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North Korea: Alone again, naturally
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING -
Once upon a time, when they fought the common enemy of
imperialism and when the son of the supreme leader Mao
Zedong, along with a million of his countrymen, died
defending that land, their ties were officially reported
to be as like "lips and teeth" - one would die without
the other. Now the reality is very different, and
although the official rhetoric has not changed, as South
Koreans elect a new president China and North Korea are
facing a moment of truth in their relationship - so much
so that just as in the 1950s Beijing decided to wage war
for the defense of Pyongyang rather than for the
conquest of Taipei, the greatest tension in the region
is with North Korea and not with Taiwan.
The
Sino-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)
alliance has been sliding for months, just as the new
policy of moderate liberalization of North Korea has
gained momentum and appears indispensable for the proud
North. The first massive contrasts came with the railway
line. China, South Korea and Japan favored a track that
moved to China's northeast after going through North
Korea. Pyongyang and Moscow preferred a track moving
directly to Vladivostok and skipping China altogether.
For a link with the South, Pyongyang wanted the line to
go through a deserted mountain pass in the middle of the
peninsula, while South Korea wanted simply to renovate
the old line going through Seoul. In other words the
North wished to use the railway to hook up with Japan
and Russia while minimizing contacts with the South and
China. Russia and Japan were farther away and their
contagious politics was easier to cure and prevent than
the political infection coming from neighboring China
and South Korea.
On these points Pyongyang's
concern was understandable. The stability of the North
was important for China and the South, both unwilling to
see the sudden collapse of North Korea and being then
confronted with the drama of 22 million starving North
Koreans to feed for decades. Then relations turned
really sour a few months ago on the issue of a special
economic zone in North Korea. The SEZ had been strongly
favored by China as it explained to the DPRK that SEZs
had been the first trigger of Chinese economic
development. Yet its location was crucial. China and the
South pushed for the choice of an area between the two
Koreas, so as to siphon in capital from South Korea and
ease the future reintegration of the peninsula.
North Korea, however, favored an area on the
border with China, something bitterly rejected by
Beijing. China feared that an SEZ at the North Korean
border would attract Chinese capital away from the old
industrial belt of its northeast, badly in need of
financial support to relaunch its factories.
Furthermore, the DPRK had been spinning up the rhetoric
about the union of all Koreans, thus opening the old
wound of the 2 million to 3 million ethnic Koreans
living in Chinese territory and holding Chinese
passports. In other words, in Beijing's eyes an SEZ on
the North Korean border could kindle all kinds of
troubles, both economic and ethnic, something that
Beijing would hate to see.
To Pyongyang,
however, it seemed that Chinese capital had fewer
strings attached than South Korean capital. China would
never seriously think of "conquering" North Korea, while
patriotism among Chinese-Koreans could be stirred up to
Pyongyang's advantage, and the 100,000 North Korean
refugees in China could be brought back under
Pyongyang's umbrella. This last had been a major
irritant for Pyongyang, which had been pressing Beijing
for their return, but Beijing had turned down the
request out of humanitarian reasons and broader
political considerations. China doesn't want to look
like an accomplice in an infamous repression of poor and
hungry people, and it thinks that helping out refugees
who can make their living in China and maybe smuggle
some money back to North Korea can actually help the
DPRK.
For all of these reasons, Beijing answered
in the negative when Pyongyang approached it on the
project of an SEZ headed by Chinese businessman Yang Bin
to be established on the border. Beijing did not explain
too much, tried to keep things low-key, and it came out
with the line that Yang Bin was not too clean and the
idea had some economic problems.
But it was very
clear that Yang Bin was not the real issue - Beijing did
not want Pyongyang to proceed with the SEZ. Pyongyang
did not see, or decided not to see, the reality behind
Beijing's words and took them at face value. It
undertook to give Yang Bin a North Korean passport and
restarted the process of SEZ, thinking that local
authorities in Shenyang, Yang Bin's Chinese base, would
work against Beijing. These moves further irritated
Beijing, especially the latter. Shenyang authorities had
to be completely purged in late 2000 after they were
found to be in business with local and international
crime syndicates. In a way North Korea, rather than
backing down, was spinning further trouble within
China's territory, pitting local Shenyang authorities
against Beijing central authorities. Things were too
serious and Beijing had to send a very clear message
despite risking some general embarrassment: it arrested
Yang Bin, who held a Dutch passport along with a Chinese
one. The official reason was tax fraud.
The
North Koreans then sent a vice minister to Beijing
trying to sort things out and seeking Yang's liberation,
but the trip was a failure, although Yang's life was
guaranteed. That was the end of the matter for Beijing,
but not for Pyongyang, which was faced with the usual
pressing problem - lack of cash.
Next: A blot on the map
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