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LAND IN THE
MIDDLE
Part 3: The false
triangle
By Tang Shiping and Cao
Xiaoyang
Part
1: Another China: The awakened giant
Part
2: America's journey to holy war
 In the
traditional security realm, the interrelations between
the big states to a large extent determine the peace and
stability of the world. Consequently, how to deal
properly with China's relations with the United States,
Japan, Russia and India affects not only the vital
interest of China but also the broader peace and
security in the Asia-Pacific region, Eurasia and even
the whole world. This article will tackle the trilateral
relationship among China, the United States and Japan,
which is of ultimate importance to China.
The
international community has, of course, no centralized
government; in other words, international cooperation,
the one thing that can bolster mutual security, is
rather difficult, though nations have been increasingly
aware of the advantages of cooperation. In many cases,
it is not uncommon that an ad hoc cooperation or
compromise between nations can resolve a crisis but fail
to establish a flexible mutual security cooperation
between nations. This established cooperation is
extremely fragile if there are no bases for mutual
security between two given countries, although all
nations are willing to seek mutual security. The issues
of the geographic environment, as well as internal
development and reciprocity, are among the most
important affecting the policies of state security and
the security environment, because they are at the roots
of mutual security between nations. In this case Chinese
relations with Japan can be understood only in light of
some kind of triangular relation involving the United
States as well.
Therefore, here we will mainly
focus on the effects of the two variables on the
trilateral relations among China, the United States and
Japan to deal with the issue of the basic points of
mutual security among the three countries. In terms of
the internal development and the reciprocity of a
country, the stress will be placed on the effects of the
domestic disputes about state security in the three
countries on the basic points of the mutual security.
The three countries' understanding of mutual security
and the attitudes toward state security, as well as the
ideas and manners of the three countries in seeking
state security, are more important to mutual security
when less suspicion is placed on their national
strengths.
China-US-Japan relations not
triangular
Normal triangular relations
entail a possibility that two of the states might unite
against the third. However, in politics as well as
security, there is no possibility that China and Japan
will unite against the US, or China and the US against
Japan. That is to say, in the affairs of politics and
security, it is impossible for China to unite with
either of them against the other, except for tactical
coordination on some concrete issues. Hence, the
relations between them are of an alliance (the US and
Japan) versus another country (China).
Of
course, we are not denying the possibility of an
economic cooperation of any two of them against the
other. Between the United States and Japan, the No 1 and
No 2 economic powers with extensive and in-depth
dependence on each other, numerous economic disputes are
inevitable. Since the end of the Cold War, free of any
definite foreign threats, the two countries have been
relatively free to pursue their competing economic
interests, and this has sharpened economic disputes.
These nonetheless cannot really endanger the alliance in
politics and security, and once an external threat is
detected, attempts will be made to alleviate the
economic divergence. Therefore, in the realm of politics
and security, the relations among the three countries
are in fact bilateral: on one side, the United States
and Japan, on the other, China. Thus, conflicts of
interests and contradictions between the United States
and Japan are the normal manifestation of intra-alliance
politics.
The most essential problem of
intra-alliance politics is the contradiction between
abandonment and entrapment. More specifically, the most
essential contradictions in the US-Japan alliance are,
on the one hand, Japan's fears that the United States
might abandon Japan and the United States' fears that
Japan might deviate from the alliance and go its own
way. On the other hand, the United States fears being
dragged into a quagmire of local conflicts by Japan,
while Japan fears being involved in large conflicts for
the sake of maintaining the alliance with the United
States. Moreover, the US-Japan alliance is a
non-reciprocal relationship, which greatly differs from
the increasingly reciprocal relations in the US-Europe
alliance. In non-reciprocal relations, another feature
arises in intra-alliance politics: the contradiction
between those who lead and the ones who are being led.
Thus, we have a situation where: 1) as the weak party,
Japan hopes to attain a more equal position, while the
United States will try to maintain its leadership; 2) in
order to maintain the alliance, under certain
circumstances, the United States will allow Japan to
acquire independence and freedom to a certain extent so
as to pacify Japan and keep it in its place.
