China

Communist Party of China Inc
By Dinkar Ayilavarapu

KOLKATA - There are two kinds of people in the world: those who try to make sense out of China, and those who have given up making sense out of it long ago. And many agree that the only other country besides India that can exist with as many contradictions as it does is the People's Republic of China.

It is neither the people's nor a republic, but surely its form of communism is Chinese. On July 1, 2001, President Jiang Zemin proposed allowing capitalists to enter the Communist Party. Now isn't that the mother of all contradictions? But what was more surprising was that Jiang quoted Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to justify it. In an interview with the New York Times, he said, "Marx and Engels lived more than 150 years ago. The Communist Manifesto was published 153 years ago. It is impossible to apply every single word they wrote at that time to today's reality. One thing we should always applaud Marx and Engels for is that they improved their views and thinking in light of changing historical conditions."

Surely, Jiang needs to be applauded for improving communism in the changing light of the 21st century. It's called improvisation, dragon style.

Fast-forward to March 6, 2002. The country's top economic planner, Zeng Peiyan, in his report to the National People's Congress, called for a 7 percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The figure, albeit less than the previous year's, is required in times of weakening domestic demand and a slowing export sector. To keep the growth at 7 percent will need another massive round of government spending that will push the budget deficit to a record US$37 billion. In the past four years the Chinese have relied on increasing government spending to stave off deflation, by boosting demand in face of a slowing export sector. This has resulted in, on the one hand, very impressive growth figures and, on the other, a rapidly rising budget deficit and government debt.

If you fault the Chinese for anything, you can't accuse them of not being pragmatic. They knew when to invade India and then when to stop. Deng Xiaoping built bridges with the Americans exactly when the Americans needed him desperately. The Chinese liberalized their economy and opened up their markets at the right time, to capitalize on the Asian economic miracle, and now they have decided to win over the burgeoning 21st-century Chinese bourgeoisie.

The decision to open up membership, which merited very little coverage in the world, is significant on two counts - it marks the total reversal of the Tiananmen phenomenon of 1989; and China now is apparently taking the route Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Indonesia took before it.

In 1989, students, intellectuals and the middle classes revolted against the communist authorities. The rural peasantry and the workers were the bulwark of the regime against these classes. In the past decade of reform, opening up and spectacular growth - it is those very students, intellectuals and the middle classes (if they are alive) who have taken the cake, and the bread as well, of the reform process. They have gained most in the decade of high growth and liberalization.

In the March convention, what worried the Chinese leadership more than the rising deficit was what would happen if the government slackened its efforts to pump up the economy. Many in the government believe that 7 percent growth is a must to prevent serious social unrest. The planning minister's report expected unemployment to rise to 4.5 percent from last year's 3.6 percent. This was not counting the rural unemployed and numerous urban workers who were idled but not formally laid off. In the previous year rural incomes grew at 4.2 percent, less than half the urban rate of income growth. In many grain-producing areas incomes actually fell. The government targets an increase of 4 percent this year to prevent major rural dislocation. Xiang Huaicheng, the Chinese finance minister, had more bad news - the budget would grow only by 7.7 percent as against the previous year's 20.9 percent.

In the prevailing circumstances, the erstwhile bastions of the communist government couldn't have it any worse. The communist health and social security apparatus is losing state patronage. To keep the old system in good health, at least $12 billion is needed - from where is the big question. Communist-style farms and other rural employment are drying out fast. Already there is large-scale migration of rural poor to the cities. With incomes growing at less than half the rate in urban China, the local satraps have been facing widespread discontent that at times has been violent. The livelihood of millions of small farmers could be damaged when China opens up to cheap competitive agricultural imports as a part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the rate of growth of the GDP is not sustained, it could be chaos.

Working conditions aren't getting any better. If you factor in the coal-mine disasters, building collapses, factory fires and even school-building accidents, working conditions are seemingly worse than 10 years ago. Protection provided to the workers over the years is being phased out. Job security is a thing of the past; hire and fire policies are already in place in the coastal belt. State-paid vacations, health benefits, education and other amenities are history. With China having entered the WTO, internal markets will be open to international business. The Chinese will have to adhere to a myriad web of treaties under the WTO that will put Chinese industry under pressure to comply, which ultimately will translate into tougher conditions for the workers.

Faced with a discontented support base, the communist mandarins, being as pragmatic as they are, have started looking for new supporters. What better class of people to reach out to than the gainers of the past decade, and those with the largest stake in the new open system - the middle classes? These classes, having made the most of the liberalization and globalization, clamor for power and representation in the Chinese political structure. To be fair to them, they are seeking their rightful share of the cake.

