Bishkek hands Putin Kyrgyz
independence By Fozil Mashrab
Kyrgyz leaders are expected to play host
to Russian President Vladimir Putin today,
September 20, when he is due in Bishkek to oversee
the signing of inter-governmental agreements
covering deals related to the construction of
large and controversial hydroelectric power
stations, extension of the rental agreements for
Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, and the
writing off of several hundred millions of dollars
of Kyrgyz debt to Russia.
As Kyrgyz
leaders trumpet the visit and the agreements as
significant successes, they seem to care little or
refuse to recognize the risks of becoming too
dependent on Russia in the future to the detriment
of their independent nationhood.
Kyrgyzstan is on the brink of bankruptcy
and economic default, according to regional
observers, as it is running a budget deficit of
more than 30% for the second consecutive year
since the violent
overthrow of former
authoritarian president Kurmanbek Bakiev in April
2010.
The Ministry of Finance reported
recently that the country's foreign debt stands at
US$3.1 billion, or 47.6% of its gross domestic
product, which might be acceptable for some
troubled European Union economies but for poor
Kyrgyzstan it is already well beyond critical and
permissible limits.
The country has been
plagued by frequent political crises with the
latest in late August, when the increasingly
popular and independent prime minister, Omurbek
Babanov, was toppled by a well-orchestrated
coalition crisis amid a corruption scandal, to be
replaced by a so-called "technical prime minister"
among one of President Almazbek Atambaev's
stalwarts.
On top of that, nationalistic
tendencies and resource nationalism seem to be on
the rise, demonstrated recently by a mob of Kyrgyz
nationalist youth disrupting and effectively
canceling the first of a series of planned
auctions organized to sell mining licenses to
foreign investors.
Foreign mining
companies' offices and equipment are often
vandalized by angry and impoverished locals in
remote villages of the country as central
government is unable to provide necessary security
guarantees.
In such circumstances, foreign
investors would usually prefer to stay away until
political stability and a semblance of normalcy is
restored. Against this background, Putin's
government is pledging to invest more than $5
billion towards building hydro-electric power
stations in Kyrgyzstan while writing off debt. In
return, he will be seeking payback on a number of
issues.
One will be the extension of a
rental agreement covering a number of Russian
military bases and other facilities in Kyrgyzstan.
It has been reported that Bishkek has already
agreed to extend the rental of such facilities for
another 15 years after 2017, when the current
rental agreement is due to expire.
Another
demand is thought to be the ousting of the US
military from the airbase at Manas airport,
outside Bishkek. However, as in the past, Russian
leaders would deny they pressured their Kyrgyz
counterparts on the US military presence in the
country - and cash-strapped Kyrgyzstan cannot
afford to kick out the US soldiers and lose around
the $100 million rental the Pentagon pays each
year.
Meanwhile, many Russian and some
foreign commentators have praised Russia for
consolidating its strategic positions in Central
Asia, which the Kremlin regards as its backyard,
by reaching agreements with Kyrgyzstan and
neighboring Tajikistan over the extension of
agreements to host Russian military bases in these
impoverished countries on favorable terms.
Russia does not have to pay any rental
payment to either of these countries, while Kyrgyz
government has even agreed to pay for electricity,
gas, telephony and other communal services used by
Russian soldiers.
Independent regional
analysts claim that the extension of rental
agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan might
seem on the surface to be geopolitical victories
for Kremlin, however, as it has been the case up
until now these military bases will serve very
little practical use for Russian government in its
efforts to deal with the single most critical
threat to Russia emanating from the region - the
trafficking of Afghan opiates through Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan. According to Russian Federal Drugs
Control Agency, Afghan drugs have been killing
tens of thousands of Russian citizens annually.
Similarly, Russian strategist might be
putting too much value on the importance of
Russian involvement in the construction of a
number of large hydro-electric power stations in
Kyrgyzstan.
Russian commentators claim
that Russian participation in the construction of
Kambarata 1 and the Narynski cascade of
hydroelectric power stations in Syrdarya River in
Kyrgyzstan will allow Russia to obtain a critical
leverage over downstream countries of Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan, thus keeping them almost
permanently dependent on Kremlin's goodwill.
However, the construction of these
extremely controversial hydroelectric power
stations is easier said than done as they require
equally massive investment. According to some
estimates, Russia would have to put in around US$5
billion to complete the planned Kyrgyz
hydro-electric power stations.
The power
stations will also give very little economic
benefit to Russia for years to come even if they
are eventually completed, therefore only Russian
state companies such as RusHydro and RAO UES are
willing to take on the job.
RAO UES'
bitter experience in neighboring Tajikistan's
hydro-electric power sector exemplifies what might
lie ahead for Russian companies in Kyrgyzstan.
Since completion of the Sangtuda 2 hydroelectric
power station in the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan,
the Russian company has been locked in a bitter
dispute with Tajik authorities over millions of
dollars of unpaid bills for supplying electricity.
As a result, Sangtuda 2 has had little
impact in alleviating Tajikistan's crippling
electricity shortages, while the Russian company
has not been able to reap any economic benefits
for itself - to the extent of being forced at
times to send its workers on unpaid leave.
Kyrgyzstan also often finds itself unable to pay
for its gas and coal imports from neighboring
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
The
construction of the Kambarata 1 and Narynski
cascade of hydroelectric power stations in
Kyrgyzstan also carries the risk of environmental
disasters such as man-made droughts and flooding
both for Kyrgyzstan and for the downstream
countries.
In an attempt to resolve their
country's chronic power shortages, Kyrgyz leaders
have been blindly pursuing their plans to
construct large hydroelectric projects by
violating international norms that regulate
management of trans-boundary rivers and by
refusing to consider any alternative sources of
power even though Kyrgyzstan has large deposits of
coal, another potential source of energy and one
that accounts for lion's share of the world's
energy production. No less important, the
Kyrgyz government risks worsening its already
tense relations with its downstream neighbors,
especially Uzbekistan. It may believe that the
extension of rental agreements for Russian
military bases in the country will improve
Kyrgyzstan's security against foreign aggression,
even if some neighboring countries have threatened
war over water disputes.
In such
circumstances, heavily indebted Kyrgyzstan,
increasingly reliant on Russia for security,
energy, economic assistance and investment, risks
becoming another subject republic under the
Russian Federation, in reality if not in name. Its
leaders' freedom of action and sovereignty will be
increasingly limited by a "big-brother" sitting
miles away in Moscow, just as in former Soviet
times.
After all, that is what Russian
President Vladimir Putin's idea of creating a
Eurasian Union if not to restore the former Soviet
Union.
Fozil Mashrab is a pseudonym
used by an independent analyst based in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan.
(Copyright 2012 Asia
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