Intra-alliance politics is also a continuous
bargaining process (strictly between the allied
countries). In the bargaining, the United States is the
leader of the alliance and knows clearly that there is
very little possibility for Japan to detach itself from
the alliance, and thus Japan's position in the
negotiation will be at a big disadvantage. In this
situation, on many major issues, the United States will
be the final winner. Japan has to follow the United
States in the end, even after opposing it in the
beginning. Sometimes Japan wants to adopt some
independent maneuvers, but has to give in to the United
States in the end because of its weak position in the
negotiation. This was more the case during the Cold War,
when the US-Japan alliance confronted more conspicuous
outer threats; it is simply that most of the time during
the Cold War, the United States would not make a fuss
about it, for it needed Japan to antagonize the Soviet
Union.
For some time after the Cold War
(approximately between 1990 and 1995-96), because of the
removal of the powerful outer pressure, the United
States became more intransigent toward Japan, while
Japan no longer followed the United States blindly. As a
result, divergence and disputes in the economic field
became more acute and frequent. In the late 1990s
(especially since the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996),
however, the United States (and also Japan) gradually
identified China as the enemy or the potential enemy.
Japan's fear of China also became intense, which
resulted in a closer US-Japan security alliance.
The constant economic disputes between the
United States and Japan during the early period after
the Cold War brought many to think that the alliance had
weakened, and relations among the three countries tended
to become more like a triangle (or at least a triangle
with unequal sides). This view not only is false
(because the United States and Japan are still in an
alliance) but also hinders our further understanding of
the complexity of the relations among the three
countries. Some errors have arisen in Chinese policies
toward Japan because of inadequate consideration of the
political rules in the US-Japan alliance. One of the
causes of these mistakes is the idea of seeking a
balanced development in the relations among China, the
United States and Japan.
To seek a balanced
development in the relations among China, the United
States and Japan would virtually mean that the United
States had to place both Japan and China on equal
positions, which is simply impossible. Worse than that,
the United States and Japan even more so would think
that China meant to wedge itself between them, in which
case suspicion would ensue and more efforts would be
made to maintain the alliance. In time of grave crisis,
the alliance will face a severe test. As far as the
US-Japan alliance is concerned, the worst crisis is a
possible conflict across the Taiwan Strait. In that
scenario, the United States is sure to interfere, while
Japan will face the most difficult choice. On the one
hand, if Japan gets involved in the crisis, considering
its geographic location as the frontline state in the
alliance, it will have to confront a possible
retaliatory strike much worse than the one that could be
feared by the United States. Therefore, Japan is not
willing to be involved in a crisis across the Strait. On
the other hand, if Japan does not support the United
States when the latter gets involved in the crisis, the
US-Japan alliance will be on the brink of a breakdown,
which is not an acceptable outcome for Japan. Facing
this dilemma, Japan really hopes to avoid the crisis,
while for the United States either war or peace is an
acceptable outcome. In order to deter the crisis, Japan
deems that it has to give more support to the United
States.
Seeking the basic
points of mutual security
The geographical
environment. In terms of geographical factors, the
United States and Japan are obviously maritime powers,
while China is generally a continental country, or a
complex one with continental and marine features. Japan
is the most vulnerable among the three. Its homeland is
small and narrow, the main strategic resources have to
be imported, and the seaways by which energy sources are
imported have to go through very few important routes.
Japan, as a country closer to the Asian continent and
China than the United States is (just as Britain is
closer to the European continent than its ally the US
is), is more sensitive to pressure from China. Hence,
from Japan's point of view, the role of the US-Japan
alliance is to protect Japan's maritime lifeline, dispel
any potential attempt by China to control the Pacific
Ocean or Japan's lifeline, and also preempt any chance
of a Sino-US unity to strike and suppress Japan. From
another point of view, however, compared with the United
States, Japan is more unlikely to expect a real Sino-US
confrontation, or a direct war, because in that case,
siding with the United States would mean that Japan
would turn from an important neighbor into a long-term
enemy. The experiences of most countries have shown that
making enemies with neighboring countries (especially
important countries) will exclusively result in harm to
the long-term interests of the country.
