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China's quiet
revolution
By Yu Bin
Pacific Forum CSIS
China's
National People's Congress began its annual
deliberations last week. The meeting marks the debut of
the fourth generation of leaders led by Hu Jintao -
appointed Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary
general last year - who are posed to steer China toward
a different mode of politics.
From 'rule of
man' to 'rule of law'
Contrary to conventional
wisdom in the West that Hu remains a "who" in the shadow
of Jiang Zemin, the new party secretary has clearly
emerged with both new style and new policies.
In
a highly publicized first Politburo "collective study
session" last December 26, Hu focused on the rule of law
(fa zhi) and the role of the constitution.
Although Jiang has not yet completely faded away, the
emphasis on the rule of law and collective leadership
indicates an unambiguous sign by the younger generation
of leaders of their willingness to depart from the rule
of man (ren zhi).
Hu's "new deal" is by
no means a mere public-relations effort, but is born of
deep concerns about widespread corruption, declining
ethical standards, and political irresponsibility. Some
of these problems are caused by a perceived "alliance"
among the political, economic and, to a lesser degree,
intellectual elites. The rule of law and democratic
mechanisms are considered crucial for balancing the
near-monopolization of resources by this alliance, and
is therefore crucial for the survival of the CCP and the
stability of Chinese society.
Unleash the
press
Real and effective rule of law and
democracy, though a desirable goal for many in China,
may not come soon. Hu and his colleagues have thus
turned to promoting a bigger "public space" with freer
media to check sociopolitical "evils".
Many
Western observers were surprised when a cinema version
of George Orwell's Animal Farm started showing in
Beijing last November 15, one day before the closing of
the CCP's 16th Party Congress. This "accident" was the
beginning of a gradual but consistent effort of the new
guard to liberalize the media and cultural "space".
Since early this year, top Chinese leaders have
urged the media to reflect not only the Party's line,
but also the opinion of ordinary people. The official
People's Daily newspaper insisted last month that
China's media should practice the "three closenesses":
close to reality, close to the masses, and close to real
life. Meanwhile, the government promises, in line with
World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements, to grant
foreign media more access to China's market.
Even the death penalty is being actively debated
among China's legal experts, human-rights scholars, and
media outlets. In a conference early this year sponsored
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the consensus
was to push toward the elimination of the inhumane
practice in China in order to join the worldwide trend
toward ending the death penalty.
A 'kinder
and gentler' reformer
Despite decades of steady
economic growth, Hu's China has become one of the most
inegalitarian nations in the world. The new leadership
is determined to address this issue. Since late last
year, Hu and others made several highly publicized trips
to some of the poorest parts of China. In his New Year's
speech, Hu stressed that the CCP should be modest,
pragmatic, honest and hard-working, and should really
serve the people. Topping Hu's agenda is reducing the
burden on farmers, promoting self-governance in rural
areas, cutting bureaucracies at all levels, and granting
legal and equal status for migrant workers in cities.
In mid-February, Hu went so far as to unveil his
own "three people principles" (power for, sympathy with,
and benefit for the people). Jiang Zemin's theory of
"three represents" (meaning the CCP represents the most
productive parts of Chinese society) remains part of
Hu's vocabulary, but Hu's softer and gentler public
policy provides an unambiguous contrast with Jiang's
merit-based and market-driven elitist approach.
Foreign policy 'new thinking': Be big and
nice
The extent to which these moderate and
liberal domestic policies will affect China's
foreign/defense outlook remains to be seen. The
publication of China's third Defense White Paper in
December, however, does indicate a more moderate threat
perception and strategic calculus regarding regional
security and relations with other countries. One marked
feature of the white paper is that it does not even
mention nor make strong implications about the United
States and its foreign policy.
The thorny Taiwan
issue is soft-pedaled, even if the Pentagon continues to
push for more military integration with Taiwan. Last
November, Beijing even raised the prospect of developing
normal and cooperative relations with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. Despite philosophical differences
with the US regarding Iraq, China has chosen to echo the
French, German, and Russian initiatives rather than take
the lead.
There is no question that Jiang's
influence on China's defense and foreign policies will
continue into the next few years as the winds of war
blow strong both far away (Iraq) and at China's doorstep
(Korea). Hu has, as vice chairman of the Central
Military Commission since 1999, been involved in the
formulation of China's defense policy.
Meanwhile, China continues to construct the
so-called rings of "political friendliness", "economic
cooperation" and "military exchange" around its
periphery. Last year, Beijing and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations signed two landmark agreements
on free trade and a Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea.
The consensus among foreign-policy makers
is that a low-profile, reactive, and cooperative foreign
policy is conducive to China's long-term goals of peace,
stability, and development. Like the Yao Ming
phenomenon, a big, rising China can, and should, be nice
to others in the brave new world of preemption.
Hu and the 'made in China'
generation
As Hu ascends, the world's most
populous country is finally coming under the tutelage of
the "boomers", just like the two former
political-military powers of the Cold War. Unlike their
US and Russian counterparts, who have both encountered
difficulties and crises and appear eager to secure their
place in history with bold domestic and foreign
policies, the fourth generation of Chinese leaders has
demonstrated little charisma or desire to be great.
Indeed, the era of strong leaders ended when
Deng Xiaoping died in 1997. To a certain degree, China
under the third generation of leaders seems to have done
better without those movers and shakers of history. As
the helm passes to a nameless fourth generation, it
seems inevitable that the rise of China will go hand in
hand with the invisibility of its leaders.
Aside
from charisma, or the lack of it, a key feature of Hu's
generation is their "indigenous" background. To a large
extent, leaders from Mao Zedong's and Deng's generation
started their career with experience in the West. The
outgoing generation of leaders is the last one that was
"made in Russia" (or the Soviet Union, to be precise),
though they were not necessarily pro-Russia. Their
departure from China's political scene marks the end of
a nearly century-old "Russian complex" in China.
This new generation of elite has been largely
"indigenously" produced. They can neither sing "Moscow
Night" in Russian nor converse fluently in English.
Their minds have been largely shaped by the decades
during which China has been reforming itself away from
the Soviet model, but they are not necessarily embracing
America's liberal democracy. In a sense, China under
Hu's generation may well become more Chinese.
This fourth generation of leaders shares a
political background and personal experiences that
occurred against the backdrop of the traumatic Cultural
Revolution. This may suggest that they would prefer a
more open-ended, less ideological attitude toward both
domestic and foreign policies. Less devoted to any "ism"
and with greater technological/intellectual abilities to
"fix" problems, Hu's generation may not produce great
thinkers or statesman. Nor will they make huge mistakes
as did Mao. Their pragmatic and moderate opinions in
international and domestic affairs does not mean that
they will go to any length to compromise (such as
letting Taiwan go). Their willingness to maintain and
achieve peace and stability, however, should not be
questioned.
Yu Bin is an associate
professor of political science at Wittenberg University,
Springfield, Ohio, and senior research associate with
the Shanghai Institute of American Studies. He is also a
regular contributor to Comparative Connections, and
co-author of Mao's Generals Remember Korea
(University Press of Kansas, 2001). He can be reached
at byu@wittenberg.edu.
This article is used by
permission of Pacific Forum CSIS.
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