US
Silk Road plans spin fragile
thread By Roman Muzalevsky
The visit to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
this month of the US Special Representative for
Global Intergovernmental Affairs, Reta Jo Lewis,
to discuss Washington's vision of a "New Silk
Road" across Central Asia comes ahead of the
pull-out of coalition forces from Afghanistan in
2014. It also comes a year after the US launched
the New Silk Road Strategy (NSRS) to facilitate
economic integration and security in Eurasia with
Afghanistan at the center of this effort.
The NSRS has a good cause, but it risks
remaining only a vision without direct US
participation in the region's development. Absent
such commitment, Washington will leave the task of
reviving the Silk Road of the 21st century to
Beijing, New Delhi, and Moscow. It will also see
its ability to shape global order from
within Eurasia
diminished. To achieve the new vision, it needs a
concrete plan of direct engagement.
Unlike
India and China, the US was obviously never a part
of the Silk Road commerce that for centuries
connected East with West - or China with the
Mediterranean littoral and Europe. In the modern
age, it has, however, been at the forefront of
promoting global trade and economic opportunity as
instruments of peace, stability, and
reconstruction - a practice it followed
particularly well in Europe immediately following
World War II.
In this context, one could
interpret the NSRS as an economic tool to do the
job that military means alone have failed to
accomplish. The strategy seeks to remove trade
barriers and streamline customs procedures,
promote trade liberalization and facilitate
economic links within and across Central and South
Asia - all in conjunction with the effort to
integrate Afghanistan with Central and South Asia.
Bridging the gap between periphery and the
core has been a goal of the US grand strategy. For
Central and South Asia, some of the world’s
least-integrated regions, this would mean
shrinking a connectivity gap by integrating the
regions with each other and global networks.
The NSRS concept suits this objective well
as it seeks to foster connections between and
within Central and South Asia to eliminate
isolation, produce economic opportunity, and
spread democratization. It brings soft rather than
hard power to the task, which seems even more
ambitious than the nation-building originally
undertaken in Afghanistan after 9/11.
But
the toolkit the US is bringing to the task is too
light to turn a desired outcome into a reality. To
be sure, Washington counts on support of other
players for the NSRS to work, which is sensible.
But, without its own direct involvement, it will
be in a weakened position to shape regional
dynamics on its own terms.
Because the US
defines its role as a facilitator rather than also
a direct participator and because there is a
mismatch of goals and means within the NSRS, it is
unlikely that the NSRS alone will bring security
to Afghanistan and the broader region in the short
term, certainly not by 2014 when it is time for
coalition troops to withdraw. Geopolitical
complexities and security challenges present
serious obstacles for the NSRS, as well.
For the NSRS to succeed, Afghanistan and
Pakistan need to be reliable partners for each
other, their neighbors, and the US, which is
problematic. Iran's participation in regional
development projects is, too, a question mark.
A lack of intra-regional cooperation
hampers the NSRS. Political differences between
downstream Uzbekistan and upstream Tajikistan
underscore this challenge in Central Asia.
Similarly for Pakistan and India in South Asia.
The US's perceived partners and rivals may also
consider the NSRS in "zero sum" terms, adopting
and adapting their Silk Road initiatives with this
view in mind.
Despite the above
challenges, the following initiatives help the
outcome sought by the NSRS.
India and
Pakistan in 2011 agreed to improve trade relations
after years of deadlock. Afghanistan and Pakistan
signed a transit and trade deal in 2010, while the
US and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership
agreement in 2012. The proposed TAPI natural gas
pipeline (linking Turkmenistan, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India) and CASA-1000 projects to
bring electricity from Central to South Asia, are
works in progress. Central Asian countries supply
electricity to Afghanistan and are building new
rail links. India and China are set to develop,
respectively, the Hajigak iron ore and Aynak
copper reserves in Afghanistan.
Washington's role as a facilitator in some
of these projects has been instrumental. But to
solidify this progress and have other actors
follow the NSRS to achieve the declared goals and
promote its geostrategic interests along the way,
the US needs concrete plans, development
initiatives, and investment projects based on
direct involvement of the US government and
business.
A beefed-up NSRS would pursue
important outcomes that are critical for enduring
regional security and American interests in the
long run. Such a strategy would allow the US to
promote economic synergies among actors that view
Central Asia as a buffer zone and platform for
geopolitical contests in Eurasia and the world. In
a region surrounded by at least four nuclear
powers, with Iran being the potential fifth, this
is a critical task.
Such an NSRS would
also enable the US to structure its regional
efforts to shape the global order because Central
Asia sees a growing involvement of the world's two
potentially largest economies, China and India,
and a strong push by Russia for economic and
security integration in the post-Soviet space.
It would help Washington channel the
development the region's immense energy resources.
The abundance of these and the global challenge of
resource scarcity, and the issues of a rising
global population and middle class, especially as
driven by China and India, make Washington's
enduring regional engagement an imperative for
Eurasian energy security and global stability.
Such a strategy would further help
Afghanistan and Pakistan, both dependent on
foreign aid, to start relying on
private-sector-led growth much faster and
encourage more rapid democratic change via
enhanced trade and economic linkages in Eurasia.
In the process, the US needs the help of
other actors, not least the European Union and
India. That US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton
announced the launch of the NSRS last year in
Chennai, India, is noteworthy. For all its flaws,
India is considered a democracy that boasts a
rapidly emerging economy. This summer, New Delhi
announced its "Connect Central Asia" policy
seeking to "glue" Central and South Asia via
Afghanistan. India's economic capabilities are
instrumental and would add "weight" to the NSRS
and the US evolving strategic relationship with
India.
Silk Road related initiatives
should help Central and South Asian countries
mitigate, if not resolve in the short run, the
many regional security challenges through and
beyond 2014. The NSRS is one such crucial
initiative, which can promote US interests while
contributing to development of Central and South
Asia.
However, this initiative risks
remaining a vision without a detailed plan based
on the direct involvement of Washington. If the US
is serious about leading the world, it needs to
remain engaged in Central Asia, which serves as a
springboard for regional and global ambitions of
China, India, and Russia, among other actors. The
US must turn itself from a facilitator into a
direct participator.
Roman
Muzalevsky works for iJet Intelligent Risk
Systems Inc, focusing on global and regional
security analysis. He is also a contributing
analyst on Eurasian affairs and security at
Jamestown Foundation and a contributing analyst on
the North America, Russia and Central Asia, and
globalization desks at the geopolitical and
security consultancy Wikistrat.
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