As a
country with both continental and maritime features,
China faces extremely complicated geographical
environments with more than a dozen neighboring
countries, including three big states, namely Japan,
Russia and India, in addition to the United States. Like
China, all these big states form their own spheres of
influence, which sometimes result in conflicts. In
facing the United States and Japan, two maritime powers,
the extensive inland areas of China obviously provide
great strategic depth. Twenty years of reform and
opening-up have established an economic system centered
on the coastal areas, which cannot be changed overnight,
even though China has launched a "Program for Western
Development", for the development of the inland regions.
This means that China will be more sensitive and
vulnerable to threats from the sea. Nonetheless, if
Taiwan were to declare its independence, China would
have no alternative but to risk a war against the United
States to accomplish the nation's reunification. Thus,
while China tries its best to persuade the United States
to stop Taiwan's drive for independence, it has to
acquire weapon systems powerful enough to deter the
military involvement of the United States and Japan.
These weapon systems are not designed to challenge the
maritime dominance of the United States and Japan, but
to tell the US-Japan alliance to respect the vital
interests of China.
In contrast, the
geographical location of the United States is the most
advantageous among the three countries (indeed, among
all the countries of the Asia-Pacific region). The
security surplus it possesses in a traditional sense is
unparalleled in the world. Considering the relations
among the three countries, the US mainland is the least
likely to suffer a military strike due to the long
distance from possible crisis areas. In addition, as the
only superpower, its operations seldom meet constraints
under the present international structure and, as a
result, it is the one enjoying the largest freedom of
action. This promotes its mentality of carrying out a
risky policy, counting too much on its advantages in
terms of security surplus.
The other issue is
plain geography. Asia is not like the European
continent, where most of the countries are allies of the
United States. The most important factor in Asia is
that, after a long period of suspicion and confrontation
between China and Russia, a strategic understanding has
finally been reached, which, more or less, arises from
the consideration to counter pressure from the United
States. If China and Russia can maintain the established
strategic arrangement on the Asian continent, things
could be totally different from those on the European
continent. An Asian continent where China and Russia
maintain cooperation could be an area beyond the
exclusive domination of the US-Japan alliance. Thus, on
the Asian continent, either the United States and Japan
jointly maintain the peace and stability of this area
with China and Russia or practice something like an
offshore balancing strategy. Either choice is acceptable
to China and Russia.
Another thing that is
totally different from Europe is that in Asia (East Asia
in particular), along the edge of the continent there is
an almost complete island chain whose strategic depth
depends on its varying distance from the continent. This
makes it possible for the United States (and Japan), a
maritime power, to construct a strong strategic defense
by virtue of its navy. In this case, the United States
will be able to control the situation if no power is
strong enough to challenge its maritime hegemony. The
sense of security in the United States might conduce to
a certain strategic understanding to be reached between
China and the United States.
The security
concepts of the three countries
We can
roughly say that there are three main theories about
state security: offensive realism, defensive realism and
neoliberalism. They have different meanings for the
three countries concerned.
Japan. After
the Cold War, a great debate broke out in Japan about
the country's future strategy. Compared with that in
other countries, this debate in Japan is more closely
related to the nation's future orientation. By and
large, the different factions in Japan have a common
goal, that is, Japan ought to hold a higher
international position, have a louder voice in
international affairs and contribute more to the
international community. The divergence between them is
largely on what kind of position to hold and how to
attain it. The views of the different groups often
overlap with each other and might all call for Japan to
take the same action, but from different starting
points.
Japan's offensive realists primarily
consist of some radicals of the "Asian International
Group" and right-wing nationalists. They think that
Japan has set up a new mode of capitalist development
that is superior to that in Europe and the United
States. Therefore, Japan should not only call upon the
developing countries (Asian countries in particular) to
learn from it, but also require Europe and the United
States to show respect. Many Japanese offensive realists
also think that Japan should once again become an
independent military power. Ultimately, these people
hope for the return of the time when big powers
contended for hegemony, and want Japan to be one of
them. In terms of history, these people think that the
Japanese invasion of Asia was a necessity in the context
of the competition among big countries. Some even think
it was a step to "liberate Asia", and as a result, there
can be no question of facing the country's historic
guilt. In addition, they stress the necessity of
containing China.
