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China hidden by media fog
By Ram Gorni
The complexity of daily
changing life cannot be described or explained easily.
Simple terms such as "truth", "lies", "good", "evil",
"peace", "war", "democracy" or "communism" are not
enough to explain the diversity of the global village.
Life is a complex mixture of individuals, groups,
communities, nationalities and countries.
History, politics, energy, power, food, water,
limited resources, money, law, justice and order are all
mixed together - working together and against each other
simultaneously. Billions of personal points of view,
dreams and ambitions, circumstances - both of peoples
and nations, along with objective causes such as nature
and environment, fate and luck turn reality into
something almost impossible to predict.
Yet
despite this huge diversity, the global information
industry is dominated by Anglo-American news. No TV
network or newswire is as comprehensive and persuasive
as the Anglo-American ones. We know what happens in the
world because we get the news from Associated Press or
Reuters, CNN or NBC. These various media sources
influence world opinion on right and wrong (1).
Statistics indicate that some two-thirds of the
news worldwide comes from the developed countries, with
one-seventh of the world's population. News from
developed countries accounts for 60 percent of the news
content of newspapers in developing countries (2). The
ethical "problem" with Britain's Reuters and the United
States' CNN, although both are objective, is that they
serve an Anglo-American (or Anglo-Americanized) public -
a public that elects its governments and supports their
decisions. There is also a dichotomy between how the
Western world sees itself - providing opportunities and
freedom - and the perceptions of Third World nations,
which feel that the developed world denies them these
opportunities (3).
The US government cannot make
decisions independently - it owes its power to the will
of the voters, who look at the newspapers, which have to
tell complicated stories in 300-400 words (4). The US
public in particular is accustomed to figuring things
out in black and white, without colors or even any
shades of gray (5). The "black and white" media
structure is not the fault of the US public (voters)
only. From a Western political-fiscal point of view, the
most desired alternative for ending any communist,
military or monarchic regime is by replacing the local
leadership with a democratic one, just as the former
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc turned into democratic
nations. The motives for that lie in the Western
capitalist governments' pressure to encourage global
democracy, as it is, in their opinion and for their own
interests, the most suitable political structure
allowing spending and consumption to flourish within
their own nations.
In terms of
Anglo-Americanized news coverage of various affairs,
China is just one of many international issues troubling
the US (international) press. The story of the balance
of power in Asia is obscure because it is too
complicated for the US media, while the issue of
democracy versus communism is very simple. China is not
a democracy - the lack of democracy and freedom in China
is bad press. So in the end, even if well-educated
pundits in Washington may appreciate the complexities of
China's predicament and make a case for helping Beijing,
the big red communist Chinese bear wins hands down
against American values (6). When focusing on China,
both Taiwan and the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations serve
as a prototype for such a political-fiscal crusade.
Taiwan
In 1949, after losing the civil
war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), about a
million people fled from the mainland to Taiwan. Under
the leadership of Nationalist General Jiang Jieshi
(Chiang Kai-shek), the Kuomintang (KMT) party repressed
the resistance of the native Taiwanese people and
imposed its rule over the majority. The KMT governed the
island under martial law until 1987. During the decades
of its rule, the KMT believed in eventual reunification
with the mainland, thus the main issue was when and how.
For many years there has been an independence
movement in Taiwan, but it was small until 1986, when
with the founding of the pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party, it gained momentum. The independence
momentum was given an even bigger boost in the 1990s
when the then KMT president, Lee Teng-hui, began to
reveal his pro-independence sympathies.
By that
time, Taiwan had developed itself into one of the
world's leading economies and in the political arena
there has been a relatively peaceful transition from
martial law to democracy. In the early 1990s, when
Taiwan's economy was booming and China's was still
faltering, the financial clout of Taipei and the appeal
of the newborn democracy were swaying politicians and
businesspeople worldwide to consider independence an
issue. Yet despite much blabber not much happened.
For years Taiwan has been spending tens of
millions of dollars putting together a network of the
best Washington lobbyists, private research
institutions, and congressional and academic contacts.
As direct donations to US politicians or their campaigns
by foreign entities is strictly illegal, Taiwan found
other means to influence while staying within the law.
For years, Taiwanese academics and industrialists - all
with strong political connections - have given generous
donations to Washington's independent think-tanks or the
private libraries of leading congressmen. US Justice
Department documents show that a whopping 26 US lobby
firms have registered to serve Taiwan, providing access
to top businesspeople, academics, Congress and leading
political circles.
