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Taking aim at fears about
China
By David Isenberg
Contrary to US government reports released
earlier this year, China's military capabilities and its
security and foreign policies may be less aggressive and
threatening than previously thought, according to a
recent study.
The study, China's Growing
Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic,
Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, is composed of
nine chapters by different authors from the United
States, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea, covering
China's security and military powers, its ballistic
missiles and East Asian reaction to US missile defense
initiatives, and improvements in Chinese conventional
military capabilities.
The study, published by
the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, is
composed of papers originally presented at an annual
conference held in September 2001 on the People's
Liberation Army (PLA).
One of the more startling
chapters, given all the publicity about China's missile
buildup, is that Chinese missile defense countermeasures
are not likely to keep pace with US technologies. Thus,
China will not be able to defeat a US missile defense
system. That chapter was prepared by Mark Stokes,
country director for China and Taiwan in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense's International Security
Affairs office.
Contrary to the Pentagon's
Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's
Republic of China (the US-China Security Commission
report) and The National Security Implications of the
Economic Relationship Between the United States and
China, both released in July, which emphasized the
security situation in the Taiwan Strait and the Chinese
threat to US security interests in Asia, the War College
study has a far more nuanced view.
For example,
the chapter by Anatoly Bolyatko of the Russian Institute
of Far Eastern Studies concludes that while China will
seek to be more effective at force projection and
defense in the Asia-Pacific region, it will not seek to
become a world power.
That may be, in part, due
to serious technical limitations. Bolyatko finds it
unlikely that the Chinese missile arsenal will perform
well in testing, because of the small volume of
production and limited early testing. China's
technological lag behind the US missile program bolsters
doubts of any successful missile firings.
The
lack of testing on a large scale poses two major
problems for the reliability of China's arsenal: first,
the current stock may have flaws, and second, the
probability of a flawed launch increases the longer a
missile sits idle and unmaintained.
Even in
regard to Taiwan, China's threat may be overstated.
According to Bolyatko, "Even the statements of Chinese
leaders regarding the possibility of forcing Taiwan to
rejoin the country should be dismissed as no more than a
political show. Now, and in the near future, an assault
on Taiwan is outside of China's capability."
If
China did decide to revise its military strategy and
pursue an accelerated military buildup, it would have to
overcome considerable difficulties, including:
A weak technical and technological base.
A vulnerable economy if a drastic increase in
military consumption and research and development
(R&D) demands occurs.
Decreasing economic relations with other nations.
Despite recent new reports of new fighter sales
from Russia to China, Kenneth Allen of the Center for
Naval Analyses concludes that the PLA Air Force may not
currently be able to field a rapid strike force of any
threat to the United States.
One noteworthy
theme is that, despite harsh rhetoric in recent years
and suspicions on the part of both China and the United
States, especially the realpolitik practitioners
of the current administration of President George W
Bush, is that "there is ample reason in both Washington
and Beijing to seek and secure mutually beneficial
bilateral relations, especially security relations".
In that regard, Chapter 2 by David Finkelstein
contends that "it is not correct for either side to
argue there is no longer a strategic rationale for a
military relationship. The fact of the matter may be at
long last, for the first time since the end of the Cold
War, there finally is a strategic rationale for
military-to military contacts. And it is simply this:
conflict avoidance.
"It is clear that the
military forces of the United States and of China will
increasingly be operating in proximity to each other.
This was shown most graphically on April 1, 2001, and
the subsequent EP-3 incident. It is also clear that
there is a growing distrust between the two military
establishments. It is clear as well that both sides
acknowledge (sometimes quietly, sometimes publicly) the
possibility of an unwanted confrontation over Taiwan.
These points alone are the most pressing arguments for
the resumption of military contacts, the enhancement of
venues in which discussion of differences can take
place, and new venues aimed at dispelling
misperceptions."
Given these trends, the United
States, contrary to prevailing orthodoxy, may very well
have the whip hand for the next decade or two. If the
United States shows restraint, does not excessively
increase its military, does not promote unilateral
expansion plans in foreign regions, does not destroy the
present system of strategic stability, does not engage
in an arms race, and does not proliferate nuclear and
conventional weapons, then China will have no incentive
to increase its own military capabilities.
Of
course, after September 11, 2001, that is a very big if.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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