The defensive realists in
Japan are by and large "rational nationalists" pursuing
a "normal nation". These people believe that
international politics has moved into a civilized era,
leaving the barbaric era of territorialization; thus,
security can be ensured even though Japan is not a big
military power. The existence of the US-Japan alliance
further decreases the need to expand Japan's military
forces. But Japan should become a "normal nation" and
the fait accompli (such as Japan's own troops and the
collective right to self-defense) should be explicitly
defined. Most of these people do not deny the history of
wartime Japan, but are loath to concentrate on
historical problems, and simply hope that the Asian
countries will let the matter slide. Their attitudes
toward China are quite pragmatic. They agree that there
are still a lot of uncertainties in the future
orientation of China, but do not support measures to
"contain" China, for this would drive China back into
isolation, which would be disadvantageous to Asia.
Those in the neoliberal group basically think
that Japan should acquire a powerful political
influence, play a greater role in the international
community and assume more responsibilities by virtue of
its strong economy and unique civilization rather than
by military might. Most of them are opposed to the
revision of the peace constitution, hope that Japan can
face its wartime history, as only by doing so can Japan
acquire the understanding and support from other Asian
countries, which would then allow Japan to play a bigger
role. Therefore, on the policies toward China, these
people all hope that China will be included in a
regional system rather than excluded. Though they do not
think that Japan should break away from the US-Japan
alliance, they oppose excessively tough measures of the
United States against China.
As far as the
present situation is concerned, although all kinds of
ideas are competing against one another, because of
existing constraints the diplomatic policies of the
Japanese government tend toward the "defensive realist"
ideas. Different sectors of the government might absorb
some ideas from neoliberalism or offensive realism (the
administration of Keizo Obuchi was influenced by some
neoliberal ideas, while the administration of Junichiro
Koizumi is tainted with offensive realism), the key
policies are defensive realist. The Japanese diplomatic
strategy guided by defensive realism is mainly to
acquire a louder voice and more international influence
while not expecting to take too much risk (such as
breaking away from the US-Japan alliance and becoming a
big military power).
The United States.
The offensive realists in the United States think their
country is the only moral nation in the world, and
consequently the country must maintain its present
international standing at all costs. An unpublished US
national defense program points out that the core
strategic goal of the United States is to prevent the
appearance of any potential global contender. This
offensive realist idea existed during the administration
of George Bush Sr, and was accepted by Dick Cheney, the
defense secretary at that time. The current
administration of George Bush Jr has basically inherited
the offensive realist policies.
In dealing with
China, the offensive realists think that China is
certain to become the enemy of the United States;
therefore, the US must be prepared for a war against
China while trying by all means to check its
development. Fortunately for China, in the US diplomatic
debate defensive realism is the mainstream. Though the
defensive realists, too, think that the present US
international standing should be maintained, they also
realize that the evolution of international order is an
inevitable historical fact. Moreover, the United States
cannot, nor should, act as it wants everywhere, despite
its superpower status. Therefore, the United States
should not behave too recklessly, but exert its
influence selectively. They do not think that China is
going to become the enemy of the United States, and that
the worst US strategy would be to make China an enemy
while the future orientation of the country is still in
doubt.
The neoliberals think that with a greater
interdependence between China and the world, China will
gradually become a responsible member of the
international community, accept more and more the
constraints of international rules and mechanisms and,
as a result, will not attempt to overthrow the present
international order by force. They think that China's
reform and opening-up have driven it into the present
economic and political world system, and that the United
States should, on the basis of the soft policy of
defensive realism toward China, cooperate with China to
construct a just international order in politics and
economics. This will help shape China into a supporter
of the order instead of a destroyer. Compared with the
administration of president Bill Clinton, whose security
policies, to a great extent, adopted the basic points of
defensive realism but with a considerable neoliberal
flavor, the present policies of the Bush administration
are on the track of offensive realism.