By the late 1990s, with
Taiwan's economy heavily dependent on Beijing's
goodwill, and Taipei's democracy tainted by scandals,
suspicion of corruption and rowdy parliamentary
wrangles, these actions became even less likely to bring
results. (7, 8, 9) Historically speaking, the stability
of the democratic government in Taiwan has not yet been
proved. The island is systematically losing its
political independence also by pasting its fiscal
fortune to the mainland. The United States, for its
part, time and time again sharpens its
political-military commitment to do "whatever it takes"
to help the island's newborn democracy defend itself
from any Chinese (communist) attack.
The 1989
Tiananmen massacre
In 1987, the popular Communist
Party general secretary Hu Yaobang was forced to resign.
He was replaced by Zhao Ziyang. By that time, the
Communist Party had entered an unclear situation,
created by a double leadership with Deng Xiaoping as
head of the Military Commission and Zhao as the
secretary general of the party. Deng was officially
lower in the hierarchy. This two-year power struggle is
thought to have led to the Tiananmen movement (10).
On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang died. His death
marked the early days of protests, when students
initially demanded his posthumous rehabilitation (11,
12). Throughout the weeks of demonstrations, one of the
protesting students' main demands was that rampant
corruption among cadres be addressed (13). The
suppression of the student-led pro-democracy protests at
Tiananmen Square left hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
civilians dead.
To this day, Beijing remains
highly nervous when the 1989 June 4 Massacre is
mentioned. The subject is heavily censored by domestic
media. By keeping silence, the Chinese leadership is
repressing the calls for anti-corruption, justice and
legal accountability. Furthermore, for more than a
decade, the Anglo-Americanized media have been
capitalizing on the incident, continuously nurturing -
or creating - the premise that the demonstrators had
been calling for an end to dictatorship and installation
of democracy (14).
Example 1: CNN. When
reporting on China, CNN time and time again links
democracy to justice, pasting the two together
inseparably. When reporting on the 1989 Tainanmen
Massacre, the story of pro-democracy and justice
combined together wins hands down against just a simple
pro-justice call.
"Despite the fact that memories
about the June 4, 1989, crackdown have lapsed, Beijing
remains highly nervous about the rightists' attack on
the CCP's refusal to overturn the verdict on the
massacre. Beijing's top concern is to prevent
dissidents, such as the June 4 mothers - a few dozen
parents of students killed in the June 4 crackdown who
are lobbying for the restitution of democracy and
justice - from winning this year's Nobel Peace
Prize." - CNN, "Jiang prepares for political
showdown", May 15, 2002
Example 2: CNN.
Time and time again, CNN keeps on connecting the past
and the present. When reporting on the nationwide
preparations for this month's 16th Party Congress, the
US news network ended its reporting with a reminder of
the bloody 1989 massacre. By doing so, CNN fixed the
1989 perceptions - linking them with the present, thus
suggesting (consciously or unconsciously) a stiff,
unchanging Chinese government.
"As China's ruling
Communists try to ensure a critical party congress comes
off without a hitch next month, a 1,000-strong army is
patrolling Beijing's Tiananmen Square, removing a
troublesome scourge - chewing gum. Ranks of cleaners
have toiled in the vast square for 18 days to scrape off
an estimated 600,000 wads of chewing gum, the official
Xinhua news agency said ... Lying at the heart of the
Chinese capital, Tiananmen Square was the focal point of
huge pro-democracy demonstrations in 1989 crushed by the
army with heavy loss of life." - CNN, "China patrols
Tiananmen Square - for chewing gum", October 16, 2002
Example 3: AP. When reporting on China,
foreign media use terminology that enriches the
objective information provided with additional
psychological and metaphorical meaning. This additional
meaning stands in line with Anglo-Americanized beliefs.
"China's communists stepped into a new age
Thursday, sending President Jiang Zemin toward
retirement, pushing a younger generation of leaders
forward and changing their mission to welcome the
nation's emerging capitalist class ..." - Yahoo, AP,
"China readies for Hu's leadership, November 14, 2002
The Mandate of Heaven
The
communist lineage is a kind of dynasty that can be
placed alongside the Qing and the Ming. Its legitimacy
derives, among others, from Confucianism, culture and
history - not from Karl Marx. Throughout history, the
source of power for any ruling sovereign derives from
the "Mandate of Heaven" (sets of rules, norms and
morals) on the one hand and the masses on the other. Any
dynasty, any sovereign emperor, acts as the governing
body - reflecting the "Mandate of Heaven" to serve the
people. Once in power, sovereigns have to adjust
themselves to the society, as the legitimacy for their
ruling is determined by the Han people. In terms of
duration of power, a certain lineage's rule ranges
anywhere from months to centuries. Leadership can
preserve its power only by the ability to provide
prosperity and morality. If it fails these two
objectives, it is replaced. At various times in China's
history, the manner in which a sovereign is replaced has
changed: power can be inherited by birth, formed by the
use of power or won through appointment by internal
elections.
