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China wary of Japan's anti-war
stance
By Phar Kim Beng
HONG
KONG - While much remains unsaid, the strategic defense
community in China is closely watching the morphing of
the US-Japan relationship in light of how Article 9 of
the Japanese constitution, which renounces war, is
interpreted. This process has been going on for at least
a year.
In August 2001, former prime minister
Kiichi Miyazawa affirmed in San Francisco that Japan
should lift its self-imposed ban on exercising its right
to collective self-defense in the interests of a more
effective Japan-US alliance. He spoke of the need for
Japan to adapt to changing global realities.
Miyazawa made the remark in his keynote address
at a conference on the future of Japan-US relations,
which kicked off the US-Japan 21st Century Project
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the signing of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty. That treaty formally ended
the war between the two countries.
Miyazawa
further proposed that Japan should define the right to
collective security as a logical extension of the right
to self-defense: "I would like to envisage that the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces can and should be deployed
to assist the US forces insofar as their activities are
clearly and directly relevant to Japanese security
risks."
Such assistance does not require a
revision of Article 9, said Miyazawa. "The Japanese
government, if necessary, should clarify the
interpretation of Article 9 with regard to the right to
collective self-defense," he said.
On the
surface, Miyazawa's call appears to be an extremely
reasonable one. After all, he was not asking for a total
revision of Article 9 - only that it accommodates the
need of Japan to engage in "collective self-defense", a
policy hitherto barred.
But on closer scrutiny,
Miyazawa's proposal is fraught with risk to China. This
is because the logical defense partner of Japan remains
the United States. Furthermore, the US-Japanese alliance
is an asymmetrical one, where Washington often calls the
shots. China's concern is clearly brought home by how
Japan reacted to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon. One week later, on
September 18, the ruling coalition agreed to allow
Japan's army to protect US military facilities in Japan.
Conservatives in Japan also urged the government
to label the attack on the United States an attack on
Japan itself. On September 27, the government and the
Liberal Democratic Party submitted a bill to the
extraordinary Diet session to enable the Self-Defense
Force (SDF) to support a US-led multinational force. The
bill featured measures to permit Japan to provide
rear-area logistics support to the US military beyond
immediate areas surrounding Japan.
While Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi subsequently ruled out any
activities that entailed the use of military force, a
position in line with Japan's war-renouncing
constitution, Japan nonetheless supplied and transported
materials via the SDF, which also provided medical help
to soldiers in Pakistan as well as in the Indian Ocean.
What China is concerned about is Japan's piecemeal
redefinition of its alliance with the United States. If
the process is continued, it could reach a stage where
Japan would no longer be barred from rallying to the
side of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion to
reclaim the island.
Historically, China has
strong grounds to worry about a strengthened US-Japan
alliance. According to an article by Cornell University
political scientist Peter Katzsenstein and colleague
Nobuo Okawara referring to the Korean War, "Japan was
actually much more fully involved on the Korean
Peninsula than was being publicly revealed at the time."
Although no Japanese soldiers fought in Korea,
between October and December 1950, Katzsenstein and
Okawara affirmed, Japan "deployed 46 minesweepers manned
by 1,200 men; two boats were sunk, one man was killed
and eight were injured". Almost one-third of the support
ships of the Incheon amphibious landing were manned by
Japanese crews.
Although this involvement
occurred under the occupation, it amply revealed that
even at that early stage, Japan was already drawn by the
US into sending members of its self-defense forces
abroad.
Since 1983, it has been accepted that US
warships on their way to help Japan defend itself can
themselves get Japanese help against an enemy attack. In
April 1996, during then US president Bill Clinton's
visit to Japan, it was agreed by both sides that Japan
can "in peacetime" provide fuel and other logistical aid
to US forces engaged on problems outside Japan.
The next stage of the process might include
agreeing that Japan's fighting men can help to rescue
Japanese and other civilians caught up in foreign
crises, or under attack by terrorists abroad; let
Japanese minesweepers help clear mines off the coast of
Korea; and saying that US warships under attack can now
be helped by Japanese ships and aircraft even if they
are not actually pointing towards Japan when the attack
happens.
If one goes by the above, it implies
that Article 9 notwithstanding, Japan does not have to
be a sitting duck. If the occasion calls for it, Japan
can join the United States in repelling hostile elements
injurious to the interest of both.
The above
scenario does not mean that Japan's postwar constitution
is a mere formality. Indeed, in 1993, international
peacekeeping bills were added to help define Japan's
foreign missions with the United Nations even more
clearly and carefully. But it does amplify Chinese fears
that after all that has been said and done, Japan can
re-arm rather quickly. And the main impediment is not
the constitution but political will coupled with US
pressure.
Although in actuality the bilateral
pact between the United States and Japan has never been
described as anything other than a mutual security
arrangement - not an alliance - one can understand why
China is constantly nervous about Japan. After all,
Japan is the only Asian nation to have attacked China
not once but twice. And, with China determined to
reclaim Taiwan, either through peaceful means or by
force, Beijing does not want to have Tokyo playing the
surrogate of the United States.
(©2002 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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