China. Offensive realists in China think
that the fact that China is becoming stronger has
aroused the increasingly sensitive vigilance of the
United States, which will adopt all means to limit
China's development and is even likely to strike China
preemptively. As a result, conflicts between the two
countries are inevitable. In such a situation, China has
to give up some immediate interests and develop its
military forces as soon as possible in order to compete
with the United States. These people have more evidence
to support their ideas after the bombing of China's
embassy in Yugoslavia, the incident of the Sino-US
aircraft collision and the strong promotion of the
national missile defense (NMD) system. Consequently,
they maintain that China should give up the idea of
"peaceful development".
The Chinese defensive
realists admit that the vigilance of the United States
is increasingly sensitive, but they do not think the
United States will take the initiative of considering
China as its enemy. Therefore there is the possibility
of strategic understanding and cooperation. However,
they also realize that it will be a long and arduous
course to reach understanding and cooperation.
Therefore, they stress that China should continue to
keep a low profile and not expand its military forces
too much, but must have sufficient deterrent power.
Defensive realism represents the mainstream in the
debate on China's security strategy, perhaps due to the
influence of "self-control" in Chinese history.
Neoliberals in China think that the United
States bears no hostility against China and the US
vigilance toward China is mainly due to China's
political system and ideology. Therefore, the attitude
of the United States toward China will be more friendly
if China steadily pushes forward economic and political
reform and melts into the US-centered political and
economic global system. Because these factors are prone
to be considered part of the "theory of democratic
peace", much of the Chinese elite is dubious about the
neoliberals' intentions, which are thus unlikely to
become a mainstream voice in the debate.
On the
whole, the view of offensive realism is thought to be
unreasonable in the debate about China's strategic
ideas, and the neoliberal view is thought too
idealistic. Therefore, the mainstream opinion is
defensive realist with the guideline of "keeping a low
profile" added to the strategy of multilateral
cooperation.
Strategies
for mutual security: The ideal vs reality
Threat
assessment and strategic selection. Besides the
overall concept of security, another important variable
in deciding national security strategy is the "threat
assessment" of a state. To a certain extent, of course,
the threat assessments of different people are closely
related to their basic security ideas. Considering the
threat assessments of the three countries and the three
internal security ideas collectively, a matrix can be
produced to reflect the different security strategies.
The grand strategies of two of the three countries,
China and the United States, are comparatively simple,
because each has placed much attention on the other's
strategic intent; meanwhile Japan's is relatively
complicated, because it has two different strategic
considerations.
The ideal of a mutual
strategic pledge. The core of the security policies
of defensive realism lies in the awareness of the
existence of the need for security, the clear
elaboration of the state's strategic goals and a mutual
security pledge: neither will threaten the other's
critical interests. In light of the threat assessments
of the three countries, the most badly needed security
pledges can be obtained.
In the first place,
Japan most badly needs security pledges from other
countries. After World War II, the United States became
its main security provider. Recently, because of the
growth of China's national strength coupled with the
long-term recession of the Japanese economy, Japan began
to feel pressure from China. Therefore, Japan requires a
security pledge from China.
The security pledge
that China can make to Japan is along the following
lines:
1) On the Taiwan issue, the reunification
of China will not threaten Japan's interests and China
will not attempt to control Japan's maritime lifeline by
taking advantage of Taiwan's geographic location.
China's nuclear weapons will not target Japan since it
is free of nuclear weapons.
2) China may help
Japan become a "normal nation". In an era of increasing
interdependence in the present international community,
however, Japan can become a "normal nation" only if it
loves peace and faces its history squarely. This way it
could better assume responsibility in maintaining
international and regional peace.