Chinese national pride is rooted in
the memory of an immense country that, for most of its
existence, considered itself so wealthy that it did not
need to trade with the Western powers. In past
centuries, it was nearly able to deny the existence of
the rest of the world (15). Today, foreigners judge
China by its tragic layers of history, the thousands who
died building the Great Wall, the chaos of the Cultural
Revolution and the shocking massacre at Tiananmen
Square. Foreigners are entranced by the epic sweep of
the Middle Kingdom, while the Chinese themselves talk
endlessly of their 5,000 years of civilization.
The irony, though, to borrow from historian
Francis Fukuyama, is that China has reached the end of
its history. The 1966-76 Cultural Revolution began the
destruction, razing centuries-old temples and condemning
China's imperial past as feudal and superstitious.
Twenty years after the terror ended, even the
middle-aged, who suffered the brunt of those horrible
years, are resolutely moving into the future, their
dreams ever more expansive (and expensive): televisions,
mobile phones, fully wired million-dollar mansions (16).
Time and time again, the Anglo-American media
nurture the notion that China must be democratized (17).
For years various news media have kept on suggesting
that the most stable solution to China's complicated
challenges (ranging from corruption in business and
legal system social stability, to the economic gap
between rural and urban, unemployment, etc) is
democracy. An example: "There are hundreds of
demonstrations each day in the Chinese countryside and
cities. Some are small; others involve thousands of
people. The rising tide of corruption threatens to
engulf Beijing's leaders ... In reality, the only thing
that can reignite the stalled reform process and save
China is real reform of the political system" (iht.com,
"China stumbles toward a crisis", November 8, 2002).
The current Chinese political reality suggests
that the Communist Party will keep its power, not lose
it through social instability or corruption. Thus, a
moral reform, not a political one, is needed. The
"coming collapse of China" theory must not be ignored.
In terms of China's own historical political
logic, the undemocratic nature of the Communist Party,
if used wisely, has an advantage over Western democracy
political reforms. In modern China, when forced to
choose between a future democracy and the current
Chinese-characteristic communism, the latter is more
suitable.
The last time China tried to replace
its values on a large scale level was during the
Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong replaced the old sets of
customs and morality, vaguely defined as "Confucian".
Nobody was allowed to own more than anybody else.
Everybody had to be equal. Marxism-communism provided
the Chinese with the only morality: to be equal with the
richer. The revolutionary wave deluded the people for a
time, and then the truth revealed itself: the Chinese
people had been left without morality (18).
If
China is to adopt democratic values, the chaos that
characterized the Cultural Revolution might happen
again. Under Chinese-characteristics democracy,
candidates wishing to be elected every four years might
use propaganda and knowingly (sometimes) lie to the
masses by promising an unrealistic future to get
elected. Once in power, they will find out that despite
optimistic promises and good and honest intentions, the
daily routine will force them to deal with solutions
different from their previous pre-election intentions.
Some of the problems will be political in nature, but as
any other Chinese sovereign body would discover, the
origin of many other problems is not political, but
practical. The reason for this lies in the fact that
governing 1.3 billion people on a daily routine is
difficult. Any government, feudal, democratic or
communist, will face problems, all the time.
The
"coming collapse of China" theory can be minimized if
Chinese leadership further embraces Confucian manners, a
move that has already begun. This month, Time magazine
reported: "Recently, China's leaders have even discussed
the need to reintroduce Confucianism, that most
traditional of Chinese philosophies. For decades, the
teachings of Confucius were ignored as outdated relics
of the nation's feudal past. But lately, the sage has
made a comeback. His moral maxims appear in state
newspapers, which herald him as 'the great Chinese wise
man', and elementary-school classes study his theories
on hierarchical society. Confucianism emphasizes morals
without challenging the Party ... It is the perfect
ideology to reintroduce to the Chinese people"
(time.com, "True believers", November 6, 2002).
The Chinese news media
China
craves to become a global economic political power in a
multipolar world - undermining the unipolar
political-financial-military superiority of the United
States. However, the country will fail to do so if it
neglects to pay equal attention to four sectors:
politics (domestic and international), the economy, the
military and the media (news and entertainment).
China's media industry is caught in a gray area.
On the one hand the media are owned by the state, yet at
the same time, they need to be financially profitable.
There is a massive popular demand for "real" papers and
magazines, and an equally strident demand from the
government for the state-owned media - which means all
of them, strictly speaking - to make money (19).
In today's China, people can have any opinion
they want in private conversation, but the affairs of
state are rarely discussed in the press. Only a few bold
newspapers sometimes break the rules - and may get
punished for it (20). More daring writers are willing to
report on financial and sex scandals, natural disasters,
corruption, and even lawsuits against the government
(21). Self-censorship among overseas and local Chinese
academics, foreign and domestic reporters, has increased
in recent years (22). As a negative side-effect,
fabricated reports in the media have become rampant due
to fierce competition among publications and a lack of
supervision of freelance reporters. A signed commentary
carried by the People's Daily questioned why so many
publications were willing to run unverified reports
contributed by freelancers (23).
