INTERVIEW Pyongyang tests Xi's populist credentials
By Sunny Lee
BEIJING - A long-expected visit to China by North Korean leader Kim Jong-eun will likely be put off indefinitely following Pyongyang's third nuclear test, say Chinese security expert Sun Zhe.
"China's leadership won't allow a visit by Kim now. It won't happen, at least not in the near future," Sun Zhe, an international relations professor at the elite Tsinghua University in Beijing, told Asia Times Online during an interview.
A visit to Beijing by Kim was expected to serve as his "debut" on the international political scene, with a meeting with China's top new leader, Xi Jinping the perfect accompanying photo-op.
But the nuclear test has even prompted rare open debate in China
on whether current policy towards the country's long-time communist ally squares with present-day China's national interest.
After the detonation on February 12, there were even anti-North Korean protests in pockets of China, including one in front of the North Korean consulate in the northeastern city of Shenyang, not far from the North Korean border.
These were small in scale, but this was the first time Chinese people had taken to the streets to lash out at Pyongyang, with protestors demanding that the Chinese government take a tougher stance against the North.
China is widely seen as the only country with any leverage over Pyongyang. But it has long been accused by the international community of "shielding" the North from punishment over its various belligerent acts.
Since Pyongyang's nuke test, the UN Security Council, on which China sits, has been deliberating on what punitive measures to slap on Pyongyang.
The way China handles North Korea is increasing impacting on the credibility of its foreign policy, particularly as it has tries to project the image of a "responsible power" in international affairs.
Sun, who visited North Korea last year, says there is little prospect of any immediate shift in China's policy on North Korea. He told Asia Times Online that Beijing still finds North Korea too useful as a "buffer zone" against America's deepening military and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific:
Sunny Lee: In the wake of Pyongyang's third nuclear test, many people are curious as to China's response.
Sun Zhe: Well, China's response is basically going to be harsh and critical. The official statement right after the test was tough, and the Chinese foreign ministry also summoned the North Korean ambassador and delivered a stern protest. I think China will work with other countries to enforce certain sanctions against North Korea. At the same time, it will also reduce or withhold assistance to North Korea.
What is more important is that there are more calls for policy change in media and local provinces. Global Times, for instance, indicated that the North Korea should pay a heavy price for what it did. Local people in some northeastern regions demonstrated in the streets to show their anger on the nuclear test. North Korea's provocative behavior has changed the Chinese perceptions on its current North Korean policy.
SL: So, do you think that China's North Korean policy will change?
SZ: Yes, but I would say it will start as a technical change rather than a fundamental u-turn. The underlying challenge for China right now is how far and to what degree China can "punish" the North while at the same time, maintain its alliance with the country.
As a matter of fact, whenever the North Koreans get whipped, it is usually Chinese companies or people doing business with North Korea who suffer. The new leadership in China needs to set a "red line" for the North Korea that North Koreans shouldn't cross. Otherwise things can get messy.
SL: What do you think the purpose of North Korea's nuclear test was?
SZ: The purpose of the nuclear test, I guess, was to demonstrate that the North is a "normal" country which cannot be bullied by the US and other hostile countries. Of course, the new leader in North Korea can also boost national pride and thus consolidate power in spite of international criticism.
If we think about the issue from North Korea's point of view, we'll find some legitimate logic. For instance, it may want to ask why was it condemned for launching a satellite when the South would not have been? Why the double standard? Why can South Korea, together with US troops, conduct military drills and that's okay, while any North Korean military maneuver is seen as a "provocation"?
SL: Many people are wondering when Kim Jong-eun will visit China. Is this still on the cards?
SZ: Well, since he carried out this test, not in the near future. I'm not quite sure if he wants to visit China first, after being criticized by Beijing. Russia could also be a good choice for him.
SL: What's Xi Jinping's North Korean policy? Does he have a roadmap?
SZ: I think China still prefers the so-called "three-step approach" to deal with North Korea. It places inter-Korean talks as a first step followed by United States-North Korean negotiations and then the resumption of the six-party talks on the North's nuke program.
The underlying goal of this approach is to stop nuclear proliferation in this region. China is really against North Korea's nuclear test. In 2006 and 2009 and now in 2013, when North Korea conducted its nuclear tests, China each time criticized the move. That's China's stance on the nuclear issue.
Secondly, China really wants to see Pyongyang carry out some sort of economic reform to improve people's livelihoods.
