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The massive challenge of
modernization
By Phar Kim Beng
HONG KONG - As a civilization that has existed
for well over 5,000 years, China has shown tremendous
staying power. Yet as a modernizing country, China is
highly vulnerable to the pressures of the process.
While China is not likely to disintegrate, a
prediction made by Gordon Chang in his book The
Coming Collapse of China, it is nevertheless a
country that is easy to admire - for its grandiose
history and rich culture - yet inevitably hard to rule.
Indeed, what makes the pressures of reform and
modernization more acute, as compared with other
developing countries, are China's sheer numbers. Simple
problems can easily acquire a massive dimension and
scale, often tying decision-makers in knots.
Take
urbanization, for instance. When economic reforms began
in 1978, 82 percent of China's population was classified
as "rural". Today, this number is down to 70 percent.
But due to increased urbanization, as occasioned by
continued economic growth, one in six persons (ie, 200
million people) in China is now living and working in a
city of more than 1 million.
Nor does the trend
of urbanization appear to be easing. Currently, there
are 688 cities of various sizes in China, of which 200
cities have a population of more than 2 million. Another
600 cities are to be built in 2011.
As more
cities are added to the urbanizing landscape of China,
however, the federal and provincial governments have to
contend with two constituencies: the economically
powerful ones who demand better and wider range of
services as well as greater representation.
The
authorities also have to address the problems caused by
some 120 million low-skilled migrant workers - often
referred to as the "floating population" - who often
travel from city to city looking for a job, but often
getting none.
Beijing is already sensitive to
the demands of the former. In President Jiang Zemin's
"Three Represents" theory, for instance, he urged in
March 1999 that the interest of the merchants and
professionals be better accommodated lest they exist at
the outer fringe of the Chinese Communist Party to
undermine it from without.
As for the unskilled
workers, however, the federal and provincial authorities
are at a loss to come up with any firm solutions.
Indeed, with employment being so scarce, these migrant
workers put immense stress on the rickety welfare system
of the cities. It has been conservatively estimated that
the authorities need to create some 20 million jobs each
year to absorb rural and urban labor alone. That is an
average of almost 1.6 million jobs a month - a tall
order by any standards.
It is little wonder that
Beijing has increasingly left the issue of job creation
to market forces. The problem of job creation, in other
words, is too difficult to resolve through any one set
of governmental institutions.
Invariably, it is
also important to remember that people in China
experience different lifestyles not just according to
their skill sets and education background, but also
according to the region where they grew up - that is,
whether they were living in rural or urban cities - or
indeed whether they are male or female. Thus, other than
one's genetic endowment, geography and gender continue
to have their influence on the prospect of a person's
ultimate station in life.
In an economically
disadvantaged region such as Guanxi, Gansu, Yunnan or
Guizhou, life is likely to be hard and bereft of the
normal material trappings. The physical infrastructure
for better education and training is simply not there
for them to enhance their prospects.
Take the
plight of the women, for instance. Since 1998, more than
half of 60 million newly laid-off workers in some
115,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been women -
this despite the fact that they made up only one-third
of the workforce.
Because of an ingrained
Chinese culture of preferring men over women, the
latter's collective interest have sadly been
systematically neglected. Thus, while China has laws
that encourage the empowerment of women, their
priorities are often given the short shrift.
In
the private sector, some 46 percent of the workers are
female. They too are faced with various challenges.
Because of the presence of illegal and cheap labor from
the poor regions, their wages remain depressed or
stagnant.
The same applies to workers from
minority groups. There are 56 minorities in China. All
of them are concentrated in economically poor regions
and provinces. While Beijing has made concerted attempts
to better their economic and social lot, such as through
the "Go West" campaign to develop Xinjiang and Tibet,
these measures assume at the outset that they are
willing to forego their way of life, such as by leaving
their traditional stock of trade in craftsmanship, which
they aren't.
Another "fundamental disconnect"
that China confronts is that of interprovincial economic
disparity. Whereas coastal cities' economic profiles are
capital-intensive and highly mechanized, those in the
hinterland are not. The rate with which income is
accumulated in the former is therefore faster.
Therefore, the issue of how best to distribute
the benefits, that is across different regions, has
piqued the mind of the leaders: Does Beijing need to
delegate more power to the provinces? How should
neighboring provinces relate to one another?
These are questions of governance to which
Beijing has not found any solution, allowing the
provinces, in the interim, to attract foreign direct
investments separately. What Beijing has done is to
enjoin different provinces to reinforce their links, so
as to facilitate the better flow of trade.
That
said, contrary to what many may believe, Beijing is not
lacking in boldness, even in areas verging on that
sensitive issue, political reforms.
Since 1988,
there have been three rounds of elections involving a
million villages. Twenty-one provinces participated in
these elections. The committees have four to seven
members of which one must be a woman. In large villages,
assemblies have one representative for about every 10
households.
That the central leadership is
willing to give local elections a try implies, in
principle, a desire to search for creative solutions.
Indeed, the elections have become more competitive, and
the use of secret ballot is not at all uncommon. These
efforts are aided by the Carter Center of the United
States.
While the "village democracy", limited
as it is, cannot foretell the future political trend of
China, its very exercise within a unitary-party state
suggests a Chinese leadership that is not as dogmatic as
some outsiders might believe. At the very least, China
accepts the instrumentality and usefulness of democracy
in some forms, rather than to eliminate it entirely.
Indeed, these elections are meant to ensure democratic
management, policy-making (at the village level) and
democratic supervision.
For what it is worth,
China has to be mindful of international standards when
dealing with social and cultural challenges. Problems
arising out of Tibet, for instance, cannot be dealt with
in a draconian manner. To do so would be to invite
shrill accusations of human-rights abuses. Under
globalization, reputation matters.
Measures
aimed at repressing any one group or minority will be
seen in a negative light. They can affect the decision
of foreign investors to invest their funds into China,
especially given the increasingly activist
non-governmental organizations and shareholders.
In confronting these diverse challenges, China
has to be creative and firm. But it has to pay heed to
the views of the international community too. Naturally,
given the difficulty of each the challenges listed
above, it serves the world well to be more sympathetic
to China's attempt to modernize itself.
(©2002
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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