In addition to
the national China Central Television, there are about
3,300 local TV stations across the mainland. In China,
about 1.3 billion people own about 270 million analogue
television sets. There are 90 million cable TV
subscribers, mostly in cities (24). There are, for
example, 18 newspapers in Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangzhou that have their own websites (25). Foreign
broadcasters (Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings,
Star TV, Time Warner, CETV) operating in China, mostly
in Guangdong province, are not allowed to beam their
news channels into China (26). On the other hand, the
illegal market for pirated satellite television
technology is thriving as never before, and both the
state regulator and approved foreign broadcasters are
losing business (27).
State-controlled
news
The CCP has always seen propaganda as vital
to its success. The Party rose on propaganda, and firmly
believes that power comes from controlling pens as well
as guns. That is especially true now, since today's
leaders lack confidence in their ability to maintain
control (28).
In China, the mission of
English-language publications aimed at foreigners, such
as the official China Daily, is to give an impression of
pragmatic government - that distortion can lead
foreigners to misconstrue the country (29).
State-produced articles are part of a broader effort to
portray the United States as a hegemonic enemy despite
the latter's positive contributions in investment and
aid. Some analysts argue that Beijing systematically
represents the US as an overbearing bully and a
declining military power with important vulnerabilities
that can be exploited. Others produce evidence to the
contrary, claiming that Chinese coverage of the US,
including Xinhua reports, is relatively balanced overall
(30).
Ahead of this month's 16th Party Congress,
state-run news media reported on President Jiang Zemin's
call for both Chinese and international media
communities to increase exchanges and cooperation as
part of new efforts to promote mutual understanding
among the people of all nations (31). Yet shortly
afterward, congress spokesman Ji Bingxuan stated that
the news media will continue to serve as the mouthpiece
of the Communist Party. Ji admitted that as far as the
domestic media are concerned, there will not be any
change to rules that required strict adherence to the
party line (32).
In today's global village
dominated by Anglo-American ethics, China's national
economy, political influence and media image fall far
behind those under US dominance. The examples below
elaborate on several reasons for the lack of recognition
of China's state-controlled media. The following items
provide a brief spotlight on several statistical
mistakes, unnecessary censorship and semi-censorship,
which all lead to a psychological distrust. These
examples are only the tip of the iceberg.
Example 1: The
exact contribution of the private sector to China's
national economy
Item 1: "By the end of last
year, there were more than 24 million self-run
businesses employing more than 46 million people, 2.03
million private enterprises, 110,000 non-state science
and technology enterprises and 90 million township and
village enterprises, according to official statistics.
The self-employed individual businesses and private
enterprises alone contributed 18 percent to last year's
gross domestic product (GDP) in the country." - China
Daily, "Commerce chief hails role of country's non-state
sector", November 7, 2002
Item 2: "The
country needs the private sector, which provides more
than half of its $1.2 trillion gross domestic product."
- businessweek.com, "Jailing tax cheats is just a
start", October 21, 2002
Item 3:
Privately run businesses now account for just over half
of the gross domestic product and employ 130 million
people - the lion's share of industrial workers, but
only about one-fifth the total work force." -
nytimes.com, "To be rich, Chinese and in trouble: 3
tales", October 13, 2002
Item 4: "China's
private sector provides 25 percent of GDP and is set to
boom over the next few years with greater market access
and improved financial services, the official China
Daily quoted a National Bureau of Statistics report as
saying. Some Western economists, however, estimate that
the non-state sector, including foreign firms, accounts
for 50-70 percent of China's GDP." - feer.com, "China
briefing", October 17, 2002
Item 5: "The
official China News Service (CNS) reported earlier this
week that more than 27 million people were hired by
about 2 million registered private enterprises ... CNS
estimated that around 100 million Chinese were working
in the non-state sector, which includes private and
foreign firms, joint ventures, as well as companies with
mixed ownership. - CNN, "Returning students bring hope
for China's future", October 4, 2002
Item
6: "Private business now accounts for more than
one-third of the gross domestic product and is the
engine of job creation ... China's 1.8 million private
entrepreneurs ..." - washingtonpost.com, "Chinese
capitalists gain new legitimacy", September 29, 2002
Item 7: "Consulting firm Accenture - in
Hong Kong - ... More than 2 million private firms on the
mainland employed about 27 million people last year ...