Another big help to the middle classes has been the transition in the Chinese leadership. More than half of the existing leadership is likely to bow out and hand over the torch to the so-called fourth generation of Chinese leadership. The first generation was Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, the second was led by Deng Xiaoping, the third by Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, and the fourth one is to be led by Hu Jintao, all set to take over as president later this year. In addition there are other vacancies in the party structure, for the middle classes to exploit. With entry no longer barred, the middle classes can surely occupy more and more of these vacancies. In simple terms the communists are looking for a new bulwark against a frustrated and repressed peasantry, and the bourgeoisie fits the bill perfectly.

In the coming years one will certainly see the Communist Party turning into an absolute ruling party with not much communism left in it. The government will become more and more middle-class-friendly and any opposition from the peasants and workers will be crushed, in the finest traditions of Chinese communism. This is the reversal of Tiananmen. In '89 it was the workers' party that cracked down on the bourgeoisie, and now it will be the bourgeoisie party that will control the workers.

This brings us to the second point: China following the track previously trodden by Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea. All these states began their journey as independent nations by being absolute regimes (Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Sukarno in Indonesia). Some time later they capitalized on economic liberalization and their economies boomed. This boom wouldn't have been possible but for the close coupling of business and power. The ruling outfits there changed into military-business oligarchies. Now, after some tenacious movements for democracy, they have transformed themselves into democracies.

China, in the first stage of its transformation, has stopped being a monolith run out of Beijing by the supreme leader. The age of patriarchs like Mao and Deng is conclusively over. The nation in the past 10 years has been powered by private enterprise in the coastal belt, and it is these entrepreneurs who will resist any imposition from the top. The nation is now run from the various regional capitals by all-powerful governors. The overall authority of Beijing has declined. Though separatists' movements such as the ones in Xingjiang and Tibet won't be tolerated, the country won't be governed from Beijing either.

It is in this context that the fourth generation of Chinese leadership assumes importance. Going by the past record, these leaders are likely to run the show for the next five to 10 years. It would be under them that China would make any of the transitions mentioned above.

Hu, as the head of the Central Party School, allowed research into alternative systems that may suit China. On a trip to Europe last year, he expressed a profound interest in the structure of the Social Democratic Party. In a conference in January in Beijing, critics of the government called for more rapid democratization. The notable feature was the presence of several top communist officials who participated as well. The National People's Congress, which in the past has acted like a rubber-stamp parliament, has regularly voted against government policy recently. The official press, though still tightly circumscribed, has started reporting on official malfeasance.

This said, there is a difference between discussion and implementation. Despite nascent signs of democratization and Westernization, none of the new generation of leaders foresees any other future for China than as a single-party state. The communists in China have apparently graduated to become a military-business alliance. And it is hoped that some day in the future, China might become democratic.

It is quite common that when there is major change, there is turmoil. When a generation hands over power to another, as China will do, there is opposition. The Chinese have already completed the biggest crackdown since Tiananmen in 1989, on the Falungong religious sect. There is a story about the Falungong. The Beijing chapter of the Falungong rubbed a minor communist official the wrong way with its public prayer meeting. The official banned public prayers of the sect. In protest to this the Falungong held a prayer session outside the official's house. This is said to have driven home the point to the communists that there was an organization in China that could drum up popular support on the streets at very short notice, and which was not called the Communist Party. Any challenge to their authority is not taken kindly to by the communists, and the rest is history.

An interesting piece of trivia is that the organizer of this crackdown is a leading light of the new generation of Chinese leadership. Luo Gon, a confidant of National People's Congress chairman Li Peng, is the law-and-order chief of China and the man whom Human Rights Watch holds responsible for the Falungong clampdown. He has been named head of the party's discipline body in the new dispensation. He is also the man behind operation "Strike Hard" against crime in which hundreds were executed. And he imposed martial law in Tibet after public protests during his four-year tenure with the party there. Despite all the talk of democracy, the new generation might not yet loosen its hold on the reins of the state.

Change in China can be for the better or for the worse. After their Great Leap Forward in the 1960s and 1970s, the Chinese abandoned all they fought for and joined the ranks of fellow East Asians as a free-market economy. After having opened itself to the winds of liberalization, China stands poised to become a nation of the middle class, freer and more democratic in disposition. In this situation, the workers of the world need to look elsewhere, for now. The Maoist revolution, finally, is devouring its children.

(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
 
Aug 16, 2002


China's changing of the guard   (Aug 2, '02)

 

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