Page 2 of 2 Real change absent in Sino-US relations
By Richard Weitz
In his post-summit news conference, President Xi stressed that, "Both sides agreed to strengthen dialogue and communication at various levels, and continuously enhance mutual understanding and trust. I and President Obama will continue to keep close contacts through exchange of visits, meetings, telephone calls and letters.".
Related to the focus on avoidance rather than achievement, Chinese analysts place the burden on the United States to avoid the logic of confrontation and promote "mutual trust" by accommodating Beijing's interests regarding territorial disputes, Taiwan, human rights and other issues.
A common refrain in Chinese commentary on these contested
issues is for the United States "to respect the facts" - that is the correctness of Beijing's position. In addition, many Chinese analysts resist the great power label for their country and see themselves simultaneously as a developed and developing nation.
This conflicted identity can sometimes make it difficult for China's leaders to define their national interests and pursue a coherent policy. Furthermore, this Chinese reasoning is instrumental in nature. They believe China would benefit from having good relations with the United States. There was not an ideological conviction that good China-US relations represented a value in itself.
Pivot problems and divergent regional security concerns
These constraints are evident in how Chinese experts view the Obama administration's rebalancing in Asia. Chinese experts appear more divided over the goals and effects of the US rebalancing.
When it was first announced in the context of the 2010 clashes between the United States and China over regional sovereignty issues, many Chinese analysts and officials saw strategic rebalancing as primarily designed to constrain China's rise under the pretext of realigning US attention toward Asia.
More analysts profess to contest that view, with some accepting at face value the Obama administration's argument that the shift represents a natural response to the changing global security environment. Some also do not believe the increased US focus on Asia will result in a major elevation in US influence in the region due to constraints on US power.
In fact, many Chinese analysts anticipate a weakening of the pivot as the dominant thrust of US foreign policy due to the US budget crisis, the inability of the US to disengage from Middle East crises, and other factors.
One increasingly prominent line of thought is that Japan, the Philippines and other countries are seeking to exploit the rebalancing to entrap Washington to support them in territorial conflicts with China. In the past, Chinese analysts had depicted cunning US officials trying to manipulate regional rivalries to encourage local actors to confront Beijing.
Some Chinese analysts now maintain that US policymakers are allowing other countries to maneuver Washington against China. They argue that the pivot could cut short promising changes in China's policy toward North Korea and other issues prematurely by requiring Beijing to reaffirm its own traditional regional alignments. [1]
At both meetings, China and the United States advocated the denuclearization of North Korea, but Beijing did not commit to new and specific measures against the North. The recent visit by South Korean President Park Geun-hye to China gathered much favorable media coverage in both countries but also did not see a major shift in Beijing's position.
Chinese experts still oppose the efforts of Washington and US allies to impose strong sanctions that could precipitate the North Korean regime's sudden collapse - which they still see as a US goal. Many Chinese would welcome a change in Pyongyang's behavior, especially an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, but they oppose any harsh measures that could engender humanitarian emergencies, economic hardships or military conflicts.
To avert these risky developments, Chinese analysts tend to downplay or overlook Pyongyang's provocations even though they recognize North Korea's confrontational policies complicate Chinese diplomatic outreach toward South Korea and entrench the US military presence in Northeast Asia.
The dilemma was most evident in my conversations in Shenyang, a large Chinese city close to the North Korean border. The local scholars were deeply frustrated with Pyongyang's ingratitude for decades of Chinese support and North Koreans' failure to take advantage of Beijing's assistance to move along China's post-Mao path toward more moderate foreign and domestic policies.
They also regretted that China's was allied with North rather than South Korea. Above all else, Shenyang intellectuals worry that their unwelcome neighbor would implode and dump a horrible mess on them - and that Washington was trying to maneuver Beijing into contributing to its demise. [2]
While US policymakers understandably are preoccupied with China's policies toward North Korea, my Chinese interlocutors were fixated on Japan.
In almost every conversation I had in China, including in the university classes I taught in Beijing and Shanghai, the Chinese academics and students faulted Tokyo for stirring up its territorial dispute with China by nationalizing the disputed islands and US policy for contributing to Japan's re-militarization through a combination of naive indifference and a purposeful effort to rely on Japanese nationalists to reinforce US power in the region.
Conclusion
The leadership transition in Beijing and the subsequent high-level China-US meetings have yet to achieve a major conceptual or policy breakthrough in overcoming bilateral tensions. The meetings have certainly not established a "New Type of Great Power Relationship" - the declared goal of Chinese diplomacy. The new Chinese thinking has occurred, but has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
For example, previously Chinese analysts warned that the United States was using the pivot to embolden China's neighbors to confront Beijing; now they warn that Washington naively is allowing Japanese rightists and other local nationalists to manipulate the United States into confronting China on their behalf.
In addition, while many Chinese view North Korea less favorably in the past, and some would like to dump Pyongyang for Seoul, Chinese analysts see the main regional security as Japan's remilitarization rather than North Korean provocations.
Richard Weitz, PhD, is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC. The author would like to thank Xiao Han, Man Ching Lam, Su Wang, Vicki Weiqi Yang and Shuyang Yu for their assistance with Chinese-language sources.
Notes:
1. Author's interviews and roundtable with think tanks and academic institutions in Beijing, May 8-9, 2013.
2. Author's attendance at a conference, Shenyang, July 18, 2013.
3. Su Hao, Presentation at Asan Forum, Seoul, May 1, 2013.
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