SL: China has now its new leader, Xi Jinping. Many outsiders expected that Xi as a new leader would take a much tougher approach towards its recalcitrant neighbor. This hasn't happen in reality, even though China has sometimes sounded tougher. We don't know Xi's North Korean policy as much as we know about his political orientation and domestic policy. In fact, there are a lot of debates about him lately. Some day he is a reformer. Others say he is a conservative. And both reformers and conservatives claim that he is on their side.
SZ: To say if somebody is a reformer or conservative, you need to follow his career and examine his words and deeds. When he was young, Xi was sent to the rural areas and suffered a lot. This was a low period in his life. His father was purged even before the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). But, his father was not subject to the public criticism, a very common feature during the turbulent times.
When Zhao Ziyang died, Xi's mother sent a wreath at to funeral. His father also worked in Guangdong, one of China's reform frontiers. I think Xi was very much influenced by his father's political views. When he was party secretary of Zhejiang province, he encouraged private entrepreneurship with great success. So far we haven't seen any evidence of neither that of Bo Xilai-style of far-leftism nor that of a conservative style. This background information lends support to the view that he is a reform-minded leader, although we cannot conclude he is a reformer.
On the other hand, if you want to argue that he is a conservative, you can find relevant background information as well. For example, when he was party secretary in Shanghai, the local Dongfang Weishi TV had its own prime time evening news, instead of the nationally broadcast central-government-run CCTV news (Xinwen Lianbo). When Xi Jinping took power in Shanghai, he changed that, saying Shanghai also needed to "confirm to the present social practice in China". So Shanghai also began to air Xinwen Lianbo by CCTV, directly run by the central government.
If you think that's evidence of his conservatism, you can argue so. But again, there is no hard evidence to prove that he is a conservative.
SL: Now, there is a third view too, saying that he is a populist.
SZ: Yes, like Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Upon his installation two months ago as the Communist Party's new head, Xi behaved like a down-to-earth leader, sharing a humble meal with local people in Hebei Province.
Unlike his rigid predecessors, who didn't allow the media to report about their family details, Xi allowed the state media to run his family pictures, such as the one in which he was helping his father in a wheelchair. That helped to boost his image as "a family man".
He also didn't block the road when his convoy passed through downtown Shenzhen. Given the political culture in China, it takes some courage to do that, especially when the two senior leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, are still in place. The hand-over of power will be carried out officially after the two conferences in March, what we call "liang hui" (two meetings).
The premier-designate, Li Keqiang, also is yet to hold full authority. He doesn't have a cabinet until March. In China, there are also many retired leaders who wield power behind closed doors. But, Xi has tried to change the "working-style" of government officials, so to speak, so it is more down to earth, with more systematic efforts in anti-corruption.
Xi faces a lot of pressure from many directions. But at least he is willing to try to go a new direction and try to stay in touch with the grassroots level.
SL: So, you mean it is actually Xi's strategy to be somewhat ambiguous at this stage? He projects himself in a way that can neither as reformist or conservative. Does he aim to safeguard his political muscle, while making gradual changes?
SZ: One of the strategies the communist party used to beat the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang during the Civil War was to strengthen its ties with grassroots people. Chinese leaders, prior to Xi, were a bit aloof. But Xi is different. He is much more down-to-earth. And people were surprised by that. So, you can say, this is a reformist move. Others can say this is a conservative move because he's trying to go back to the old Communist Party rule. You can take both sides of the argument.
My personal view is that at least so far Xi is trying to bring hope to people, hope for reform, hope for changing bureaucracy, to bring more integrity to the face of China in international society. So far, I would say the indication shows that he is a reform-minded party secretary. He really wants to revamp the Communist Party to bring hope to China.
SL: Let's go back to the North Korean nuclear issue. China and Russia often take the same stance when it comes to North Korea. What should we learn from that?
SZ: China's North Korean policy doesn't easily change. But you can see a sign of shift by looking at whether China consults with Russia on taking joint action against North Korea.
SL: Could you elaborate on this?
SZ: China doesn't want to give the world the impression that China is guarding North Korea. So, it wants to team up with Russia to take a joint approach, which would make China's role less prominent.
SL: China harshly criticized North Korea in 2006 following the latter's first nuclear test. But its attitude became much more "protective" in the wake of the North's second nuclear test in 2009. Outside analysts were very curious about the change.
