| |
The ominous subtext to US-China
relations
By Stephen Blank
Since the end of the Cold War, pundits in Asia
have anxiously read the tea leaves to find an emerging
threat to American hegemony. Before September 11, one
could easily have proclaimed that a new bipolarity or at
least rivalry for control of Asia between China and
America was the most likely outcome of developing trends
in Asian international politics. The war on terrorism
changed all that - at least temporarily.
But
even though that war has forced China to improve its
relationship with America, it is unlikely that this
change represents much more than improved atmospherics.
The shadow of this impending rivalry has not been
totally suppressed. Indeed, it now appears to be
lengthening. Recent events throughout East Asia show
that China's rising economic power in the context of the
stagnation of Japan's and Russia's economies has created
opportunities for China that it is seizing with
alacrity.
Two examples of the shadow cast by
China's rising economic power are to be found in regard
to developments in and around North Korea. Beijing's ire
at not being consulted by Pyongyang before it announced
the creation of a free economic zone in Sinujiu under
the leadership of a shady Chinese businessman led the
Chinese government to arrest him and essentially torpedo
the program. North Korea had no choice but to swallow
this insult and learn that in the future it had to
coordinate its policies with China in advance.
At the same time, the two Koreas and Russia
announced the beginning of construction of a railway
network that would link a trans-Korean railway with the
Trans-Siberian line and allow uninterrupted travel and
shipping from Korea through Russia to European
destinations. Announcing this project Russian, President
Vladimir Putin proclaimed that it was essential to build
this railway now for if Russia did not do so its friend
and neighbor, China, had comparable plans to build such
a link through China, bypassing Russia. Thus, the
prospect of Chinese hegemony over North Korean
development and the inter-continental land trade has
already galvanized the thinking of Russian elites who
are sensitive to every hint of Russia's potential
marginalization in Asia. For if Russia loses this
opportunity to influence the future of Asia's trade, its
far east will remain a stricken region in desperate need
of help from China.
Despite talk a year ago of a
Sino-Russian alliance, we see here a frank assertion of
economic-political rivalry and Russia's fears of China's
rising economic power. But while Russia may be
especially vulnerable given its profound economic
weakness, the state with the most to lose in the
immediate future from rising Chinese power is Japan.
This dawning economic rivalry is occurring with
particular force in Southeast Asia.
In the past
few weeks China has signed both a free trade alliance
with Southeast Asian states and an agreement over the
Spratly Islands with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Apart from the fact that Chinese
economic power is forcing individual Southeast Asian
states into ever more stringent competition or even to
get out of earlier markets because they cannot compete,
these agreements signify China's ability to compel ASEAN
and its members to accept economic and political
outcomes that enhance Beijing's advantages at their
interests' expense. It is highly unlikely that the
agreement on free trade will lessen China's competitive
superiority over many Southeast Asian states, or that
the Spratly accord will lead to it desisting from
"salami tactics" - taking the islands bit by bit.
Equally important is that these agreements have forced
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's government in Japan
to offer its own version of a free trade treaty with
Southeast Asian states to stave off the Chinese
challenge and to regenerate Japan's stagnant economy. No
longer does the Asian international economy resemble the
Japanese model of the flying geese where Japan was the
leading goose. Rather this menagerie increasingly
resembles a struggle for supremacy between some
tiger-like animals, conducted only partly in the open
but no less brutal or consequential for that. Thus
China, which controls the headwaters of the Mekong
River, is already using its power to influence political
outcomes in countries that depend on the river, like
Laos and Cambodia.
Similar trends are visible in
China's unremitting efforts to forge a relationship of
Taiwanese economic dependency on the mainland. Offering
investment opportunities to Taiwanese businesses and
attempting to use those opportunities to co-opt
Taiwanese businesspeople, coupled with increasing
efforts to invest in Taiwan itself, highlight the latest
phase of China's efforts to convert economic power into
lasting strategic advantage. These are not the only
places where such tactics are used either. In Russia
proper, Chinese business communities have already
attempted to influence local elections and we can also
expect the demonstration of Chinese economic power in
Central Asia, to match China's first ever projection of
military power abroad under treaty as in the recent
joint maneuvers with Kyrgyzstan.
China's
burgeoning economic power also is increasingly
translated into military power through its greatly
increased military spending, efforts to develop a
thoroughly competitive domestic arms industry, and a
move to a high-tech base emphasizing space, information
technology, missiles, and the like.
Although
China's omnidirectional diplomacy continues and
relations with Washington have improved, the trend
toward bipolarity is reemerging, with China a much
stronger and tougher economic and military player, even
if it is still under most observers' radar screens. We
can now see the shadow or outlines of the consequences
of China's rising economic power being deployed or made
manifest. More to the point, Asian governments can see
it also, and this vision is already producing some
uncomfortable adjustments to the new reality.
Even as the war on terrorism brings Washington
and Beijing together it is likely that we will see more
of this subterranean struggle going on. But ultimately
the outcome of the present and forthcoming maneuvers on
both sides may turn out to be at least as consequential
as the war on terrorism if not more so. The already
discernible bipolar contest between Washington and
Beijing may not and need not end in violence, but even
so it will not be pretty.
Professor
Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks (the views expressed
do not represent those of the US Army, Defense
Department or the US government.)
(©2002 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
