkent's shift in foreign policy,
while on the other hand, it can now be expected to
make a determined bid in the coming weeks to
regain its lost influence in Tajikistan.
Indeed, Islander One has lethally wounded
"neo-Ottoman" Turkey's vanities in Central Asia.
Now, as the Kyrgyz intelligence agency known by
its acronym GKNB (which is the successor
organization of Soviet-era KGB) begins to dig for
the family tree of Islander One - and if it
stumbles upon its DNA sample - the carefully
cultivated Turkish and the US profile in Central
Asia as benign foreign powers could take a
beating. Even Tashkent might develop second
thoughts about the wisdom of venturing into the
dark, leaving the CSTO tent.
This is
happening at a most inopportune moment for the US,
when the Great Game in Central Asia is rising to a
crescendo, and for serious players there is very
little time to be lost between now and 2014 when,
as the Americans would say, a new ball game is set
to begin.
Ambassador M K
Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included
the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and
Turkey.
(Copyright 2012 Asia Times
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