3) In the
"normal nation" frame, China supports Japan's
Self-Defense Forces participating in United Nations
peacekeeping operations. The Japanese troops, however,
have to restrain themselves and act cautiously within
the range of each operation. Once Japan has faced its
wartime history and its behavior has been tested for
some time, China will support Japan's bid to become a
permanent member of the UN Security Council.
4)
China is interested in establishing a regional
multilateral cooperative mechanism while the Japanese
economy is still in the leading position in Asia. China
understands Japan's maintenance of its alliance with the
United States because of its security needs, but hopes
that ultimately the security of the Asia-Pacific region
will be established on the basis of multilateral
security cooperation between all the big powers rather
than on the basis of two camps confronting each other.
The objective of East Asian integration is not to repel
the US presence in East Asia or impair Japan's security.
The security pledge that China can make to the
United States is along the following lines:
1)
China does not wish to repel the US presence in the
Asia-Pacific region, but opposes any malicious blockade
of the United States against China. China hopes that the
United States will gradually realize that the outcome of
two big-power groups harboring suspicion toward each
other is a situation resembling that on the European
continent in World War I: the alliance became closer,
while the regional situation became increasingly
unstable.
2) The means for China to seek a
multipolar world is peaceful and China will not actively
attempt to breach the structure of the global system.
3) On the Taiwan issue, what China pursues is
its legal interest in reunifying the country and not any
illegal expansive interests, and the reunification of
China will not threaten the maritime dominance of the
United States.
As a comparatively weak country,
the strategic security pledges that China needs are also
various. The strategic security pledges that the United
States and Japan, as an alliance, can provide should at
least include the following:
1) The
reunification of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. This
is a life-and-death security interest of China, and
therefore the United States and Japan must explicitly
express their support for and acceptance of a reunified
China. They must be aware that a separated China will
always be an uncertain factor in the Asia-Pacific
region, and only a reunified China will have the will
and responsibility to jointly maintain peace and
security with the United States and Japan (and also
Russia) in this region. China is more content than
anybody else to become a status quo country, which,
however, can only happen after the reunification.
2) The US-Japan alliance does not take the
initiative of threatening China's security interests,
especially China's minimal deterrent capability. Any of
the missile defense systems that the United States and
Japan develop to deal with so-called "rogue states" will
have to be limited; the defense system currently being
planned could trigger a new arms race.
3) The
United States should not further consolidate the
US-centered bilateral security alliance system, and
instead should work for a multilateral security
cooperative mechanism. To relieve China from the anxiety
that the United States and its allies are jointly
working against China, the multilateral security
mechanism must also embrace the countries close to
China.
4) Japan pledges not to abjure the peace
constitution. Any of Japan's overseas military actions
can only be carried out in the context of UN
peacekeeping operations.
5) Japanese statesmen
must face history squarely and make efforts for the
country to reach the correct consensus about its wartime
history.
On the basis of the above mutually made
strategic security pledges, the three countries (and
Russia) should also accept some common security ideas.
Only in this way can a multilateral security cooperation
among big countries, or "big-state coordination", in the
Asia-Pacific region be established. The ideas can
generally be summarized as "self-control" and
"acceptance of constraints".
First, every big
state should be aware that defensive realism means that
all countries must jointly accept that security is
relative, so they should "control themselves". For
instance, to a certain extent, China understands some of
Japan's uneasiness and the need to maintain the US-Japan
security alliance. But since the alliance is more than
enough to prevent a lot of sudden incidents, it is
unnecessary for the two members to become closer. The
US-Japan alliance has, to a certain extent, made China
and Russia come closer, so the vicious circle of the
security challenge has become very obvious. Therefore,
the United States and Japan should restrain themselves
in their alliance policies, and over time this alliance
should ultimately be replaced by a multilateral security
coordinative mechanism among big states.
Second,
the freedom of action of the big states, to a certain
extent, must be limited by other states. This is the
only way to gain the right to require other countries to
exercise self-restraint, also requiring less pressure
diplomacy. In a word, the security policies of defensive
realism must fully embody the understanding of the
security challenge so that even without external
pressure, the policies of a state can to a certain
extent maintain self-control and accept reasonable
limitations on the freedom of action.