It also estimated that the private sector was
responsible for 21 percent of China's gross domestic
product, compared with 4 per cent in 1990." - South
China Morning Post, "Cut the red tape or firms stagnate,
says consultant", September 27, 2002
Item
8: "... But today, private firms account for 50-70
percent of GDP and are the main source of urgently
needed new jobs ... Private enterprises have created 12
million new jobs nationwide over the past three years.
China's 2 million or so private firms employ at least 30
million." - Yahoo, "A capitalist treads carefully in
communist China", September 22, 2002
Item
9: "It has stock markets, Starbucks, a crumbling
welfare system, and a private sector that accounts for
50-70 percent of GDP." - Yahoo, "China's Communist Party
dances to capitalist tune", September 18, 2002
Item 10: "The study also found that
China's top 500 private companies had employed 46
percent more employees last year to reach 1.23 million.
It is estimated the private sector accounts for 43
percent of GDP." - SCMP, "State body honours star
companies", August 29, 2002
Item 11: "The
private sector is estimated to employ 54 million people
and accounts for 43 percent of the economy. The number
of private companies has increased more than 19-fold
since 1990." - SCMP, "Business input sought as forum
tackles jobs crisis", August 28, 2002
Item
12: "An estimated 37 percent of China's GDP stems
from the state sector, compared with 33 percent from the
private sector. The rest is from the non-state sector,
which often disguises de facto private enterprises that
find it convenient for many practical reasons not to
register as private companies." - Asia Times Online,
China's private dilemma,
April 20, 2002
Example 2: Trade value between China and the
US in 2000
Item 1: "Trade between the US and
China grew from US$63.5 billion in 1996 to US$116
billion in 2000, according to the United States-China
Business Council." - SCMP, "ASEAN looks to China for
export growth", October 21, 2002
Item 2:
"In July 2001, in Washington, the House voted 259-169 to
back President Bush's request to continue normal trade
relations with China. The House voted to reject a
measure to overturn Bush's decision, thus allowing China
to ship its goods to the United States under the same
low tariffs enjoyed by almost all nations. Two-way trade
totaled US$100 billion in 2000, including about US$84
billion in Chinese exports to the United States and
US$16 billion in US shipments to China." - CNN,
"Congress backs normal China trade relations", July 20,
2002
Item 3: "The volume of trade between
the two countries [China and the US] reached US$124
billion last year." - China Daily, "Racehorses wait for
WTO gate to open", September 8, 2001
Example 3: Trade
value between China and the European Union
Item
1: "With billions of dollars in trade flowing
between them, the European Union's trade commissioner
met with his Chinese counterpart to discuss a 'loaded
agenda' - including a spat over both sides' banning of
exported animal and food products ... Pascal Lamy and
Shi Guangsheng, meeting at China's Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation, had no major problems of
commerce between the EU and China to discuss; trade is
now worth more than $101 billion." -
chinanewsagency.com, "EU trade commissioner visits
China", October 17, 2002
Item 2:
"China-EU trade volume reached US$77.6 billion last
year, up 15 percent from the previous year." AToL, Open
up, China tells EU, March 29, 2002
Example 4: Trade
value between China and Australia
Item 1:
"Statistics revealed the Sino-Australian trade volume
reached US$8.9 billion last year, up 6.5 percent on the
previous year ..." - China Daily, "Gas contract avails
ties with Australia", September 17, 2002
Item
2: "Last year's bilateral trade volume was US$13.6
billion, and the number is still rising." - China Daily,
"Former Australian PM praises trade and education
co-operation", July 30, 2002
Example 5: Trade value between China and
Thailand
Item 1: "According to statistics, last
year's trade volume between the two countries reached
US$7.05 billion, an increase of 6.4 percent over the
previous year. China has become Thailand's
fourth-biggest trade partner." - China Daily, "Visit
impetus for Sino-Thai relationship", September 6, 2002
Item 2: "The annual bilateral trade
volume has exceeded US$6 billion largely because China
has been one of the major importers of Thailand's
agriculture products." - China Daily, "Sino-Thai ties
promoted during leader's visit", July 23, 2002
Item 3: "Statistics indicated that
Sino-Thailand trade stood at US$7 billion last year." -
China Daily, "Thai leader praises co-op ties", July 17,
2002
Example 6:
Taiwan's total investment in the mainland
Item 1:
"China and Taiwan have been diplomatic and military
rivals since their split after a civil war ended in
1949. But that has not stopped Taiwanese businessmen
from investing up to $100 billion in China since the
late 1980s." - reuters.com, "Taiwan's envoy to APEC sees
hope for China ties", October 26, 2002
Item
2: "Taiwanese investment in China is variously
estimated at between US$50 billion and $200 billion, not
exactly pocket change for Taiwan's economy, which was
worth $281 billion (measured by nominal gross domestic
product) in 2001." - ATol, Cross-Strait
links: US muddies the waters, October 8, 2002
Item 3: "Taiwanese firms have invested
$70 billion in mainland operations since 1987." - BBC,
"China fines Taiwan firms over label row", October 2,
2002
Item 4: "Taiwan businessmen have
invested up to $100 billion in China since detente began
in the late 1980s, lured by a vast market, low
production costs and a common culture." - nytimes.com,
"US envoy to Taiwan: China not economic threat",
September 18, 2002
Item 5: "Taiwan's
government estimates that its companies have invested a
total of US$100 billion in China since the island lifted
a ban on business dealings with the mainland a decade
ago." - Yahoo, "China says Taiwan's investments jumped
by 47 percent in first half of year", September 16, 2002
Item 6: "Taiwanese companies have already
poured more than US$40 billion into the mainland." -
SCMP, "Keeping politics out of cross-Strait business",
September 5, 2002
Item 7: "Taiwan has
already invested US$29 billion (HK$225 billion) on the
mainland, and perhaps twice that much through indirect
channels. Bilateral trade was up 4.6 percent in the
first 10 months of last year and totaled US$26 billion."