SZ: It's only natural, I would say. There was a realization that China couldn't abandon North Korea from its geopolitical strategic perspective. That view still holds true today. Think about it. What the US and South Korea want China to do is to isolate and abandon North Korea. North Korea and China are neighboring countries. There's no way we can shut down the border completely. There will always be an underground trade. China can only go so far as to do what I would call "soft criticism" not "hard criticism". Besides, isolating North Korea won't help.
SL: China is not happy with North Korea. But it also cannot afford to scrap its relationship with North Korea? Will continue to provide aid to North Korea to prop it up economically?
SZ: This is China's dilemma. It's like giving money to tame an ill-tempered person. That's better than letting things go completely out of control. But the basic policy approach in China is to engage North Korea and it appears to work because North Korea has begun to display signs of economic reforms too.
SL: What's your view on South Korea's approach towards North Korea?
SZ: The problem I see with South Korea's approach is that it has tried two different approaches. One government tried to provide aid unconditionally. The other attached conditions to the aid.
With conditions attached, North Koreans refused to enter a dialogue with South Korea. South Korea has a consistency problem with North Korea. Overall, I think the two Koreas should find a way of expanding their economic cooperation. The Gaesong Special Economic Zone is a good idea. Seoul can expand the effort further, setting up similar economic zones in different parts of North Korea.
SL: When it comes to China's strategic interests in the Korean Peninsula, we get the sense that Beijing frowns upon South Korea's military alliance with the US.
SZ: There are some misunderstandings on this. First of all, China is not against the military alliance between South Korea and the US. We understand that it is a historic relic that goes back to the Korean War. What we complain about is that there are too many military drills. Some of them, I think, are unnecessary. This is something that we feel uncomfortable about.
With regard to the free trade agreement (FTA) between Washington and Seoul, China has not said anything about it, despite the fact that it will have negative repercussions on China, given the competition between Beijing and Washington.
It is bound to hurt China's market share in the US as well. We think we can handle the impact. Once again, what China hopes to see is the reduction of military drills that are too frequently done and most are also symbolic in nature against North Korea and it raises tension on the Korean Peninsula, affecting the region.
SL: The two Koreas went to a war against each other before. People in South Korea are concerned about possible provocations from North Korea again.
SZ: A lot of South Koreans, including senior government officials I met, worry about possible attacks from North Korea. That, I think, will never happen.
SL: It will never happen?
SZ: It will never happen.
SL: What's your basis for that argument?
SZ: Because by attacking, North Korea would be committing suicide, if you consider the lack of electricity, lack of fuel oil and so forth. Google chief Eric Schmidt had to shiver in -20 degrees Celsius [-4 degree Fahrenheit] temperatures in Pyongyang. He was one of those highest-level foreign guests North Korea had hosted. But even he had to stay at a hotel without heating during the winter time.
Today, South Korea's military is better equipped than their counterpart in the North. In addition, the South also has the military alliance with the US. As a matter of fact, North Korea is worried about an invasion by South Korea and the US. I think South Koreans tend to overestimate the military capability of the North.
SL: What do you think is South Korea's biggest misunderstanding about China?
SZ: First of all, many South Koreans think China hasn't done enough to contain North Korea's belligerence. China's influence on North Korea is limited. China is seen what I'd call an "awful middleman" on North Korean issues. China is a broker, not a seller, not a buyer. The only way you can persuade the seller is to talk to the seller directly. The middleman's role is limited. The North Korean issue is the same. Don't overestimate China's influence on North Korea.
Secondly, many South Koreans think China is closer to North Korea than it is to South Korea. That's not true. Thirdly, some South Koreans are afraid of China's rise and future intentions in the region. But I can say confidently that such worries are unwarranted. South Korea doesn't have to fear China.
SL: South Korea feels that it is stuck between China and the United States, the two global super powers. Some strategists call for "hedging." Others call for "balancing." What's your advice?
SZ: Perhaps double-hedging or double-balancing. If you add North Korea and Japan, South Korea needs to play four diplomatic balls at the same time. But that will be a very tiring job. So, be yourself. The key is inter-Korean relations. That's the basis for all the other relations. Try to fix the inter-Korean ties. That's the first order of priority.
SL: Finally, Park Geun-hye [who was officially inaugurated as South Korea's new president on February 25]. What would you like to say to her, in terms of managing the inter-Korean relations?
SZ: The former Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui said "jie ji yong ren." It means we should exercise patience with regard to Taiwan's economic investment in mainland China. So, my advice to South Korea in terms of North Korea is the same: be patient.
Sunny Lee, PhD is a Seoul-born columnist and commentator, who follows events in North Korea and China.
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