The disparities in
reality: Short- and long-term problems
The
short-term problems. As far as current policies are
concerned, the security policies pursued by the Chinese
and Japanese governments are generally defensive
realist. Unfortunately, in the US, from the time when
Bush took power to September 11 2001, the administration
had a policy closer to offensive realism. This caused a
big setback in the Sino-US strategic understanding
reached in the late period of the Clinton
administration, and made it more difficult for the two
countries to reach mutual security.
When a
country adopts the offensive realist strategy, it will
be very difficult for other countries to reach
compromises. In this period of time, a state adopting
offensive realism is more like a rogue or predator state
and international politics becomes more dangerous than
ever. Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration
has markedly softened the offensive overtones in its
policy, which has made it possible for its allies as
well as China and Russia to reposition their mutual
relations. The shift might have been only temporary, due
to the present predicament, although the possibility of
a fundamental change in the attitude of some American
elites should not be neglected. In the present policy
debates in the United States, no trace of major changes
in thought has been detected, and the former hardliners
and the moderates are still the same. Therefore, we have
to be cautious in judging whether the attitudinal change
of Bush himself will last long.
Fortunately,
defensive realism still holds the mainstream in the
debates among the American elites. As a country
characterized by sudden turns and political cycles, any
of the different doctrines might become central to
important segments of the government in the United
States. Therefore, Chinese strategy ought to be
"tit-for-tat", but within a certain range without adding
a last straw, on the basis of trying peaceful measures
first. Contrary to the intuition of most, making
concessions blindly when facing harsh policies cannot
soften the opponent, but will rather make the hardliners
take a more forceful position in the domestic debates.
In this case the US hardliners might make use of the
expected effects achieved by their harsh positions (ie,
China's concession) as proof to continue with the harsh
policies toward China. In fact, quite a number of
Americans have reached this conclusion.
What is
left for China is, if Bush switches back to the
offensive realist policies after the anti-terrorism war,
to try to prevent the United States from encroaching
upon China's interests and to force the US back on to
the track of defensive realism. The result that China
would hope to gain in that case would be to make Bush's
policies unpopular, both internationally and
domestically. The president either would give up his
original security idea, or lose his ability power to
shape US security policies.
In confronting the
administration of president Ronald Reagan, China did not
budge even at the cost of setting back relations. When
Clinton was stubborn, China did not hesitate to face a
military confrontation, which at last made the US
government go back to more pragmatic policies and
enabled China to reach its goals. Recently, in the face
of the numerous criticisms of US policies from the
international community and domestic public opinion, the
Bush administration realized that it cannot do as it
likes, and began to show some traces of tactical retreat
on some issues. This has also confirmed the feasibility
of the aforementioned "tit-for-tat" policy.
In
terms of Sino-Japanese relations, Japan's attitude to
history and domestic nationalist sentiments make it hard
for the two countries to achieve reconciliation in the
short term. Because of historical issues, in particular,
the distrust between the two countries seems hard to
bridge.
The long-term issues. Evidently,
even if both the United States and Japan fully adopted
defensive realist security policies, it is still not an
easy thing for the US-Japan alliance, and the United
States in particular, to make a strategic security
pledge to China. The United States is a country that
tends to see the world in black and white. It is
accustomed to providing strategic security pledges to
its allies, but not to China, which is likely to become
its rival.
Historically, in the past 50 years,
the United States only made strategic security pledges
to China under the terms of its strategic alliance with
China during the Cold War. After that, in a sense, the
United States has always asked China to give, but never
promised China any practical returns. The negotiating
strategy it has adopted is a roguish but effective one:
first impose sanctions against a country, then ask the
country to make a big concession, while the only award
it gets is to go back to where it was before the
sanctions.
Another reason behind the
difficulties in reaching a strategic understanding with
the United States is that, as the only superpower in the
world, the United States has a larger degree of freedom
compared with other countries. It cannot resist the
temptation of offensive realism, nor has it the patience
to seek security cooperation, and the last thing it
hopes for is to see its security policies being
constrained by others, even if this constraint does good
to all, including the United States itself. As leader of
the political and economic order of the present world,
the United States is used to going its own way.