- SCMP, "Beijing's tone of tolerance for Taiwan",
January 22, 2002
Item 8: "Conservative
estimates put Taiwan's overall investment in China at
US$60 billion. Many firms use loopholes to hide the
total amount they have invested." - SCMP, "Taipei to
ease restrictions on mainland investments", November 6,
2001
Item 9: "Taiwanese investments in
China have continued to rise despite tensions between
the two sides and now total an estimated US$70 billion."
- taipeitimes.com, "China slams new cross-Strait moves",
August 20, 2001
Example 7: Trade value between China and
India
Item 1: "Trade between the two countries is
expected to rise to US$4 billion this year, from US$3.6
billion last year ..." - Yahoo, "China, India in
partnership to host global trade fair", July 31, 2002
Item 2: "Bilateral trade between the two
countries continues to grow. According to recently
released figures of India's Ministry of Commerce,
India's trade with China grew by 25 percent during
2000-01, rising to $2.29 billion against $1.82 billion
in 1999-2000 with overall exports to China jumping a 53
percent during the period ..." - AToL, Indian business makes tracks for
China, July 17, 2002
Statistical mistakes
Beijing's
official statistics always promote a rosy outlook. Many
investors seem to accept these data despite strong
evidence that many of them are seriously inaccurate.
Although the overall trend of China's growth cannot be
doubted, China is often misunderstood and its growth
overstated. For example, some experts suggest that
China's electricity usage has not increased rapidly
enough to warrant the official growth rate of 7-8
percent over the last four years. What's more, many
investors have lost money in the country, and there are
pitfalls in picking even popular big-cap investments.
Much to be blamed are the misperceptions of people who
extrapolate too much from sketchy data. (33)
In
counties and districts scattered around the huge Chinese
countryside, reported figures are produced in meetings.
The local officials set the standards, a few points
lower than the reported growth rate of some rich town
nearby, but a couple of points higher than the poor
village down the road. In sum, they have to agree
roughly with the state-announced growth goal, and set
the numbers at a level at which everybody is happy. Then
everybody must be consistent. They simply do not know
what the local production is, and so they try to cover
their backsides, producing figures that won't have their
superiors going after them. (34)
Since foreign
investors rely heavily on data recorded by local
statisticians concerning market conditions, a question
arises as to whether billions of foreign invested
dollars were wisely spent on China plays. (35)
In October, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji urged
that the statistics departments across China should
speed up their reforms and improve the accuracy of their
data. Zhu made the remarks when inspecting the Chinese
National Bureau of Statistics with Vice Premier Wen
Jiabao. (35)
Censorship: Bad news is no news
Below are examples of unnecessary
censorship.
Example 1: "Mainland
authorities have been accused of trying to cover up an
accident at a rural school in Sichuan province nine days
ago which left at least one person dead and more than 30
others injured. A classroom of the Bachuan Primary
School in Suining city collapsed, an official of Suining
government said yesterday, confirming a statement
released by New York-based Human Rights in China ...
