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US-China-Taiwan: Missile diplomacy
By Macabe Keliher
TAIPEI -
Under the warm Texas sun on October 25, with the smell
of sagebrush blowing over Crawford's dirt roads, one
president proposed to another: If China "froze" its
missile deployment along the Fujian coast, would the
United States reduce weapons sales to Taiwan? As
tantalizing a question as it was, Chinese President
Jiang Zemin and US President George W Bush "only touched
on the issue and did not continue to discuss it
further", according to Chen Chien-jen, Taiwan's top
representative in the United States.
Although
the presidential proposition ceased at Bush's ranch, the
memos have continued to fly around China, testing the
currents as usually happens before a major policy
change. China is considering lowering the military
threat against Taiwan, its "renegade province" just 150
kilometers off the Fujian coast. Of the 400 short-range
ballistic missiles aimed at the island, China may
"freeze" further deployment, or "reduce" or "move
inland" the M-11s. Although such an act would not leave
Taiwan out of harm's way, or even amount to Beijing
backing down on the use of force, it would give the
international community a sign that Beijing is finally
acting like a responsible country in the family of
nations and is sincere about stability. But more than
that, it would mark a significant change in Beijing's
Taiwan policy, moving from the longtime position of
using military deterrence against independence, to
expressing goodwill and encouraging the island to unite
under the Beijing government.
In fact, this
shift has been a few years in the making. When Taiwan's
current president Chen Shui-bian was elected on a
pro-independence ticket in March 2000, the Beijing
leadership had to come to terms with the failure of its
military-driven policy of threatening Taiwan against
embracing independence. The missiles, it seems, were not
working. Since then Beijing has failed to threaten
Taiwan verbally with the "fires of war", as was once
customary, and has continuously downplayed its refusal
to relinquish the use of force. The biggest change came
in September at the United Nations, where China's
representative laid out the "new definition" of the "one
China" policy in which both Taiwan and the mainland are
part of China. (The previous definition was that Taiwan
is a part of China.) Subtle, perhaps, but a clear
softening, especially considering that President Chen
had just made his remark about "one country on either
side".
Toning down the direct military threat to
the island would be a logical next step for Beijing.
Missiles have only brought the condemnation of the
international community and driven Taiwan and the US
closer together. In fact, many in Taipei say that
relinquishing the threat of force would be an extremely
smart move on China's part. "It would be the best thing
Beijing could do. It would bifurcate Taiwan's politics,
undercut Taipei's China policy, and raise China's status
on the international stage," says former Taiwanese
diplomat Chang Yachung.
Indeed, from restricting
direct travel and communication links with China, to
spending a huge portion of its budget on defense, Taipei
has geared itself for war with China. How would it
handle the prospect of peace? Beijing may not be far off
the mark when it says Taiwan will not drift toward
independence. In Taiwan, pro-unification political
parties still remain a force, diplomatic allies are
dwindling, and even the once pro-independence ruling
Democratic Progressive Party has removed the
independence clause from its party constitution. As
China's Vice Premier Qian Qichen said recently in an
interview in Study Times, "Taiwan independence is not
popular on the island and is extremely isolated
internationally."
Even so, would Beijing take
such a step without some sort of commitment from the
United States to reduce, if not cease altogether, arms
sales to Taiwan? Although Jiang Zemin has promoted 64 of
the 81 senior generals in the People's Liberation Army,
and does seem to have them well under his control, the
military has an interest in maintaining the use of force
against Taiwan. It also holds that throughout history,
unification has never been achieved without a battle,
and that the ultimate solution must be military in
nature. It is largely believed that the PLA and other
hawks would need some type of concession to jump on
board.
But would the US bite? It would certainly
welcome such a step towards peace and stabilization in
the Taiwan Strait, but to reciprocate that with reduced
weapon sales puts it in a bind as it must uphold its
"Six Assurances" to Taiwan, the third of which states
that "the United States would not consult with China in
advance before making decisions about US arms sales to
Taiwan". The State Department has emphasized this legal
brief, and as a Bush administration official told Chen
Chien-jen, "I don’t think you are that naive, and
neither are we," referring to the possibility of the US
cutting arms sales to Taiwan.
Of course, with
Taiwan buying US$8.54 billion in weapons a year there is
also a strong interest to keep supplying. But without
the immediate threat of missile bombardment, the
congress might hesitate to give Taiwan such big
packages, and could even cancel sales of missile
protection systems like the AEGIS. In fact, Taiwan’s
China Times Daily recently quoted unnamed Pentagon
sources saying they may reconsider these systems.
Furthermore, with Taipei running a budget deficit it
would not be unreasonable for it to scale back defense
procurements.
Given such a scenario, China
watchers say that China's new leader, Hu Jintao, could
make the announcement in late January when he presides
over the anniversary of Jiang's Eight Points on the
reunification of Taiwan. The problem for Taipei,
however, is that it does not point to Beijing renouncing
the use of force. As quickly as missiles on the coast
get reduced, they can as easily be redeployed. And even
so, Beijing still has a full arsenal to attack with by
air and by sea, if not the least with its Hongniao 2 and
3 cruise missiles offering ranges of 2,000 and 3,000
kilometers respectively. "It's a nice diplomatic
gesture," says Lin Chung-pin, senior advisor on Taiwan's
National Security Council, "but we would like to remind
them to resume talks. This would do more for
confidence-building."
(©2002 Asia Times Online
Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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