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Chinese politics: Secrecy in an open
world
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - China's economy is booming despite the
difficulties being experienced in much of the rest of
the world. But this success comes at a price. As China
opens up its markets and reaps the benefits of
international investment, its secretive political system
comes under more and more international scrutiny.
This interest does not arise out of mere
curiosity. Billions of dollars in trade and investment
now depend on China's internal politics. Those who are
in power in Beijing, and those who will inherit power in
a much anticipated change of leadership at the 16th
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) this
year, control the fate of all that investment, and hence
the welfare of many countries.
However, for many
reasons, old and new, Beijing continues to keep its
political cards close to its chest. The old reasons have
to do with the secretive tradition of the Communist
Party. The new ones have to do with the party's
difficulty coping with outside pressure. Leaks and
rumors affect what happens in the inner chambers of
Chinese politics and become part of the decision-making
process in a way that Beijing's leaders find difficult
to control. And so, even after formal meetings on the
leadership at the resort of Beidaihe ended early last
week, even the date of the party congress remains
uncertain, although Asia Times Online has it on good
authority that it will take place next month (see China's changing of the guard,
August 2).
Yet the disclosure of information on
the future of Chinese politics is important for the
Chinese and for world economics. So we must be aware
that the facts and stories that are revealed might
change the actual decision to be made on the country's
leadership. It is already certain that Jiang Zemin, when
he goes to the United States in October, will still hold
the post of head of state, from which he might
eventually resign only in March next year.
There
are a few other certainties. On July 22 the official
Xinhua news agency announced the publication of a new
statute for promotion and demotion of cadres. "According
to the statute, a person must have both working
competence and moral integrity to serve as a party or
administrative official." Furthermore, Vice President Hu
Jintao was quoted as saying that "the selection of
officials must be democratic, fair and strictly follow
the regulations of statute in order to build sound
official selection and appointment systems at all
levels".
The statute is important for several
reasons. It restricts the discretionary power of senior
party officials in elevating or demoting others.
Decisions will not be as arbitrary, and thus it is an
important step from the rule by law to the rule
of law. The law will be more important than the
person who makes it.
Furthermore any explicit
reference to socialism or Marxism-Leninism has been
struck out, and Xinhua speaks of "democratic selection"
without any reference to socialism. Of course anything
can be hidden under this still obscure "democratic
selection", but it is important that it is said to be
democratic.
On July 23, Xinhua reported more on
the subject. It said: "The regulation, that fully
embodies the 'Three Represents' thought and the CPC
Central Committee's new requirements for appointing
officials, is of vital importance to the success of the
Party's career and the nation's stability, according to
the decree. A person must have both professional
competence and moral integrity to serve as a Party or
administrative official. The regulation details
conditions and processes in the promotion, demotion and
resignation of officials, which must be legal,
democratic, fair and open to supervision in order to
build sound selection and appointment systems at all
levels."
Here we have a shower of adjectives
dear to the ears of the West: "legal, democratic, fair
and open to supervision", and although again we don't
actually know what they will mean in practice, it is
important that the principles are changed.
Even
more important is the reference to Jiang's theory of the
"Three Represents". The theory is fundamental not only
because it paves the way for the accession of
entrepreneurs to the party, but because it breaks clean
from the Marxist principle of the proletariat as the
leading force for change. Once it is enshrined, as Jiang
is trying to do, in the party constitution, it will be
the cornerstone of political reforms. If the proletariat
and its tradition are left behind, the old Leninist
tradition can be set aside and the party can start
working on the rule of law and democratization, as they
are forms of modernization.
This new path can be
trodden without a major break from tradition, as the
theory of the "Three Represents" can be seen as a
development of Marxism. If the proletariat once
was the most advanced force it might be no more,
as Karl Marx believed in history more than anything, and
history changes the situation.
Therefore Jiang's
contribution to China's modernization could overcome
that of Deng Xiaoping's and, with his theory in the
party constitution, he might at least partially step
back.
A complete resignation is unlikely,
however, for political reasons: continuity and
stability. Hu Jintao, the anointed heir, despite 10
years of warming up on the sidelines, is new and can't
command the complete loyalty Jiang has. Therefore, in
these difficult times of strong social protest, the
party must ensure that power struggles won't spill over
on to the streets, as occurred during the Cultural
Revolution or the Tiananmen incidents.
These are
the general principles and the (almost) certain points.
What is uncertain is how to implement these political
principles. Hu is the heir apparent but many things are
unsettled. It is not sure how many of his three hats
(president of state, chairman of the military commission
and general secretary of the party) Jiang will retain.
The most likely to drop is that of president. But this
is also the most prestigious abroad (the Chinese papers
love to call Jiang president), and so if he is going to
drop that one he might as well drop that of general
secretary as well, since the real power could stay with
the chairman of the military commission.
The
second halting question is what will happen with the
other senior leaders. If Jiang doesn't go, will
parliament chief Li Peng, Premier Zhu Rongji or Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
chairman Li Ruihuan (the youngest of the lot) be willing
to retire? This is the crux of the matter, because Jiang
might retain one or two hats, but if the rest of the
Poltiburo doesn't retire then the power of Hu and his
young colleagues will be seriously diminished.
Furthermore, the presence of two lineups of younger and
older leaders could create conflicts of interest and of
vision that could trigger the violent power struggle the
party has successfully prevented during the past 10
years.
The next question is about the role of
Jiang's top adviser, alternative Politburo member Zeng
Qinghong. He should get into the standing committee of
the Politburo, but it is not certain what will he do,
and how will he cooperate with Hu. Hu and Zeng are both
committed reformers, but of course the issue is who will
be on top and what will be the power of the former and
of the latter.
There is another problem. As Deng
Xiaoping chose Jiang as his successor, Jiang should have
the right to choose his. But Hu was chosen by Deng, not
by Jiang. It is important to see if Jiang also endorses
Hu as his own successor, and if Jiang will make a choice
about the fifth-generation leader.
The great
innovation of the 1992 Congress was introducing, 10
years in advance, not only the third generation
(Jiang's) but also the leader of the fourth (Hu) to
minimize the chance of a future power struggle and to
smooth difficult transition problems. The fact that this
transition is going smoothly is a credit to the choices
made 10 years ago.
Will such a choice be made
again? Will a man in his late 40s be elevated to the
standing Politburo? Who will choose him and who will he
be? This is possibly the most interesting question of
the whole Congress, as this man will have had a few
brushes with Tiananmen and might well have a very strong
modernizing agenda.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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