Government officials disputed Human Rights in China's
claim that five children died, saying only one child was
killed. The US group said officials had banned the
mainland media from reporting the incident." - SCMP,
"Cover-up claim over fatalities in school accident",
October 18, 2002
Example 2: "A
mountaineering tragedy that claimed the lives of five
people this summer in Tibet has not dampened interest in
Peking University's famous climbing club ... Five of
their fellow students died on August 7 in an avalanche
on Mount Shishapangma, the world's 14th-highest mountain
at 8,012 meters. A group of 15 climbers was trying to
reach the summit of the 7,292-meter western peak at the
time. State media reports after the accident blamed the
club for ignoring advice that the group should have been
accompanied by a local guide. But Ms Ma said that there
had been misleading reports in the press about the
accident, causing resentment among students." - SCMP,
"Student mountaineering club is thriving after avalanche
tragedy", October 2, 2002
Example 3:
"Lodi Gyari - who has just completed the first
diplomatic mission to China on behalf of the exiled
Tibetan spiritual leader in 20 years - said direct links
have been restored and that Beijing appeared open to the
possibility of talks on Tibetan autonomy. Mr Lodi said:
'Since I had the opportunity to meet the Chinese leaders
in Beijing in the early 1980s, what impressed us more
this time was the much greater flexibility displayed by
the current leaders.' Chinese media [were] silent on the
subject. In recent days, officials have reiterated the
government's position, condemning the Dalai Lama for
seeking outright independence for Tibet." -
independent.co.uk, "Tibetan leader resumes contact with
Beijing", October 1, 2002
Example 4: "The
Foreign Ministry has airbrushed its version of Prime
Minister Zhu Rongji's press conference on March 15 after
the annual session of the National People's Congress.
Removed entirely from the official English and Chinese
texts posted on the ministry's website are questions
from two foreign news agencies related to Zhu's
retirement plans. Zhu dodged both queries. Questions
from CNN and the French news agency AFP were edited to
remove journalists' references to the possibility of Zhu
staying on for a second term as premier. A note at the
bottom of the transcripts notes: 'Premier Zhu also took
other questions from the press.'" - feer.com, "China
briefing", April 21, 2002
Giving no
details
The excerpts below are examples of
semi-censorship, which creates a psychological distrust
toward the Chinese media as a first-hand choice of
information.
Example 1: "The local
Communist Party leaders of Beijing and Shanghai - both
key allies of President Jiang Zemin - have been moved to
posts in the party's central organization, possibly in
preparation for being promoted at a party congress next
month. Party secretaries Jia Qinglin of Beijing and
Huang Ju of Shanghai have been 'moved to positions in
the center', the official Xinhua News Agency reported
Tuesday. Xinhua did not say what positions the two men
would be given ... Xinhua said the party secretary of
the sprawling western metropolis of Chongqing, He
Guoqiang, also was being reassigned. But it did not say
what his new post would be." - nytimes.com, "2 China
leader allies get new posts", October 22, 2002
Example 2: The second-ranked officials of
Anhui province and Chongqing municipality have been
replaced in the latest reshuffles before next month's
16th Party Congress. An Anhui official confirmed
Zhejiang deputy party secretary Wang Jinshan had been
appointed as acting governor to replace Xu Zhonglin. The
official refused to give further details ..." - SCMP,
"Officials reshuffled in lead-up to congress", October
16, 2002
Example 3: "China has named a
Buddhist master from Jiangxi province as the new
chairman of its national Buddhist association. Master Yi
Cheng, 75, succeeds Zhao Puchu as chairman of the
Buddhist Association of China. Zhao, who was not a
Buddhist monk, headed the association for two decades
until his death two years ago aged 93. Master Yi Cheng
has been the abbot of Baofeng Monastery at Shimen
Mountain since 1999. The monastery is regarded as one of
China's top Buddhist sites. Zhao was also a vice
chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC). The agency did not say if Master Yi
Cheng would succeed his position on the advisory body."
- China Daily, "Buddhist master to head association",
September 23, 2002
Example 4: "The first
news of the Tibetans' trip came in a September 9
statement from the Tibetan government-in-exile in India.
At scheduled press briefings thereafter, Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman Kong Quan would only say that 'some
Tibetan compatriots' were visiting China in a private
capacity, and he had no details. All questions and
answers about the envoys were edited out of transcripts
of the briefings on the ministry's website. At a
briefing a day after a senior Tibet official told
foreign journalists in Lhasa that he had met the envoys,
Kong declined to describe them as such. He acknowledged
'relevant leaders' had briefed them, but said their trip
was for 'sightseeing and visits to relatives and
friends'. He still declined to call them 'envoys'." -
feer.com, "China briefing", September 26, 2002
Example 5: "Beijing's top representative
in Hong Kong is leaving his post and will be succeeded
by his deputy, a Hong Kong government statement said. It
did not say when Jiang Enzhu, director of Beijing's
Liaison Office in Hong Kong, will be departing the
territory. No reasons were given for his departure.
