Kyrgyzstan flirts with Russian
ambitions By Dmitry Shlapentokh
Recent agreements signed between Russian
President Vladimir Putin and his Kyrgyz Republic
counterpart, Almazbek Atambayev, are replete with
mutual benefits. Russia affirmed the presence of
its military bases in Kyrgyzstan, whereas the tiny
Central Asian country Kyrgyzstan received a
promise from Moscow over the building of a cascade
of hydropower stations and forgiveness of Russian
loans.
The deals in Putin's visit to
Bishkek at the end of last month neatly fit the
assumption that Moscow is making strides to create
a Eurasian Union, the geopolitical goal that Putin
supposedly set for Russia in the beginning of his
rule.
The ambition implies that many
states of the former Soviet Union, including those
of Central Asia, are to be assembled in a
geopolitical body with
Russia at the center. The Eurasian Union is
designed as actually Russia's informal empire,
Russia's sphere of influence.
That it is
intended to breathe life into a renewed Russian
imperialism seems to be reinforced by the desire
expressed by some members of the Russian elite, or
at least by those who are prominent in Russian
intellectual/political discourse. On the eve of
Putin's travel to Bishkek, they organized a
so-called "Izborsk Club", where they promulgated
that the creation of a "Eurasian empire" should be
Russia's major goal. Still, the project is hardly
possible, at least looking at the Moscow
blueprint.
The problem is that
"Eurasianism", the teaching that emerged in the
1920s among Russian emigres, which became quite
popular more than a decade ago, saw a happy
"symbiosis" between Russians, historically
Orthodox, and Muslims of the various ethnic
origins.
In a way, "Eurasianism" was a
transmogrified form of Soviet ideology whose
proponents proclaimed that a variety of people of
different ethnic origins could actually create a
new quasi-nation of Soviet people. Soviet
"Eurasianism" was extended, to some degree, even
to outsiders, those who became a part of the
Soviet imperial sphere of influence. It implied
that while Moscow required absolute
political/geopolitical submission, it would
generously provide economic largesse.
This
arrangement is basically gone. While Moscow would
accept some "payment" in the form of geopolitical
loyalty, it would still need considerable economic
benefits from its clients. In addition, Moscow,
after recuperating from the Gorbachev/Yeltsin
disaster, did not have enough in its treasury to
demand absolute submission from receivers of its
financial infusion. In addition, Moscow's
abilities to provide military krysha (roof,
protection, the term has been taken by Russian
from the criminal lexicon) is also quite limited.
All of this is recognized even by those
states in Central Asia that do not mind flirting
with Moscow, as is the case with Kyrgyzstan, and
they usually engage in "multi-vector" foreign
action where Russian direction is just one among
many.
Upon his election in December, 2011
Atambayev visited Moscow, where he emphasized
"Eurasianism" and the deep ethnic/cultural
connection between Russians and Turkic Kyrgyzia.
He received practically nothing from Moscow and
immediately went to Ankara, where he emphasized
the brotherly ties between Turkic Kyrgyzs and
Turks and implicitly asked for help.
Atambayev did not break with the Turks,
who had their own neo-Ottoman ambitions to unite a
variety of people of the Ottoman Empire, including
Slavs and the Greeks of the Balkans. A recent
Turkish movie on the taking of Constantinople -
present-day Istanbul - by the Ottomans in 1453
presented the event as a great progressive leap
forward since it brought prosperity and stability
for the people of the ex-Byzantine Empire.
The fact that Ankara has a rather tense
relationship with Moscow due to disagreements on
Syria and other problems, did not bother Bishkek.
The assumption on Bishkek's part that it could
receive handouts from both the Eurasian and
neo-Ottoman universes inspires it to look to both.
Also, China has its own designs for Central Asia,
which increasingly is important for Beijing as the
source of oil and gas and a market for goods.
Bishkek has not rejected Beijing's advances and
has engaged in various economic projects with the
Chinese.
Bishkek's assurances that the
United States will be driven from Manas when the
lease on the military base expires in 2014 should
also be taken with a grain of salt. The skepticism
here is based on a previous promise to drive out
the US, which did not materialize.
Finally, Bishkek maintains a warm
relationship with Georgia, a regime seen as deeply
hostile to Russia. The desire to maintain a good
relationship with Tbilisi is not due to the desire
to get some direct benefits - Georgia is poor - or
even to please the US, since Georgia itself
maintains a good relationship with Iran, which is
hardly pleasing to Washington. Rather, it
reasserts Bishkek's independence.
All of
this replicates particular arrangements in Central
Asia and possibly elsewhere. Moscow, which became
much stronger after the years of the late
perestroika and the Boris Yeltsin regime,
is trying to restore its influence in the
post-Soviet era. Moscow could definitely increase
its presence in Central Asia and elsewhere in
post-Soviet space. In some cases, it could even
emerge as a dominant force. Still, it will not
have that geopolitical space all to itself.
Instead of a "monogamous" geopolitical
marriage of the Cold War-era, Kyrgyzstan could
well engage in a peculiar "menage de troi plus" in
which it could be "married" to the Eurasian Union,
Turkish/New Ottomanism, and Chinese Commonwealth,
flirt with the US/European Union and engage in
geopolitical, "casual dating" of Georgia or other
states, simply to show to other partners that they
should not take Bishkek's benevolence for granted
and that not only should Bishkek compete with
others for their attention but they also should
compete with each other for Bishkek's good will.
Dmitry Shlapentokh, PhD, is
associate professor of history, College of Liberal
Arts and Sciences, Indiana University South Bend.
He is author of East Against West: The First
Encounter - The Life of Themistocles (2005).
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