Nuclear fuel bank or nuclear
graveyard? By Zhulduz Baizakova
Kazakhstan plans to build an international
nuclear fuel bank in Ust-Kamenogorsk (Oskemen), in
the country's east, at the site of Ulba
Metallurgic Plant, part of the giant national
company Kazatomprom, which produces fuel tablets
for nuclear power plants.
While the
authorities are keen on the plan, some citizens
are seriously questioning it - questions that are
likely to remain largely unanswered.
The
nuclear fuel bank will store low-enriched uranium
for the fuel assemblies of nuclear power plants
under the auspices of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). LEU is a special fissionable
material containing a concentration of uranium-235
of less than 20%.
In March 2010, Russia
introduced the first LEU reserve (to store
120 tonnes) for the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the
International Uranium Enrichment Center in
Angarsk, southeastern Siberia. The terms and
conditions were the same as being currently
negotiated with Kazakhstan: The host country
provides the storage facility and funds the
maintenance, physical security and safeguards.
Kazakhstan offered to store LEU in
2009-2010 and met the three main criteria: The
country is politically neutral; it abides by the
nuclear non-proliferation regime; and it is able
to supply LEU to any country that meets the
non-proliferation requirements. The LEU would
remain legally under the control of the IAEA and
be supplied at free-market prices.
IAEA
director general Yukiya Amano said: "The LEU
reserve would be made available for backup supply
to any eligible IAEA member state that might face
a non-commercial disruption of supply of LEU to be
used in nuclear fuel for power reactors, thereby
facilitating the development of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes."
Today Kazakhstan is a
top uranium producer, shifting from fifth in the
world in 2003 to second place in 2008.
According to the head of Kazatomprom,
Vladimir Shkolnik, the IAEA approved the Ulba
Plant since "it has more than 50 years of
experience in working with and storing nuclear
materials in uranium-hexafluoride form".
The Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs
says the Host Country Agreement is due to be
signed by the end of this year, after the IAEA
board of governors meeting. Physical construction
will begin in mid-2013.
The IAEA and its
donors have pledged US$150 million for the
project.
The host country must meet the
general requirements and guidelines of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and be open for IAEA
inspections.
The head of the Kazakh Agency
for Atomic Energy, Timur Zhantikin, said: "There
will be certain restricted areas provided for
nuclear-fuel storage inside the Ulba Plant itself
with relevant signs posted."
He also
stressed that this was a political project for
Kazakhstan aimed at strengthening the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and that the
fuel would be officially kept under IAEA control.
The plant itself will need only "a slight amount
of modernization, as it has all the required
infrastructure and qualified personnel", Zhantikin
added.
Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat
Umarov noted that Kazakhstan had a good reputation
in terms of abiding by the non-proliferation rules
and also has clear and comprehensive legislation
in the field of export of nuclear and dual-use
materials. Hosting the fuel bank would spur new
development of nuclear-energy production and
enhance the country's scientific and technical
framework.
Kazakhstan has quite a credible
list of achievements in its non-proliferation
activity, such as closing the Soviet-era
Semipalatinsk (Polygon) Test Site and voluntarily
renouncing the fourth-largest nuclear arsenal in
the world.
Increasingly, state officials
claim that this project entails no threat
whatsoever to the country, and that it will not
create any waste such as spent nuclear fuel, as
some citizens fear. The possibility of a terrorist
threat has also been dismissed by arguing that LEU
is of no interest to terrorists.
The
director of the Institute of High Technologies,
Serik Kozhakhmetov, goes as far as equating
Kazakhstan with Switzerland in the field of
nuclear energy. Both the former and current US
ambassadors to Kazakhstan, John Ordway and Kenneth
Fairfax, support the idea of locating the
nuclear-fuel bank in this country.
However, the general population remains
confused as to what purpose the fuel bank might
serve in Kazakhstan, as many understand that there
is little if any economic benefit to be gained.
Some locals demand that before making the
crucial decision on physically building the
facilities for the bank, the population should be
consulted and everything explained. Some are
worried that there is very little economic benefit
to be realized from hosting the bank. Others
cannot help suspecting that under the guise of
low-enriched uranium, the plant will host real
nuclear waste and damage the fragile environment
of East Kazakhstan province even further.
Some believe that by providing the
territory for hosting the bank, President
Nursultan Nazarbayev received some sort of
"indulgence for his mischief" from the great
powers and that now, Kazakhstan's security will be
guarded ever more closely.
Communists in
Ust-Kamenogorsk think the bank would be
environmentally dangerous. Mielz Eleusizov, leader
of the Tabigat Ecological Union, suspects that it
will turn out to be a disguised storage facility
for spent nuclear fuel.
However, experts
claim that LEU is not radioactive and does not
present any environmental threat to the
population. "There would be the same radioactivity
as in any of our other uranium-producing regions,
from Aktau to Stepnogorsk," Shkolnik said.
Kairat Kadyrzhanov, director of the
National Nuclear Center, says hosting the bank
will significantly increase the country's status
internationally.
Sergey Lukashenko,
director of the Institute for Radiation Security
and Ecology, says that since Kazakhstan has no
conflict with any other state, those countries
seeking to acquire nuclear fuel would face no
political implications.
However, it is
precisely the political friendliness of Kazakhstan
that disturbs some international experts. Richard
Weitz, an analyst for the Hudson Institute, a
conservative US think-tank, feels "uneasy about
Kazakhstan's proximity to and friendly relations
with Iran".
However, the Central Asian
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaty, of which
Kazakhstan is a signatory, explicitly states that
no party can provide special fissionable material
to "any non-nuclear-weapon state, unless that
state has concluded with the I??? ? comprehensive
safeguards agreement and its Additional Protocol".
Legally, Kazakhstan or any other Central Asian
state cannot deal with Iran on any nuclear
activities, which would appear to make certain
concerns about the fuel bank unnecessary and
groundless. (Iran signed the Additional Protocol
in 2003 and worked with IAEA inspectors in 2003
and 2005, but the protocol is still not in force.)
The anxieties of the local population can
be interpreted from the context of general
ignorance, lack of a relevant information campaign
on the part of authorities, and possibly slight
hysteria on the part of green movements. However,
the major obstacle is constant reference to the
tragic past of the former Soviet republic being
used as a nuclear test site and the environmental
and health implications that entailed. Perhaps the
population would be more eager to welcome the
initiative if the authorities started an
appropriate campaign to explain why the nuclear
fuel bank is needed in the first place and what
purposes it may serve.
Another reason for
skepticism is that many experts as well as
officials openly question the feasibility of the
nuclear fuel bank, referring to the lack of
economic benefits.
The possibility that an
open public debate will be held is next to zero.
It is clear, however, from official statements
that the authorities will attempt to use the
initiative as another propaganda tool to advance
the country's image worldwide.
The
national argument around the construction of the
nuclear fuel bank is bound to continue, with
questions from the general population
remaining.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