Jiang, 63, will be succeeded by his deputy Gao Siren,
the statement said. Jiang, a former Chinese ambassador
to Britain, was appointed to China's Xinhua News Agency
in Hong Kong in 1997, shortly after the return of this
British colony to Chinese sovereignty." - nytimes.com,
"Beijing's top rep leaving Hong Kong", August 21, 2002
Example 6: "China's military is planning
exercises in mid-August aimed at Taiwan. Involving land,
sea and air forces, they will be held in Fujian and
Zhejiang provinces, which face Taiwan across the Taiwan
Strait, and in part of the province of Guangdong. 'The
strategic target of the exercises is Taiwan Island,' the
China Daily newspaper said, citing unidentified
'military insiders' ... The report didn't say how many
would take part this year but said they would practice
simulated attacks and landings. It didn't mention recent
comments by Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian. Mainland
leaders have refused to talk to Mr Chen since he warned
last week if they didn't work with him, the island would
walk down its 'own Taiwanese road'. -
heraldsun.news.com.au, "China to flex its muscles",
August 5, 2002
Example 7: "China said it
was in talks with the British Broadcasting Corp over its
axed satellite signal, adding that restoring
transmission would depend on the media company's
'reaction'. Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said
on Thursday the BBC had 'violated an agreement' with
China International TV Corp (CITV), but gave no details
of that agreement." - Yahoo, "BBC, China in talks to
resume satellite broadcasts", July 11, 2002
Example 8: "A follower of the Falungong
in northeastern China has been sentenced to death for
strangling a daughter she believed was possessed by a
demon, a state-controlled newspaper reported Friday.
Guan Shuyun was convicted in Heilongjiang province of
murder and other charges related to her alleged
involvement with the banned spiritual movement. The
court granted her a two-year reprieve before the
sentence is to be carried out, the Legal Daily reported.
The newspaper said 31 other Falungong practitioners were
also sentenced but didn't give details ..." -
nytimes.com, "Falun Gong member gets death penalty",
October 18, 2002
Example 9: "Chinese
authorities have exposed 10,000 phony police officers
over the last five years, the Beijing Morning Post
reported. It did not give details of what the fake
officers did, but police in China wield wide, often
unchecked powers, are feared by many citizens and are
often accused of corruption." - itechnology.co.za,
"Chinese cops bust 10,000 imposters", June 22, 2002
Sources
1. Asia Times Online,
Risky business: Exporting the American
dream, March 15,
2002
2. China Daily, "Asian media must seek larger
role", April 15, 2002
3. AToL, "Another China", September
7, 2001. This e-book by Francesco
Sisci is available in PDF format.
4. ATol, Beijing's fatal flaw, March 30, 2002
5. AToL, Chen ups the ante,
August 7, 2002
6. AToL, Beijing's fatal flaw, March 30, 2002
7. AToL, "Another China",
September 20, 2001
8. AToL, Beijing's hawks down but not
out, March 19, 2002
9.
South China Morning Post, "Fig leaf diplomacy", March
25, 2002
10. AToL, Hu steps up but Jiang stays on
top, November 16,
2002
11. British Broadcasting Corp, "Timeline:
China", May 5, 2002
12. Cable News Network, "Secret
paper shows China 'rift' over Tiananmen", April 24,
2001
13. SCMP, "Crackdown on corrupt cadres hailed as
big success", October 15, 2002
14. ncmonline.com,
"China replaces Russia as America's global partner",
November 2, 2002
15. AToL, The awakened giant,
October 31, 2002
16. time.com, "Let one hundred
cultures bloom", November 6, 2002
17. iht.com, "China
stumbles toward a crisis", November 8, 2002
18. AToL,
"Another China", June 2, 2001
19. SCMP, "Mainland's
media opens up, but not without risk", September 30,
2002
20. guardian.co.uk, "Journalists hit the limits
of China's reforms", November 4, 2002
21.
newsmax.com, "China's Communists clamping down on
defiant media", September 16, 2002
22. SCMP,
"Scholars' arrest 'causing more self-censorship'", June
29, 2002
23. SCMP, "Fabricated reports rampant, says
paper", April 22, 2002
24. thestandard.com.hk,
"Guangdong leads in digital TV provision", September 22,
2002
25. AToL, Newspaper industry presses ahead, July 3, 2002
26. SCMP, "China licence delay
cited for Phoenix woes", September 5, 2002
27.
feer.com, "Very remote control", August 30, 2002
28.
newsmax.com, "China's Communists clamping down on
defiant media", September 16, 2002
29. feer.com,
"Appearances can deceive", December 13, 2001
30.
SCMP, "US study on mainland media tells two stories",
July 18, 2002
31. xinhuanet.com, "Chinese president
calls for more global media exchanges", November 6,
2002
32. SCMP, "Hopes are dashed for easing of media
grip", November 8, 2002
33. CNN, "China growth myths
dispelled", October 30, 2002
34. AToL, China's
numbers game, May 3, 2002
35. scmp.com, "Rosy
economy beggars belief", June 19, 2002
36.
xinhuanet.com, "Chinese premier urges more accurate
statistics nationwide", October 28, 2002
(©2002
Ram Gorni, Chinawn.com (China World News). All rights
reserved.)
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