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COMMENTARY
Chinese-box approach to international
conflict
By Qiao Liang and Wang
Xiangsui
(In February 1999, Qiao Liang and
Wang Xiangsui, colonels in the People's Liberation Army,
published Unrestricted Warfare, in which they
proposed tactics for developing countries, especially
China, to compensate for their military inferiority to
the United States in a high-tech war. Mentioned
prominently in the book was a certain Saudi by the name
of Osama bin Laden. Asia Times Online is
presenting two articles by the officers on China's
unique approach to international conflict.)
Many people and countries that have looked to
China for more effective intervention in regional
affairs are disappointed that, as India and Pakistan are
rattling their sabers, China's leaders, instead of
putting forward concrete solutions to the crisis, have
only called on both parties to adhere to the "five
principles of peaceful co-existence" (mutual respect for
each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful co-existence). However, China's approach to the
Indo-Pakistani conflict illustrates the unique Chinese
manner of intervening in international conflicts.
China
certainly does not regard the Kashmir conflict
as a trivial matter, as it is concerned both
about the success of its strategy for developing western
China and about maintaining its leading position in
regional affairs. As Beijing sees it, however, the
Kashmir issue cannot be treated in isolation: it has to
be tackled along with the broader issue of
Indo-Pakistani relations, which in turn should be placed
in the context of the South Asian framework. Viewed from
the perspective of the global powers' involvement in the
region, especially the concentration of US forces in
South Asia, there is also the American factor to be
considered. Which also means a global vision is needed.
In other words, to check or ultimately to
resolve the Kashmir conflict, the whole issue should be
approached and tackled from the
Kashmir-Indo-Pakistani-relationship-South
Asia-global-security angle.
It is Chinese
practice to attack an issue with a framework larger than
the issue itself. When a crisis occurs, Chinese leaders
first detach from it temporally and spacially. They
spend time thinking about the issue before action, thus
allowing more room for maneuver in the future. This is
somewhat like playing with a magic box: first you pack
the specific problem and related factors into a box and
then fit it into larger boxes with related problems in
different levels. Finally, you come up with a framework
of highest generality to harness the whole situation.
In the
Chinese mythical story Journey to the West
, the mighty Tathagata Buddha did not seek
to subdue the Monkey King, who had just wrought havoc
with the Celestial Palace, on their first encounter.
Instead, the Monkey was given full freedom to display its
somersaulting skill. Far though the Monkey might jump, the
Buddha, an even more adept magician, enlarged his hand
so that the Monkey could never reach beyond his palm.
Strategically, what Chinese leaders admire most and
strive hard to achieve is emulating the masterly Buddha
in engaging his opponent. "Forbearance is the mark of
great virtue": such is the pursuit of Chinese moral
cultivation and the goal of Chinese statecraft.
The characteristic of Chinese strategic
thinking is that the Chinese do not want to tackle an issue
as such but would rather place it in a wider context
and spend more time seeking a solution. It is similar to the
Chinese medical approach. If the doctor administers a
prescription that treats the disease as such, the
Chinese would say he is only treating the symptoms
rather than the root cause. Therefore, crisis-management
theory, which is common knowledge in the international
community, is still alien to China's leaders. They may
even be resistant to the practice of emphasizing
transparency of procedures, quick response and
individual responsibility. The situation is like Chinese
people's resistance to Western medicine.
This
slow-boat approach was gradually cultivated during the
time when the Chinese government was focused on internal
affairs and important international crises only occurred
once in a few years or decades. The core of this mindset
is "avoid troubles": don't build a fire that will burn
your fingers. As the speed of globalization increases,
however, China's leaders are discovering that crises are
coming one after the other, some of them even
deliberately manufactured.
There is no way that troubles can
be avoided now. China will be put into a passive
position if it fails to respond to these crises quickly.
This has been proved in cases such as the bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese jet fighter's
collision with a US aircraft, and the North Koreans'
intrusion into a Japanese consulate.