In Japan, those who maintain that the US-Japan
military alliance should ultimately be replaced by a
multilateral cooperative mechanism between the big
states are still the minority. The majority thinks that
the US-Japan security alliance is the cornerstone of
Japan's security strategy and is suspicious of any
thoughts that are likely to shake the cornerstone.
The debate about Japan's future orientation
seems to remain on the level of "off Asia and into
Europe", "off Europe and into Asia" and "into Europe and
into Asia". However, even the idea proposed by those who
are for "into Europe and into Asia" for Japan to become
the bridge between Europe-US and the East Asian region
is doubtlessly one that would marginalize Japan.
High-ranking Asian figures are now present in a few
important economic bodies, they know well about the
United States and Western Europe, and hence, Japan is no
longer needed as a bridge. Thus, Japan has to follow the
strategy of "into Europe as part of Asia". The present
10+3 frame has provided Japan with a mechanism and place
to melt into Asia and especially learn and cooperate
with China. Only when Japan really melts into the East
Asian region can it be free of worries about Asia's
suspicion toward it, then it can "enter Europe" more
confidently, further play more constructive and
important roles in the world and attain the
international standing it has been seeking.
The
discussion about how Japan should face history and where
it should go in the future obviously touches the most
essential ideas of Japanese nationalism, which entails a
deep domestic debate to change it. Consequently, Japan's
future orientation rests with the domestic debates in
the country. For this purpose, China, South Korea and
other Asian countries should encourage the debates in
Japan about becoming a "normal nation", or at least
quietly keep an eye on them. Ultimately, only an idea of
Japan as a "normal nation" based on a strong public
consensus can be the root of Japan's future stability.
At the same time, if the tendency should be
detected in the debate for Japan to revert to the
perilous militarist track, China and other Asian
countries bear the responsibility and obligation to
unite with the whole international community to warn
Japan and prevent it from getting on the same old
disastrous road, in the interest of Asia and the world
as well as Japan itself. In a word, Japan's uncertainty
about its future role and the contradictory mentality
about historical issues have jointly limited its new
security mentality.
Conclusion
The
United States and Japan have not realized that Taiwan is
a life-and-death issue for China, and not for the United
States and Japan - it is not even important to their
interests. Therefore, conflicts between the US-Japan
alliance and China are possible. Prior to the solution
of the Taiwan issue, any strategic understandings
reached among the three countries are bound to be
fragile, and it will be impossible to reach a strategic
understanding in the whole Asia-Pacific region: the
Sino-US reconciliation of 1997-98 proved to be
short-lived and unstable.
Therefore,
establishing some relative security among China, the
United States and Japan (and Russia) will be a long and
zigzag course. China must have enough patience and
preparation to carry out a long-term strategy, which is
not to break up the US-Japan security alliance to
isolate Japan and drive the United States out of Asia,
but substitute a multilateral security cooperative
mechanism for the US-Japan alliance. This will eliminate
the possibility of two camps in mutual confrontation in
the Asia-Pacific region. What China must do is, on the
one hand, resist the US-Japan alliance and, on the
other, not give up the possibility of cooperating with
the United States, Japan and Russia. To this end, full
imagination should be brought into play. When the US
government comes back to defensive realism, China and
Russia ought to attempt to reach a more extensive
strategic understanding and seek a multilateral security
cooperative mechanism to safeguard the peace and
stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
To take
the first step in this cooperative mechanism among the
big states, China must play a more active and
imaginative role in the evolution on the Korean
Peninsula. On the affairs of the peninsula and the
political orientation after reunification, China may and
should make use of the historic opportunity to promote
the strategic understanding of China, the United States,
Japan and Russia in the Northeast Asian region to lay
the foundation for the future broader strategic
cooperation among the big states.
(©
Heartland. Translated by Yao Ximing. This version has
been edited by Asia Times Online.To subscribe to
Heartland, please email cassanpress@sina.com)
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