SPEAKING FREELY Change in the Middle Kingdom
By Stefan Soesanto
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.
With the official start of the once-a-decade leadership transition in November 2012, the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) under General Secretary Xi Jinping took center stage at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party. But while portraying an image of unity and political stability, the new leadership has little in common with the communist ideal the party once envisioned.
Analysts have so far desperately tried to classify each individual in terms of their family background, princelings versus tuanpai (the Youth League faction), and political affiliation, the proteges of
former president Jiang Zemin versus the proteges of outgoing President Hu Jintao. Yet none have so far proven the existence of any strong leadership cohesion that would define China's upcoming security policy. In fact, in the absence of such cohesion, Xi would be in the very delicate position of adhering to Jiang and appeasing Hu, while at the same time log-rolling with the members of the PSC to achieve consensus. So on what security issues will the leadership converge to find consensus?
First, the PSC will try to avoid riding the wave of nationalism. All seven members have risen through the party system and have been mainly confronted with economic and social problems in the rich eastern provinces. Their primary objective is to consolidate the party's position by keeping a lid on an increasingly confident military. The forces in Zhongnanhai need political stability and a firm grip on power to push through Jiang's economic reforms while maintaining Hu's harmonious society. For the new red nobility economic interests come first, foreign interest second.
With the appointment of Zhang Dejiang and Yu Zhengsheng to the PSC, China is also naturally bound to continue its pragmatic security policies towards Pyongyang. Yu is a ballistic missile engineer and Zhang studied economics at Kim Il Sung University. Both have a unique perspective on the current North Korean proliferation issue, which they are going to shape in tandem. Yu will press for increasing cooperation with the international community, in step with Beijing's need for regional stability and peace, while Zhang will block any efforts to destabilize Pyongyang that would cause spill-over effects into Jillin province, where he served as party secretary.
Third, China's relations towards South Korea will continue to evolve into a business-like partnership driven by trade rather than common security interests. Beijing's policies towards Pyongyang, as well as Seoul's military alliance with Washington, remain constant obstacles to a deeper bilateral relationship. In terms of trade policies however, the economics of scale will prevail over the economics of scope. There is actually little evidence that the current FTA negotiations will result in anything more than a low quality trade agreement. While Seoul is still refusing to open its market for Chinese agricultural products, Beijing has little incentives to reduce its tariffs in the automobile and machinery sector.
Fourth, the territorial dispute between China and Japan is going to be shelved. None of the members in the PSC, nor Jiang or Hu, have any stake in a military escalation that would undermine regional stability and foster nationalism. In fact, Hu's constant emphasis on the military and the armed police to safeguard social stability, and Xi's strident reminder that the PLA is subject to the will of the party, are all signals of preparing the security apparatus for domestic intervention rather than foreign escalation. What we have seen in the past, in terms of jet fighters scrambling and warships locking onto their targets, is in fact merely a combination of pre-emption and individualism, which might lead to an accident, but never to a war.
So while Beijing's external security policies will be guided by cooperation and the dictum of stability and peace, China's security stance at home will be increasingly authoritarian. Under Xi the "one country, two systems'" policy will seize to exit. Zhang Xiaoming's recent article in the Wen Wei Po, and the appointment of Zhang Dejiang as head of the party's leading group on Hong Kong and Macau affairs, reflect this change in attitude. While the former is defending the implementation of a highly criticized anti-subversion and security law in Hong Kong, the latter is known as an enforcer and trouble-shooter responsible for restoring order in Chongqing after the fall of Bo Xilai. Combining these qualities can only lead to further restrictions on free speech and the excessive use of force.
For the communist party the emphasis is on recovering its political legitimacy and public image through cohesion and strict adherence to norms and standards throughout the whole Republic. Democracy and human rights are therefore off the table, economic reforms and political consolidation are the name of the game.
Stefan Soesanto is an intern at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. Articles submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions and do not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