Given that the possibility of changing the
present decisional procedures is slight, China has
deployed a strategic "idle piece" on the chessboard of
international affairs. And it seems to be effective.
The idle piece
Although the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), established in 1996, is the
first regional organization created under the auspices
of China, because of the lack of any concrete follow-up
measures and the stable conditions of Central Asia
at the time of its creation, it was regarded as expendable,
like an "idle piece" in the Chinese game of go.
After September 11, the United States, with
its victimization by terrorists as a moral
justification, marshaled a global anti-terrorism campaign and waged
a war in Afghanistan. Suddenly tension rose in
Central Asia. Faced with this emergency, SCO members could
not even come up with a common position. Instead,
they declared their support for the US anti-terrorist campaign
individually. The fact that Russia and China remained
silent to US double standards in regard to Chechen and
East Turkestan terrorists especially exposed the
impotence of the SCO.
This changed when the SCO
held its summit in St Petersburg recently. The six
members passed the Charter of SCO, issued an
"anti-terrorist statement", decided to set up an office
in Beijing, and established an anti-terrorist center in
Kyrgyzstan, which helped gain some say for China, Russia
and the Central Asian countries in the global
anti-terrorism campaign. Suddenly the SCO had become a
real thing.
More important, the SCO has a great
strategic potential for a framework of regional security
cooperation. Pakistan has expressed its wish to join the
organization, as has India. Although it may be doubtful
that this "security roof" can accommodate the two
perennial enemies, the prospect is promising. If one day
the SCO accepts India's and Pakistan's membership to
form a large cooperation organization composed of
Central and South Asian countries, there will be a
revolution in the global geopolitical setup and the
status of the SCO will be raised significantly. The
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia held in Almaty may be a transition to
the formation of this framework. That is why the leaders
of the 16 countries in the region were willing to
participate in this informal meeting.
For China,
there are more potential advantages. If this framework
can ultimately be formed, not only will the threat to
China's west constituted by the Indo-Pakistani
"dangerous liaisons" be deflected, China will also be
able to find a way to counter the US infiltration in
European and Asian continents or even the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's eastward expansion, a possible
result of the cooperation between Russia and NATO. The
key is to unite Central and South Asian countries for
regional security and development.
China might
not have had this strategic awareness when the SCO was
established, but it nevertheless turned out to be a
proactive move. The issue today is that China should
make more such moves at quicker speed. It should
integrate the economic development of the western region
with its geopolitical strategy, so that the gambit of
playing off the Western alliance against eastern
expansion can materialize. As pressure from the West's
eastern expansion is repelled, there will be more room
for development and better security conditions for
China.
When President George W Bush named the "axis
of evil" and prepared for a "pre-emptive strike", US
security strategy did not intend to leave much room for
a security framework centered on other regions. From Russian
President Vladimir Putin's idea of an "arc of stability",
it can be seen that not much time has been given
to Russia (in fact China too) to build up a geopolitical
strategy that is consistent with their national
interests. For a country that longs to be an influential
global power, a long-term strategic design alone is not
enough. There is also the need to react promptly and
take the initiative. This is not just the trivial trick of
"playing off the barbarians against the barbarian", but
a grand move in the participation of creating a new
international order.
It should be admitted
that China, still a junior student in international
affairs, is learning to be a global power, including how
to respond to crises. However, as a junior student
that nevertheless is thousands of years old, China should
rise above its long-held parochial Sino-centric
(Tian-sha) vision, salvage the wisdom of
diplomatic maneuvers from the depth of historical
memory, and absorb the nutrients of strategic thinking
from its heritage, so as to arrive at its own original
answers in the test of international strategy.
In the next Asian crisis, people will find that
China has already put another "idle piece" in the
far-away city of Bo-ao. It is hoped that the strategy of
"playing off the Western alliance against eastern
expansion" will have become mature by then and, like
other Chinese strategic deployment, will form a security
buffer for China.
Next: Western alliance
and eastern expansion
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
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policies.)
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Russian-Chinese
pact a 'great game' victim
