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US Air Force flies into problem in
Asia
By David Isenberg
The
Asia-Pacific region poses an access challenge for the US
Air Force (USAF) because the United States lacks basing
options for military operations in the region - a
problem with no easy solution, according to a new report
issued by RAND, the air force's premier think-tank,
whose studies often presage Pentagon policy.
It
is no surprise that the United States has been looking
to Asia as the most likely place where it will fight
future wars. Several high-level reports in recent years
have been quite explicit in that regard.
For
example, in 2000 the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment
released ASIA 2025, which rejected the view that
Chinese-American relations might evolve gently and
fruitfully. Last year, another RAND study, "The United
States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force
Posture", said that while the United States should
strive to avoid making an enemy of China, the US
military must consider how it would carry out war plans
in East Asia in the face of Chinese opposition. The lead
author of that Rand study was Zalmay Khalilzad, who
headed the George W Bush administration's transition
team at the Pentagon before joining the White House
staff as a senior member of the National Security
Council.
Last year's Quadrennial Defense Review
also raised the issue of limited access to Asia. It
found the alignment of US assets concentrated in Western
Europe and Northeast Asia "inadequate for the new
strategic environment". It directed Air Force Secretary
James Roche to "increase contingency basing in the
Pacific and Indian oceans, as well as in the Arabian
Gulf". Studies on how the Defense Department should
accomplish this are ongoing.
More
recently the Pentagon's "Annual Report on the Military
Power of the People's Republic of China" and the first
report of the US-China Security Commission have warned
of the growing military power of China (see the series
China's military might
,
July-August 2002).
The new RAND study, "United
States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century", was
co-edited by Zalmay Khalilzad. In the section on
providing adequate access for expeditionary forces, it
recommends a multi-faceted approach to securing access
that includes building up facilities on domestic
territory and pursuing improved access to bases on
foreign soil.
The study is not optimistic about
gaining support from other countries. In the case of
Iraq, it found that attempts to punish Saddam Hussein's
regime had "frequently been hampered by a lack of
cooperation from friends and allies". In 1996, when
Baghdad launched a large-scale attack against the Kurds
in northern Iraq, neither Turkey nor Saudi Arabia
allowed the United States to fly combat missions against
Iraqi troops. In January 1998, when Iraq refused to
allow inspectors to inspect presidential palaces, not
only did Riyadh deny the use of US aircraft based in
Saudi Arabia, but it would not allow the aircraft to be
moved to a neighboring country to conduct attacks from
there.
The situation is no better for the USAF
in other parts of Asia. According to the RAND study, "In
the Asian arena, the USAF's biggest problem may be lack
of adequate basing in the South China Sea and in
Southeast Asia. Addressing these shortfalls promises to
be a difficult and long-term problem. While Guam is a
valuable chunk of sovereign US territory in East Asia,
the island is distant from most likely conflict
locations. Similarly, US forces in Korea and Japan,
while well situated for their primary mission of
deterring North Korean adventurism, are based quite far
away from the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea."
The situation is even worse in Southeast and
South Asia, where existing US relationships are far less
developed than in the East, even as the region has grown
increasingly volatile, the RAND study asserts. The
United States has limited access in Thailand and
Singapore. Although there have been some improvements
with Pakistan and India due to the terrorist attacks in
the United States last September 11, relationships are
still fragile.
The RAND study identified five
alternative approaches for improving access and basing
in the future, although they all have limitations. They
are:
Expand the number of overseas main operating bases
(MOBs) to increase the likelihood that forces will be
present where and when they are needed.
Identify one or more "reliable" allies in each
region of the world, and count on them to cooperate when
asked.
Proliferate security agreements and alliances to
broaden the set of potential partners in any given
contingency.
Negotiate and secure long-term extraterritorial
access to bases, as was done with Diego Garcia.
Rely on extended-range operations from US territory.
The problems with the first approach are that
there are no popular constituencies for such an
expansion, they are expensive propositions, and having
forces stationed on another country's territory does not
in itself guarantee that they can be used how and when
desired.
The problem with the second approach is
that aside from Britain there are few reliable "ally"
candidates. This is especially true in Asia, where
access promises to be especially problematic.
The third approach suffers the same limitation
as the first, the lack of a popular constituency for it.
And the historical record suggests that much of the
payoff comes in the early stages of a relationship when
a prospective partner is anxious to prove its value to
Washington.
The fourth option suffers from a
lack of viable candidates. Extraordinary circumstances
are typically needed to induce a country to cede
sovereignty over part of its territory. Diego Garcia was
acquired from a close friend, Britain, facing a common
foe. According to the study, "Assuming that Washington
will be able to acquire such privileges anywhere else,
let alone at multiple locations, would be foolhardy."
Finally, projecting power from the continental
United States (CONUS) is difficult because of the lack
of long-range bombers, and the fact that flying such
great distances means you can generate fairly few
sorties.
As a solution, RAND calls for using
only five locations as "forward support locations", in
essence "mega-MOBs". This would put most of the world
within the range of the C-130, useful for rapid resupply
and combat operations, the report notes. Spare parts,
equipment, and munitions could be pre-positioned at
these locations, which should also be built where access
is either guaranteed or highly likely. These bases could
be based on US territory in Alaska, Puerto Rico, and
Guam, and on the territory of close ally Great Britain
in England and on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
It is also conceivable that MOBs could be found
in Asia, which would put major sections of the continent
inside a useful combat radius. Currently, the USAF is
operating out of bases in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan.
There are also former Soviet air bases in Uzbekistan
that could be used, and possibly in Kazakhstan. However,
bases in such locations would be away from logical
resupply routes.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
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